Regular Soldiers, Irregular War

Violence and Restraint in the Second Intifada

Devorah S. Manekin

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Abbreviations

ACRI	Association for Civil Rights in Israel
BTS	Breaking the Silence
DCO	District Coordination Offices
EV	entrepreneurial violence
GSS	General Security Services (Shin Bet)
HCJ	High Court of Justice
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IED	improvised explosive device
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
MAG	Military Advocate General
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
OV	opportunistic violence
PA	Palestinian Authority
SDG	Serbian Volunteer Guard
SV	strategic violence

Note on Translations and Pseudonyms

I conducted all of the interviews and surveys with Israeli participants in Hebrew and have used many Hebrew sources. All translations are my own.

I identify all study participants by pseudonyms to protect their identity. I have named individuals only when relying on publicly available sources that previously published their names.

Introduction

THE PRODUCTION AND RESTRAINT OF MILITARY VIOLENCE

Everyone tells you . . . "You did what you had to do." And I just hate that comment, "You did what you had to do." Because I didn't have to do any of it. . . . That's the hardest thing to deal with . . . . I didn't have to do shit.

Sergeant Brendan O'Byrne, *Korengal*, Dir. Sebastian Junger (2014)

On March 23, 2009, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) military prosecutors charged an infantry officer and his deputy with hitting and shaking Palestinian civilians in the course of questioning during an operation in the West Bank village of Qadum. A soldier who witnessed the events had alerted military investigators, and the case was eventually brought to trial. While similar cases had gone unnoticed in the past, this one received widespread publicity. The reason for the media attention was that the officer's battalion and brigade commanders, both respected military figures, testified on his behalf, arguing that the use of physical force could be a legitimate exercise of military discretion. In a highly unusual move, then-Chief of Central Command Gadi Shamni, one of the IDF's most senior generals, was summoned to testify. Shamni stated emphatically that beating was not a legitimate military action. The brigade commander was reprimanded for suggesting otherwise, and some months later, the accused officer was convicted of aggravated assault and conduct unbecoming an officer.[1] The trial made headlines in Israel, and former combatants I interviewed often commented on it. One former infantryman wryly recalled how he and his fellow soldiers used to joke that, in the army, you could shoot but you couldn't hit: "If you take out your gun and shoot someone because he threatened you, that's fine. He'll die and that's great. But hit him with a rifle butt? That's strictly forbidden."

This seeming paradox, in which soldiers treat more deadly violence as more legitimate, is not unique to Israeli soldiers. Five years earlier, in Samarra, Iraq, a team of U.S. army investigators began investigating allegations that a number of American soldiers had forced two Iraqis caught outside after curfew to jump from

a bridge into the Tigris River.[2] One of the men survived, and a second body was found several weeks later, though investigators were unable to conclusively prove that it was the man who had been forced into the water. It later surfaced that the soldiers' brigade commander, a decorated officer, had instructed his men not to disclose the incident. As a result of this cover-up the officer was reprimanded, and his military career came to an abrupt end. In a newspaper interview he commented on the irony of the situation: "You know what's strange? Two Iraqis out after curfew, in a town like Samarra? They could have killed those guys, and they would have gotten medals" (qtd. in Filkins 2008, 165).

Although the contexts of these cases differ, the parallels between them are striking. Both took place in the course of irregular warfare, in which soldiers faced insurgents in civilian areas, rather than enemy soldiers on a conventional battlefield. In both cases, soldiers participated in violence against civilians, despite being aware, as subsequent attempts to cover up the incidents show, that the violence was problematic at the very least. In both cases, not all the soldiers participated. In the first instance, one of the soldiers who witnessed the events reported them, ultimately leading to an investigation and trial; in the second, one soldier present refused to push the men into the river and was allowed by his commander to stay behind.

The reactions to the events are also remarkably similar. In both cases, the soldiers were fully aware that not all violence is created equal and that, while sometimes violence is legitimate and even praiseworthy, at other times it is a punishable offense. The judgment that soldiers made about when violence is appropriate is surprising, however. It cannot be explained by their perception of threat, because in both cases, they were not in active combat situations and the victims were unarmed. Nor can the severity of the violence explain the distinction. In both cases, soldiers understood their actions, which had been nonlethal in intent, as somehow less legitimate than lethal force would have been.

The incidents, and the soldiers' counterintuitive reactions to them, raise several questions: What explains differences in soldier participation in violence during irregular war? Why do soldiers sometimes inflict violence eagerly, but at other times evade or resist using force? Why are some forms of violence readily adopted, while others are deemed excessive or inappropriate? More generally, through what processes do soldiers come to accept violence as legitimate, and what are the limits of these processes? How do ordinary men become professional wielders of force, and when does this transformation falter or fail? These are the questions this book seeks to answer.

A growing literature in political science has sought to understand why violence against civilians varies across conflicts and within them, examining the incentives and constraints that produce patterns of violence and restraint in

conflict.[3] This literature generally focuses on variation among armed groups, rather than on patterns of participation *within* these groups, and therefore does not directly address the questions I pose here. Individual participation in violence has been explored primarily by social psychologists, who have long sought to uncover the individual and social factors that drive ordinary people to overcome normative boundaries and commit violent acts against others.[4] Yet though many of the factors they study are present in the military as well, the military context is also unique in important ways. Unlike the civilians on whom much of this research has focused, soldiers are not transgressing societal norms by acting violently, but rather are carrying out the role society intended for them. By definition, the military controls aggression, legitimating it insofar as it is conducted on behalf of the state. Rather than simply unleashing unrestrained violence, then, the military engages soldiers from the very beginning in creating distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate violent behavior. This organizational context, I argue, powerfully shapes patterns of individual participation in violence.

This book draws on a detailed case study of the IDF's repression of the Palestinian insurgency of 2000–5, known as the Second Intifada, to explain the production and restraint of violence in the modern Western military. The Second Intifada, known also as the Al-Aqsa Intifada after the site where violence first broke out, was one of the bloodier episodes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, killing more than 3,300 Palestinians and over 1,300 Israelis in five years.[5] Casualty statistics only partially reflect, however, the extent of suffering endured by parties to the conflict. In the course of repression of the insurgency, Palestinian civilians experienced a steep increase in Israeli military regimentation and control, leading to the loss of freedom of movement, widespread destruction of property, an ongoing threat of detention and arrest, and physical and verbal harassment at sites of friction with the Israeli military. Israeli civilians suffered a major blow to their sense of personal security, with cafes, buses, and shopping malls becoming sites of deadly terror attacks.

The Second Intifada was ultimately repressed by Israel's security forces. The bulk of this effort was carried out by IDF ground troops, who in those years were deployed almost exclusively in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) of the West Bank and Gaza to quell the insurgency.[6] As is often the case in counterinsurgency and occupation, the Second Intifada brought Israeli soldiers into close contact with Palestinian civilians—at checkpoints, roadblocks, streets, and homes—with much greater frequency and intensity than in the previous decade. This contact created countless opportunities for combatants to inflict harm on individuals and their property. Nevertheless, participation in violence varied across individual combatants and their units.

Sometimes, variation existed in the behavior of the very same combatants, who were eager to commit violence under some circumstances but averse to using force in others. A tank commander I interviewed reported participating enthusiastically in firing in crowded urban areas during Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF's reoccupation of the West Bank's major cities in 2002. Yet when ordered several months later to enforce the closure of the city of Nablus, he found it increasingly difficult to carry out his orders and ultimately defied them. A former Special Forces soldier recalled that members of his unit participated wholeheartedly in the destruction of property during cordon and search missions but would never take any such property for themselves. And an infantry soldier described many incidents of civilian harassment and mistreatment, but also several episodes in which he and his peers evaded their missions altogether, preferring to sneak away out of sight. As in the cases described earlier, variation in participation here cannot be explained by the severity of the violence, as demonstrated in the tank commander's account of eager participation in potentially lethal force but defiance of much less damaging orders to restrict movement. Nor are they linked to a linear process of brutalization, as evidenced by the commando soldier's ability to clearly distinguish between various forms of harm to property or the infantry soldier's occasional dodging of missions. What, then, explains these patterns? To gain insight into these questions, I turn to the micro-level, analyzing the behavior of individual soldiers and small combat units.

The Argument: Social Control and the Production and Restraint of Military Violence

To understand the dynamics of soldier participation in violence, the organizational context is crucial. Soldiers differ from mere thugs in that their violence is, at least in principle, controlled and directed at organizational goals. They differ from rebels, who may also be organized, in that the state authorizes and legitimates their behavior. Soldier participation, then, is actively produced and legitimated by the military organization in accordance with its strategic objectives. These objectives vary from military to military and from conflict to conflict, reflecting differing ideologies, incentives, cultures, and constraints. They may call for expansive violence or for restraint, for indiscriminate or selective targeting, for comprehensive operations or for limited ones. But regardless of which policies are chosen at the top, combat soldiers must be induced to carry them out.

The core argument of this book is that participation in counterinsurgent violence is best explained by the effectiveness of the mechanisms that induce soldiers to commit violence on behalf of the military, which I refer to as mechanisms of organizational control.[7] Organizational control mechanisms are broadly defined as any process that aims to motivate and direct members to act in ways that are consistent with and advance organizational objectives.[8] While some of these mechanisms are formal, such as rules, discipline, and sanctioning, I show that the most powerful control mechanisms are *social* and include such tools as socialization, persuasion, leadership, and the creation of a shared identity and culture.[9] A former infantry officer I interviewed described the power of such control:

> The approach in the beginning is to take apart the soldiers and start with them from zero . . . wipe out the soldier's personality when he's young, just wipe it out, because some people arrived [poorly] from home and others were raised well. Some people were raised badly at home, they come with lousy ethics so what does [the army] do? They mix them all up, slap everyone around, bring them down to the ground and *yalla*—start from zero.[10]

Organizational control shapes participation in two phases, each associated with a distinct mechanism. First, in the training phase, control exercised primarily through military socialization instills in combatants a set of norms that construct organizationally useful violence as appropriate and valuable, and organizationally useless violence as illegitimate. This normalization of organizationally useful violence is achieved through a variety of neutralization techniques that defuse violence of any previously held negative meanings insofar as it serves military objectives and reconstruct it as valuable and desirable. Reframed in this way, violence that serves military needs is deemed appropriate and, in fact, is not typically understood as violence at all but as combat, security, or protection. This process of normalization of organizationally sanctioned violence is important in shaping baseline participation patterns, because participation is always far greater in normative behavior than in deviant behavior, and the processes that produce each differ in important ways.

In the deployment phase, however, the boundaries established in training can erode due to the strains of ongoing military activity, leading to a rise in soldier deviation from organizational preferences, whether through underproduction of sanctioned violence, overproduction of unsanctioned violence, or the development of new violent practices with uncertain organizational utility. In this phase the task of control falls primarily to small-unit commanders, who are charged with reinforcing military norms regarding the use of force. The extent to which they are successful in doing so further shapes patterns of participation in violence.

A Typology of Violence

This discussion suggests that soldier participation in violence hinges on whether such violence serves organizational goals. But how are individual soldiers to make such a determination? Two factors, I argue, shape whether soldiers perceive violence to be organizationally useful or not: The first is who **initiates** the violence. Militaries are hierarchical organizations, operating according to directives communicated from generals down the chain of command to the rank and file. Organizationally sanctioned violence flows from top to bottom in such forms as doctrine, operating procedures, orders, and commands. When the upper military echelons dictate violence in this official way, it is almost by definition intended to benefit the military organization.[11]

The second factor is who **benefits** from violence. The military employs violence to advance particular strategic goals. Violence that is employed in the service of other ends, such as for personal profit or to relieve peer pressure, can distract from and even undermine military objectives. Soldiers are generally aware of organizational objectives because of their intensive training and ongoing orders, briefings, and missions once deployed. They are thus typically able to broadly discern whether a particular act of violence is committed to advance the goals of the military organization or for other, nonorganizational ends.

The interaction of these two factors produces four analytically distinct categories of violence, summarized in table I.1, each of which is associated with different participation patterns.

I define *strategic violence* as violence that soldiers commit in accordance with orders from their superiors and is designed to advance organizational goals.[12] From a soldier's perspective, violence is strategic when clear, explicit directives exist, backed by the military chain of command. This means that participation in an authorized *tactic* is defined as strategic violence, regardless of the precise content of high-level goals. I argue that baseline patterns of participation in such violence should be high, given the vast institutional means allocated to training and socialization in modern Western militaries. Such violence is likely to take

TABLE I.1. Military violence in conflict

	INITIATOR	
BENEFICIARY	**LEADERSHIP**	**RANK AND FILE**
Organization	Strategic violence	Entrepreneurial violence
Individual	Corruption / senior misconduct	Opportunistic violence

forms familiar to soldiers everywhere: lethal violence, the destruction of property, and the conquest of space. Its targets, most obviously, are enemy combatants, whether of the irregular or regular variety.

Opportunistic violence, in contrast, is violence that soldiers initiate to advance their own interests, impulses, or social standing. Forms associated with such violence can include looting for personal benefit or abuse for individual gratification or social posturing. Targets of such violence include enemy combatants (when violence exceeds or contravenes that mandated by the military organization), as well as unconnected civilians, whose abuse serves no military purpose.

These two categories do not, however, exhaust the types of violence produced within the military organization. In some cases, directives from above are ambiguous or absent, and members of the rank and file fill the gap by devising violent practices of their own that, in their perception, advance military aims. Forms of violence associated with this category can include unauthorized abuse to extract potentially useful information or various punishments devised to deter insurgent activity. Targets are typically individuals whom soldiers see as contributing to the insurgency, whether because they are suspected insurgents themselves or because they aid or support them. Building on a large literature on entrepreneurship within organizations, I term this category *entrepreneurial violence*.

Finally, in some cases, members of the elite initiate violence to advance their own ends. This category encompasses cases of violence committed by military elites for personal enrichment (such as elite graft or theft) or enjoyment. Because this book focuses on ordinary soldiers rather than generals, I exclude this last category from the analysis.

To emphasize, this typology makes no claims as to which type of violence is more or less harmful to its victims. Violence in any category can be expansive or limited, targeted narrowly or broadly. Rather, these distinctions reflect how combat soldiers *perceive* violence, thereby shedding light on patterns of participation. To be sure, because they rely on perceptions, these distinctions are not always clear-cut in practice, especially in the absence of clear, detailed orders requiring or forbidding certain behaviors. Yet the distinctions are not completely subjective, either. Because of the efforts invested in training and briefing soldiers to carry out military objectives, soldiers generally have at least a basic idea of what these objectives are.

Control, Violence, and Participation: Implications of the Argument

I have argued that organizational control shapes participation in violence in two ways. First, centralized control mechanisms in the initial military training period

inculcate a set of beliefs and values among combatants that construct violence as legitimate and appropriate to the extent that it serves military ends. The result of this training is a normative framework encompassing three categories: at one end is strategic violence, directed from above to serve organizational purposes. At the other end is opportunistic violence, emerging from below to serve individual ends. In the middle lies a more ambiguous area in which violence designed to serve organizational goals emerges from below: entrepreneurial violence.

In the deployment phase, organizational control, exercised primarily by small-unit commanders, seeks to realign combatants with the military organization, reducing opportunistic violence as well as shirking from or resistance to strategic violence. The extent to which such control is successful further shapes patterns of participation in violence. Specifically, effective organizational control should produce high levels of participation in strategic and entrepreneurial violence and low levels of participation in opportunistic violence. In contrast, weak control should reduce rates of participation in strategic and entrepreneurial violence while at the same time increasing participation in opportunistic violence. Table I.2. summarizes these relationships. The empirical chapters of this book provide a wealth of evidence demonstrating how participation in each category is produced and sustained over time.

The framework outlined here calls attention both to the vital role of purpose in determining participation patterns in military violence and to the ways in which participation varies across categories of violence in accordance with local mechanisms of organizational control. An important implication is that simply asking what factors cause violence to rise or decline can be misleading because not all military violence is identical. The same factors that cause participation in opportunistic violence to increase can cause participation in strategic violence to decline and encourage the emergence of entrepreneurial violence. Accordingly, using aggregate violence data to understand patterns of violence in wartime can lead to misleading conclusions about the mechanisms that produce it.

The argument also has important policy implications, drawing attention to the fact that policy prescriptions designed to minimize some forms of violence may cause other forms to increase. In particular, policies that are intended to increase

TABLE I.2. Participation in violence by purpose and level of control

	HIGH CONTROL	LOW CONTROL
Strategic violence	High	Low
Entrepreneurial violence	Medium/high	Medium/low
Opportunistic violence	Low	High

discipline and monitoring may reduce opportunistic violence, but if elite strategies call for victimization of civilians, heightened control will only increase participation in (and therefore the execution of) strategic violence. More careful attention to the internal organizational dynamics of military violence can thus contribute to the development and testing of theories of violence in armed conflict and shed light on the unintended consequences of policies designed to mitigate such violence.

Why Counterinsurgency?

This book is concerned with the dynamics of soldier participation in irregular warfare in the modern, bureaucratized military or, put differently, with the microfoundations of counterinsurgency. By counterinsurgency, I mean state engagement in irregular warfare, defined as a form of internal armed conflict that involves an organized state military battling one or more insurgent groups (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).[13] I use counterinsurgency to refer to such warfare regardless of the specific doctrine by which it is waged. Notably, this usage is distinct from the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine published in 2006, which adopted a particular approach to fighting insurgencies that has been termed "population-centric."[14] This strategy differs in key ways from Israeli policies in the Second Intifada, discussed in chapter 3. My analytic concern, however, lies not with the origins of strategic policies formulated by elites, but rather with how individual soldiers and their units implement them. The particular policies are thus taken as given, a backdrop to the questions motivating this book.

I focus on counterinsurgency for several reasons. First, counterinsurgency warfare is the most common form of warfare practiced by modern militaries today, and its practice has taken center stage in policy debates about warfare. Yet academic research on state violence in irregular war has focused primarily on the incentives and constraints of military elites with regard to civilian targeting[15] or on evaluating conflict outcomes and the effectiveness of particular tactics.[16] The internal dynamics of small military units conducting counterinsurgency operations, and the ways in which these shape violence patterns within modern, bureaucratized militaries, remain largely opaque. In particular, we still lack an account of the full repertoire of soldier behavior, encompassing compliance and shirking, excessive violence and resistance, sometimes occurring side by side.

This omission is problematic, because, as is well known, counterinsurgency warfare poses substantial risks to civilian protection. Insurgents strategically seek to blend into the population, making it difficult for states to identify and target militants selectively. Yaniv, a former company commander, explained,

> Terrorism hides in the population. And the simple soldier, he doesn't understand what he is fighting against. . . . Terrorism exists but he doesn't see it, it's not tangible to him. . . . And this is where the problem begins—that you're fighting against something that you don't see and you just hear, hear, hear about. . . . It's like battling windmills. And that's one of the problems—from an ethical and from a professional perspective.

Moreover, insurgents often depend on civilians for information, support, and shelter, rendering them in some ways participants in or accomplices to the insurgency. Finally, unlike conventional warfare, counterinsurgency takes place "amongst the people" (Smith 2007), in dense urban quarters and remote rural areas. Counterinsurgent violence against civilians can thus be a product of deliberate targeting strategies designed to sever ties between insurgents and their civilian support base, the inability to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, or simply the existence of many opportunities and incentives for violence by virtue of soldiers' presence in civilian areas.

At the same time, counterinsurgency warfare also poses many challenges to military control. Conventional warfare typically involves large, mechanized military units facing each other on the battlefield. But size and mechanization, while assets in conventional war, become liabilities in counterinsurgency, requiring militaries to adapt their capabilities and organizational formations. Consequently, counterinsurgency warfare is frequently conducted by small teams of soldiers, isolated from command headquarters and subordinate only to a junior commander, often at the squad or platoon level. Though such operations can enhance the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by mimicking the organization and mobility of guerilla networks, they make control much more challenging, because soldiers are geographically dispersed and difficult to monitor. The strategies of elites can therefore provide only a partial explanation for participation patterns on the ground. Counterinsurgency operations thus offer a useful lens through which to view the dynamics of production and control of violence.

Why Israel?

A study of soldier participation in violence requires data on two phenomena that are typically hidden from the public eye: patterns of military violence and the organizational characteristics of small military units. As a result, a study that can trace the processes leading to variation within a single case is particularly valuable for theory building. The Israeli-Palestinian case is unique in some respects, such as the context of prolonged military occupation in which episodes of armed

insurgency and counterinsurgency break out periodically. The IDF also remains one of the few modern militaries that recruit through mandatory conscription and generally does not provide alternative service options for combat-eligible men. For these and other reasons the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been relatively understudied by scholars of comparative conflict processes (Pearlman 2011). Instead, much of the literature on the conflict tends to be historical, policy-oriented, or polemical in nature.[17]

Yet the Israeli case also presents several important advantages for studying patterns of participation in violence in irregular war. First, the presence of numerous local and international human rights organizations assiduously tracking human rights violations in the Israeli-Palestinian context means that more data are available than in many other conflict zones. Combatants are not difficult to locate and access due to Israel's compact size and its mandatory conscription laws. And though soldiers in regular service cannot be interviewed on political or military matters without the approval of the IDF, former combatants may speak freely as Israeli civilians. In addition, fieldwork is possible in some areas, and observers can collect data with greater freedom than exists in many other conflict settings.

In addition to the relative availability and accessibility of data, there are substantive advantages to selecting the Israeli case. The IDF's prolonged engagement with irregular warfare, insurgency, and population control has turned it into an authority in international security circles. Israeli military experts regularly export knowledge and experience to other countries engaged in counterinsurgency warfare. As a result, the IDF's experience can illuminate to some extent the practices of other modern militaries engaged in counterinsurgency. Chapter 7 illustrates this possibility by briefly exploring how arguments developed based on the experience of the IDF can help shed light on the behavior of U.S. soldiers in Iraq in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also significant in its own right, and readers with particular interest in this case will hopefully find its analysis here informative.

Finally, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a particularly salient, contentious item on the international policy agenda, it is perhaps worth emphasizing what this book is not. The book draws on the experience of the regular ground forces of the IDF during the Second Intifada to investigate the production and restraint of violence in counterinsurgency. It does not provide a comprehensive account of the conflict nor a history of Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem and the political machinations that led to its entrenchment over time. For that important background, which provides context for Israeli counterinsurgency operations in the Second Intifada, the reader is referred to the many texts analyzing the birth, conduct, and consequences of the Israeli occupation.[18]

Because my goal is to understand the behaviors and perspectives of soldiers, I do not analyze patterns of Palestinian insurgent violence in the Second Intifada. This is not to suggest that such violence was inconsequential. Two-thirds of Israelis killed in the Second Intifada were civilians, making it the most lethal conflict in terms of Israeli civilian death tolls since Israel's establishment in 1948. Insurgent violence is mentioned throughout the text insofar as it is linked to the production and restraint of violence in counterinsurgency. However, the dynamics of Palestinian insurgency in this period have been studied elsewhere and are outside the scope of this study.[19]

In addition, in its focus on organizational dynamics within the military, this book diverges from two alternative explanations that are sometimes raised to explain patterns of military violence in the Israeli-Palestinian context: demographic changes in the military's composition, especially the increasing presence of nationalist-religious soldiers in its officer corps (Levy 2008), and a general shift to the right in Israeli politics after the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the escalation of the Second Intifada. I do not debate these empirical claims here. Rather, I expect such trends to have an impact primarily at the strategic level by generating additional incentives and constraints on elite policymaking. Once policy has been formulated, however, the military remains a space where individuals must be tightly controlled and organized in order to function properly. The particular preferences of soldiers, their influence on one another, and the preferences and impact of politicians may present challenges to effective control but do not supplant it as an explanatory factor. In principle at least, the army has organizational tools that allow it to distinguish between its practices and between broader social and political trends. Whether these tools are adequately employed is, ultimately, a question of effective control.

A Final Note

Before turning to the analysis of violence and control in the Second Intifada, a final comment is in order. The academic analysis of violence and suffering necessarily does an injustice to the experiential dimensions of pain shared by those who have been personally touched by conflict. This injustice is perhaps compounded by the analytical approach taken in this book. To better understand the dynamics of participation in military violence, I investigate the perspectives of soldiers, the structures within which they operate, and the way these structures shape individual agency in conflict. While I also lay out the often dire consequences of these actions and the extensive damage they inflicted (most fully and explicitly in chapter 3), I do not offer a normative assessment of soldier conduct

or of security policy. This perspective may frustrate readers who seek justification or condemnation rather than explanation, or whose suffering is inadequately captured by these words. As Robben and Nordstrom (1995, 5) observe,

> Researching and writing about violence will never be a simple endeavor. . . . Like power, violence is essentially contested: everyone knows it exists, but no one agrees on what actually constitutes the phenomenon. Vested interests, personal history, ideological loyalties, propaganda, and a dearth of firsthand information ensure that many "definitions" of violence are powerful fictions and negotiated half-truths.

I do not pretend that I can avoid these challenges. But though some dimensions of violence can never be reduced to written representation, it is my hope that continued attention to the empirical dynamics of political violence, and in particular to the ways in which such violence can be limited, can nevertheless make a contribution to the understanding of violent conflict and, hopefully, to its mitigation.

1

PARTICIPATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Aviv served as a commander in a paratrooper unit at the height of the Second Intifada. He described his command style as strict and demanding, the kind of commander who soldiers often label a "hard head." Other commanders in his unit were more lax. They subjected their soldiers to fewer seemingly trivial demands and required less strenuous physical activity and less exacting adherence to rules. Their soldiers were also more likely to harass civilians at checkpoints. "The stories that came out of there were juicier," Aviv observed. When I asked him what that meant, he was evasive, hinting at gratuitous detentions and long body searches. He mostly recalled that in general, the attitudes of those soldiers toward civilians were different from those of his own soldiers.

The fact that Aviv's soldiers were more restrained at checkpoints is, perhaps, not surprising. Several theories would have predicted that less disciplined soldiers would also be more violent toward civilians (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007). What those theories would likely not predict, however, is that Aviv himself was not an exemplar of restraint or of engaging cooperatively with civilians. On the contrary, he described himself as rather aggressive. When carrying out search missions, for example, he stressed that "he was not gentle," but did whatever needed to be done to conduct a thorough search. On occasion, he also initiated violence against civilians. For example, after children threw rocks at his squad from the upper stories of a local building, he reacted by shattering another building's large front window. He did that, he explained, because he thought that residents would attribute the damage to the local kids, and that this would motivate them to control them. "I remember reasoning that this was how

I could make the population understand that they shouldn't throw rocks at us, that it isn't good for them. And that if they did throw rocks, they'd pay."[1]

A simple diagnosis of "violence" or "restraint" thus inadequately describes Aviv's actions or those of others like him. To understand why and when he participated in violence wholeheartedly, why and when he initiated violence of his own accord, and why and when he exhibited restraint, it is important to distinguish among different categories of armed group violence and to understand how and why participation differs across them.

With these questions in mind, this chapter lays out the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the book. I begin with an overview of existing approaches to violence and restraint in irregular conflict, showing how my own approach differs from previous work. Next, I turn to my own argument, presenting the theoretical framework in greater detail. I then define the book's central concepts and conclude with a discussion of the methods and data used in this study.

Existing Approaches: Elites, Institutions, and Agency on the Battlefield

The behavior of soldiers and of the military organization more generally has been studied most extensively by military sociologists. Since World War II, scholars have sought to understand the determinants of combat motivation, asking what drives men to fight. These studies have debated whether soldiers fight mostly for their buddies, pointing to the importance of primary group cohesion (Marshall 1947; Shils and Janowitz 1948; Wong et al. 2003), or whether they are driven by ideology and commitment to certain values (Bartov 1992; Moskos 1970).[2] More recently, scholars have argued that task cohesion, or the ability to perform as a team, is more important than social cohesion in motivating soldiers to fight (MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin 2006).

Yet though the scholarship on combat motivation is extensive, its ability to explain participation in violence is limited. For one thing, the analysis of combat motivation is typically intended to shed light on combat performance, which entails more than participation in violence. Indeed, the question of motivation is often framed as a collective action problem: What could possibly drive soldiers to risk their comfort, well-being, and ultimately their lives in combat? This framing emphasizes combat's risky dimensions, largely focusing on soldiers as potential **targets** of violence. Scholarship on how soldiers are driven to become **participants** in violence is far more rare.[3] Instead, research is more concerned with such outcomes as military effectiveness and efficiency.[4] The relative neglect of violence in the study of the military is also evident in the Israeli context, with

only a few exceptions.[5] Thus, though work in military sociology provides important insight into the organizational features of combat units, the puzzle of participation in violence (as distinct from combat more broadly) remains.

A second source of insight on patterns of military violence and restraint is the recent wave of research on wartime violence against civilians in political science. This literature tends to focus on armed groups as the level of analysis, examining why violence against civilians varies both across conflicts and within them. The main argument emerging from this work attributes violence and restraint to the incentive structures of armed group leaders. A dominant school of thought disregards soldier motivations altogether, focusing instead on the strategic calculations of military elites in ordering violence against civilians. In this view, variation in violence against civilians can be explained by the incentives and constraints of these elites, who employ violence when it is strategically useful to do so.[6] In his work on violence in civil war, for example, Kalyvas (2006, 25–26) argues that, even though individual motives for violence are diverse and often expressive, they are subsumed by those of armed group leaders who use violence instrumentally to control or govern a population.[7]

The focus on the incentives and constraints of leaders provides an important counterpoint to popular accounts of conflict that evoke ahistorical images of primordial "ancient hatreds" by demonstrating that violence is often calculated, rather than a spontaneous eruption of fury, and by specifying the factors that shape and constrain strategic calculation in conflict. However, the argument that empirical violence patterns reflect leader incentives implicitly reduces soldiers to the puppets of generals, unquestioningly carrying out orders and serving their superiors' interests. Although many armed groups and certainly state militaries tend to be hierarchical organizations where obedience is demanded, its supply can be a different matter. Combatants are a diverse lot who sometimes act opportunistically, exceeding and even undermining elite strategy, and other times dodge or resist orders, failing to produce the violence expected of them. In the Second Intifada's first year, for instance, junior and mid-level commanders frequently initiated violence independently, expressly violating strategic directives mandating restraint.[8]

Moreover, the instrumentalist approach implicitly assumes that the strategies of elites are coherently articulated and clearly communicated. In practice, however, elite calculations are sometimes unspecified or unknown to soldiers, whether because of the notoriously foggy conditions of operations or because senior commanders may deliberately choose to remain ambiguous regarding the scope of permissible violence. For example, during the Second Intifada restrictions on Palestinian movement increased dramatically, making checkpoint duty a central part of the mission of many soldiers. Nevertheless, a recurrent theme in the rec-

ollections of soldiers who served at the time was the lack of explicit direction or regulation regarding treatment of civilians at these high-friction sites. This vagueness was likely not accidental: an internal IDF investigative commission noted that ambiguity and inconsistency of regulations at checkpoints persisted nearly four years after the insurgency began.[9] Soldier agency, uncertainty, and unintentional or deliberate ambiguities at the senior-command level thus preclude an analysis of violence patterns rooted solely in elite calculations and require additional attention to the mechanisms that communicate and enforce these calculations down the chain of command.

Addressing these concerns, a second theoretical approach disputes the instrumentalist construction of ordinary combatants as extensions of elites, recognizing that armed groups are complex organizations with divergent preferences and norms. According to this perspective, violence in conflict cannot be understood through an examination of elite incentives alone, but rather attention must be directed to the mechanisms that translate these incentives into combatant behavior.[10] Abuse of civilians, in this view, is a byproduct of organizational processes rather than a calculated strategy, as Weinstein (2007) argues regarding rebel groups. Initially, this research took a relatively narrow view of group institutions, focusing on such formal mechanisms as recruitment, discipline, and punishment that can weed out or rein in opportunistic combatants (see Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007). More recent scholarship has also highlighted the role of more informal and less coercive means of controlling combatants, such as socialization and political education (e.g., Hoover Green 2016; Wood 2009). Generally, this work tends to argue that combatants are more violence prone than their superiors, therefore requiring effective institutions to restrain their behavior.[11] In the absence of effective institutions, combatant violence is to be expected.

The organizational approach importantly underscores the fact that violence in conflict does not always accord with elite strategies, directing attention to the role of armed group institutions in restraining combatant behavior. To date, however, it has been used more often to understand the behavior of rebel groups than that of state militaries, perhaps because rebel recruitment is assumed to be riskier and more voluntary than military enlistment, raising questions about who nevertheless participates in armed group violence and why. Militaries in general, and modern Western militaries in particular, are less frequently examined in the armed conflict literature.[12] Second, the perception of armed group institutions as instruments of restraint is partial at best, because the goal of organizational control mechanisms is not restraint per se but the direction of violence toward the service of armed group goals. If these goals involve extensive civilian victimization, discipline will not limit violence and may in fact escalate it.[13] In addition, this approach tends to view institutions as static and unchanging, largely

neglecting the dynamic processes that cause change within armed groups (see Checkel 2017 for a similar critique).

A more general shortcoming of existing research is that it often portrays the instrumental and organizational approaches as conflicting, with one implying that violence results from obedient soldiers serving the interests of military leaders and the other approach evoking images of undisciplined and vicious bands of warriors inflicting harm on innocent victims who come their way. A closer look, however, reveals that, even though both approaches seek to explain civilian targeting, they are usually (though often implicitly) concerned with different types of violence, both of which commonly occur in conflict. Proponents of the instrumentalist approach focus on violence committed **in accordance with** armed group leader interests, or "strategic violence." Advocates of the organizational approach, in contrast, analyze violence committed **without the permission** of armed group leaders, or "opportunistic violence." The result has been a tendency toward bifurcated analyses that distinguish between the instrumental mechanisms that lead to strategic violence, on the one hand, and the organizational institutions that restrain opportunistic violence, on the other.

This bifurcated approach has a number of weaknesses. First, although the two theories diverge conceptually, the data used to test them empirically are often aggregated. Though this tendency may be understandable, because it is often difficult to distinguish between strategic and opportunistic violence without detailed micro-level data, aggregating data can be misleading.[14] For example, when violence is posited to result from combatants' lack of discipline, but the theory is tested on violence that occurs both when it is ordered by superiors and when it is not, conclusions can be distorted. A second drawback of binary theorization is that it does not reveal the relationship *between* categories, making it difficult to expose and explain the full continuum of combatant behavior. Finally, a binary approach captures only a segment of empirical variation in violence during wartime, obscuring violence that takes place in the large gray area between the strategic and opportunistic categories, committed to advance military goals but not explicitly authorized by leaders.

A theory of participation in violence should render visible the various behaviors of combatants, including excessive violence, compliance, shirking, and resistance, and explore the relationships among them. I argue that there is a logic to participation in these behaviors and that it is determined by the extent to which the military has effectively shaped its combatants to internalize its mission. This organizational process rests largely on mechanisms of social control, which take place in two phases: during training and during deployment. A focus on how these mechanisms function and why they sometimes fail can advance our understanding of the behavior of soldiers in conflict, shedding light on patterns of violence

and restraint in war. Moreover, it shows that these mechanisms function not as systems of restraint (as typically portrayed), but rather as systems of *alignment*, resulting in a diverse range of combat soldier behavior that is not easily captured by a dichotomy distinguishing violent groups from restrained ones.

Controlling Violence

All organizations must find ways to harness the varying abilities, attitudes, and inclinations of individual members and direct them toward the service of organizational goals.[15] For the military, which deals in lethal force, this task is literally a matter of life and death. As a result, the military invests extensive effort in producing and directing violence toward its own ends. As the body entrusted with the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force, it does not legitimize force of all kinds, but only violence that advances the state's interests. This book argues that an understanding of soldier participation in violence requires attention to the legitimate/illegitimate distinction that underlies the use of military force and to the organizational means through which this distinction is instilled among soldiers.[16]

Specifically, the military utilizes a variety of control mechanisms to ensure that soldiers employ violence in accordance with its own strategic interests. Although discipline and sanctions are typically associated with military control, the most powerful control mechanisms are not formal but social, such as socialization, persuasion, and leadership. Social control shapes participation in violence in two main phases. First, in the training phase, the military inculcates among soldiers a normative framework that constructs organizationally useful violence as appropriate and organizationally useless violence as deviant, thereby creating distinctions between different categories of violence. Next, in the deployment phase, the military seeks to enforce this framework through its agents of control at the field level: the commanders of its squads, platoons, and companies. The extent to which control in both phases is successful thus shapes both the normative categories of violence and how participation varies across them.[17] In subsequent chapters I elaborate on these processes in the particular context of the IDF. Here I summarize them in general terms.

Phase I: Normalizing Violence

The production of participation begins in the lengthy and intense training period that characterizes induction into the military and specifically into the combat forces. For the military to carry out its mission in a coordinated fashion without

devolving into anarchical sub-units, individuals of disparate dispositions and backgrounds must be transformed into a cohesive, aggressive force prepared to wield violence at the service of military objectives. This entails two separate challenges: first, ensuring that soldiers produce the violence that is expected of them and second, that violence is organized and directed toward organizational goals. One way of achieving these goals is by incentivizing organizationally useful behavior and punishing behavior that is organizationally useless. Indeed, formal control mechanisms such as concrete rules, incentives, discipline, and sanctions are an integral and pervasive part of military training. Cadets are subject to rigid rules and scheduling, endless drilling, and close monitoring. They are routinely shouted at and harassed, and their most minor infractions are punished.

Yet while formal control is a central element of training, it is insufficient in directing soldier behavior. Formal mechanisms require continuous monitoring that is possible in training, but becomes impossible in the quickly shifting conditions of operations. Moreover, discipline and sanctions can signal mistrust, adversely affect morale, and inhibit autonomy and discretion, all of which can impair soldier performance during deployment.[18] As a result, military training also relies extensively on social control mechanisms.[19] More subtle than formal control, social control involves the fostering of a shared identity and inculcation of values, norms, and beliefs among organizational members. When effective, members act in the best interest of the organization not due to fear, coercion, or economic incentives but because of their commitment to and identification with organizational objectives. The exercise of social control is particularly intense in military training, divesting recruits of their civilian selves and socializing them into a new identity and social community through such means as severe restriction of contact with the outside world; uniformity of appearance; persuasion, ritual, narrative, and song; and cultivation of a common culture and group allegiance. Together, these mechanisms create cohesion, loyalty, and identification with the military.

But although it is generally recognized that basic training fosters cohesion (Siebold 2007), esprit de corps (Manning 1991), and certain notions of masculinity (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978), it is less acknowledged that, for those who will serve in the combat force, a central part of the training process involves the normalization of violence so that ordinary individuals can be transformed into violence professionals. Combatants must be inculcated with norms that regulate the use of violence, ensuring both safety and the preservation of the command hierarchy. These norms include, for example, rules that determine what level of command must authorize a particular act of violence, with acts that inflict more damage requiring higher levels of authorization. They also include rules regulating appropriate targets of violence, enforced through strict punishment of cadets

who violate regulations regarding the use of firearms. In short, violence is normalized and legitimated to the extent that it accords with the rules and regulations that ensure it is used for organizational purposes.

For this process to work, values and behaviors must be directed in favor of military goals, preexisting normative frameworks that generally consider violence unacceptable must be transformed to a value system that legitimizes violence that serves organizational needs, and prior negative beliefs about violence must be defused. These goals are achieved through a variety of neutralization techniques—discussed in chapter 4—that are designed to obscure the harmful dimensions of violence and reframe it as valuable and desirable.

Military socialization, of course, is not always successful. Socializing agents may be unskilled at persuading, modeling appropriate behavior, or creating a cohesive community to sustain newly inculcated norms. Some individuals may resist socialization efforts due to a deeper commitment to competing norms, highly salient material concerns, and perhaps even personality factors. Even in modern Western militaries, where socialization and training are generally effective, some individuals do not complete military training because they are unable or unwilling to do so or because the military deems them unsuitable. But in general, when conducted effectively, control exercised through military socialization normalizes violence that serves organizational goals.

Violence that adheres to the norms communicated during training—in its authorization procedures, its permissible targets, and its allowed forms—thus becomes not only permissible but necessary: it is the combat soldier's job. I refer to this violence as *strategic*—indicating that it is committed in pursuit of organizational strategy as indicated by the military's upper echelons. From the soldier's perspective, violence is strategic when it follows explicit directives received through the chain of command.

In contrast, violence that violates the norms communicated during training is unacceptable and results in swift punishment. I refer to this violence as *opportunistic*—indicating that it reflects individual opportunity rather than organizational mandate. The regulation and control of violence in the training period produce divergent baseline patterns of participation before deployment. Strategic violence is normative and is therefore expected to induce high levels of participation; opportunistic violence is deviant, and is therefore, like deviant behavior in general, a low-base-rate phenomenon.

Phase II: Policing Violence

Though the intense military training period instills a set of norms among combatants that legitimize some forms of violence but not others, these norms can

become deeply undermined after combatants leave the manufactured setting of combat training for deployment, shifting behavior patterns away from organizational interests unless ongoing control is exercised. Deployment in counterinsurgency is associated with a variety of situational factors that are likely to increase opportunistic violence. Combatants, uniformed and armed, are surrounded by aggressive cues (objects that prime aggressive thoughts), and provocations—real or perceived—are plentiful. In circumstances of heightened fear and animosity, a slur, a comment, even an inopportune glance can be perceived as a threat or instigation. Moreover, violence can be employed as retaliation for the loss of a comrade or out of resentment for being in that situation in the first place. Pain and discomfort are common, as soldiers deploy away from home for long periods of time in physical conditions that are uncomfortable and sometimes grueling.[20] These factors can interact with individual attributes such as personality traits, beliefs, or attitudes predisposing some combatants to lash out violently for their own ends.

At the same time, deployment can lead to greater shirking from or resistance to participation in strategic violence. This too could be due to individual characteristics, with some soldiers likely to be more timid, resistant, or restrained than others. The strain of ongoing operations can also lead soldiers to become increasingly stressed, frustrated, burnt out, or bored and therefore less willing to carry out their missions. Underproduction of violence may also result from exposure to the realities of deployment, as the neutralization techniques that were part of the military training phase lose their power once the stresses of combat are experienced firsthand.

In addition, determining whether violence serves military objectives, which seems so clear in the training period, turns out to be less straightforward during deployment. From the perspective of soldiers, employing higher levels of violence than authorized, for instance, may be seen as a more effective means of repressing insurgency, but may also backfire and lead to unintended casualties. Forms of violence designed to punish potential insurgents may serve as a deterrent, but may also increase the motivation to take up arms. Targeting civilians thought to be supporters or accomplices of the insurgency may reduce the insurgent support base, but may also radicalize and mobilize individuals who were previously uninvolved or attract domestic or international condemnation, leading to negative consequences for the military.

The common thread linking these acts of military violence is the ambiguity that surrounds their implementation: in many cases, no clear message emanates from the upper echelons regarding their permissibility. Such ambiguity could result simply from the fact that no preconceived military strategy can possibly address every empirical contingency that occurs in conflict. But am-

biguity can also be strategic, reflecting a deliberate vagueness regarding the precise scope of authorized behavior. Such vagueness delegates responsibility for violence to the lower ranks. Under conditions of ambiguity, violent practices can emerge from the bottom of the organization, whether because explicit direction is lacking or because junior officers wish to impress on their seniors that they are proactive and aggressive in promoting the organization's mission. I term such violence *entrepreneurial* violence, indicating that such practices are organizationally innovative yet risky. When this type of violence is detected and condemned, subordinates are invariably held liable, since it is extremely difficult to produce evidence linking the senior commander to the crime. When this violence is effective in advancing military goals, such practices can be adopted and institutionalized by the military as part of its strategic repertoire.

Entrepreneurial violence differs from strategic violence in that it is not explicitly authorized. It differs from opportunistic violence in that soldiers perceive it as serving the military organization, in a climate of ambiguity from above. This ambiguity is distinct from the question of enforcement—I classify self-serving violence as opportunistic whether the military punishes it or tolerates it. For example, if looting for personal enrichment is tolerated by the armed group, I would classify it as opportunistic, because it is committed for individual gain.[21] I acknowledge that this distinction is sometimes difficult to make in practice, because soldiers have an incentive, should they be questioned, to present self-serving behavior as designed to serve the organization and because military elites have an incentive to present entrepreneurial violence as self-serving to preserve deniability. I discuss some indications for distinguishing between the two at the end of chapter 5.

In the deployment phase, too, levels of control, and especially of *social* control, will largely shape patterns of violence and restraint. In this phase, organizational control is no longer centralized but instead is entrusted to small-unit commanders, the junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who supervise soldiers at the field level. Though these commanders are lawfully entitled to exercise formal mechanisms to control their soldiers, the use of strict discipline and punishment in the field can be very difficult in the close-knit social circles of small units, especially given demanding physical conditions and emotional strain. Social control mechanisms such as leadership, modeling, and persuasion thus become the central tools in the commander's arsenal. Effective use of these tools reduces participation in opportunistic violence and increases participation in strategic violence. Effective control can also persuade soldiers that entrepreneurial violence is necessary and legitimate, reducing ambiguity and resistance. Small-unit commanders, however, can be ineffective in controlling their soldiers, for

reasons discussed at length in future chapters. As a result, participation patterns can vary substantially between small units.

Patterns of Participation

The preceding discussion shows how the military first instills and then enforces a set of norms that distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate violence based on the extent to which it serves organizational goals. From the perspective of deployed combat soldiers, these control efforts create three analytically distinct categories of violence—strategic, entrepreneurial, and opportunistic.

These categories differ on a number of dimensions. Most centrally, they reflect who is the beneficiary of the violence: the military organization (in the case of strategic and entrepreneurial violence) and the individual or his small group of peers (in the case of opportunistic violence). In the case of strategic violence, the perception of organizational utility is relatively high: soldiers are operating under clear directives from above, and although they may not always agree with military orders, at a basic level it is clear that they are carrying out military strategy as determined by its senior officers.[22] The perceived utility of opportunistic violence to the organization is relatively low, and it is sometimes even harmful to organizational interests. Entrepreneurial violence, in contrast, occupies a gray area in terms of organizational utility: though its initiators likely perceive it to be organizationally useful, the ambiguity surrounding its permissibility means that some soldiers are likely to dispute how useful it actually is. These differing perceptions of utility are also reflected in the level of authorization associated with each violent action. Strategic violence is authorized by senior commanders, opportunistic violence is not authorized by the chain of command at all, and entrepreneurial violence is typically initiated by junior commanders, NCOs and relatively junior officers (at the platoon or company level), who have the authority to lead soldiers on violent missions but are not explicitly backed by more senior levels of command.

Participation patterns across these categories depend primarily on the effectiveness of organizational control. Assuming that control mechanisms in the training phase are relatively effective in modern, bureaucratized militaries, and that organizational directives are explicit and clear, baseline patterns of participation before deployment should reflect organizational preferences: relatively high participation in strategic violence and relatively low participation in opportunistic violence. These patterns begin to vary during deployment: entrepreneurial violence emerges when organizational strategy is ambiguous, and participation patterns shift depending primarily on the behavior of small-unit commanders. When

commanders exercise control effectively, participation in strategic and entrepreneurial violence is likely to rise, and participation in opportunistic violence is likely to decline. When they are ineffective, participation in strategic and entrepreneurial violence is likely to decline, and participation in opportunistic violence is likely to rise.

In addition to its contribution to understanding soldier participation in counterinsurgent violence, this argument also has implications for variations in patterns of conflict violence more generally.[23] First, it has implications for variation in form: forms associated with effective organizational control should be forms sanctioned by the military, most obviously firepower and the use of more advanced weapons that require authorization. Forms of violence associated with weak organizational control are likely to be self-serving, most obviously various forms of extortion or looting. Consequently, a key organizational means of inducing soldiers to participate in violence is to frame it as "warlike" in its techniques and forms. I discuss this dynamic at length in chapter 4.

The distinction also has implications for variation in targeting: when organizational control is strong, targets are likely to be those the military organization is interested in targeting, most obviously enemy combatants or insurgents. When organizational control is weak, violence should increasingly be directed at those whose targeting serves no military purpose, such as civilians unconnected to the insurgency. These are, of course, illustrative examples rather than clear-cut predictions, because strategies vary across armed groups and across conflicts. The point is simply that each category has certain forms and targets that tend to be associated with it, depending on organizational interests.

The book's empirical chapters examine strategic, entrepreneurial, and opportunistic violence separately and draw on a wealth of evidence to understand patterns of participation at the individual and small-unit level. But before proceeding to a more detailed description of my research design, the next section lays out my conceptual definition of violence and how it differs from those in some of the existing studies on patterns of violence in conflict.

A Definition of Counterinsurgent Violence

Definitions of violence are notoriously fluid, embedded in sociocultural contexts that are historically contingent and reflective of power asymmetries. They are contested, because they recognize the suffering of some and disregard the suffering of others. And they are subject to political manipulation, as actors jostle to legitimize the harm they inflict while delegitimizing the harm inflicted by others. The definition of violence used in this book is expansive and differs from ones

used in many studies of violence in armed conflict in several respects. In particular, it differs in the types of behaviors and in the nature of targets deemed worthy of analysis. For conceptual clarity, I discuss each in turn.

Violence

Following the World Health Organization (2002, 5), I define violence as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation." This definition is broader than the one used in most studies of violence in conflict, as it includes violence that is indirect and nonlethal. Indirect violence refers to the harm caused to civilians by conflict, such as displacement across or within national borders; destruction of infrastructure; impaired access to food, medicine, and education; deterioration in physical or mental health; and declining employment opportunities or earning capability.[24] The directness of violence is distinct from the question of intentionality. Indirect violence can be caused intentionally, as when a warring party deliberately prevents the transfer of humanitarian supplies to a civilian community. It can also be unintentional, as when infrastructure is destroyed in the course of military activity.

Nonlethal violence is also frequently excluded from studies of wartime violence.[25] Even when, conceptually, violence is understood to encompass multiple forms, operationally the number of casualties is usually its sole indicator. Sometimes this is because of data limitations and the availability of more accurate data on homicides than on other forms of violence. Other times lethal violence is viewed as the most extreme and total form of violence and therefore as its clearest and least ambiguous representative (Kalyvas 2006).

Yet though measuring wartime violence using only statistics of battle deaths may be useful in terms of data availability and clarity (though in conflict, even homicide data are frequently incomplete or distorted[26]), it is misleading for many reasons. First, it obscures and misrepresents the sheer volume of indirect and nonlethal violence inflicted in conflict, which is responsible for far more civilian suffering than direct lethal targeting alone. In addition, the neglect of indirect and nonlethal violence brings to light certain experiences of victimhood but conceals others. For example, women are more likely than men to suffer sexual violence, as well as to be harmed by indirect violence inflicted on health and infrastructure systems. Finally, precisely because direct, lethal violence is more likely to be detected and documented, and because it can directly be traced to a particular agent, militaries may shift to indirect or nonlethal methods to avoid scrutiny, condemnation, or sanction. Such violence is then couched in norma-

tive terms as the natural and inevitable consequence of war, releasing its architects from accountability for the suffering that it inflicts. Ostensible patterns of restraint may in this way mask strategies of violence that provide similar results but at lower reputational costs. There are therefore both normative and empirical grounds for including indirect and nonlethal violence in the analysis of violence in conflict.

A broad definition of violence is particularly appropriate in the Israeli case, as it provides insight into patterns that have long puzzled analysts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A sole focus on number of deaths would in fact lead to the conclusion that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is relatively nonviolent. The Second Intifada, one of the conflict's more intense episodes, saw the death of approximately 5,000 Palestinians and Israelis in five years. Such numbers are relatively small when compared to many other armed conflicts, even after adjusting for population size. But despite these relatively limited levels of lethal violence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has proved to be one of the world's longest and most intractable.

Expanding the analysis to indirect and nonlethal violence also helps shed light on the behavior of parties to the conflict that may initially seem puzzling. On the Palestinian side, the Second Intifada saw a steep rise in suicide bombings, which have typically been explained as the actions of either "cultural dopes or rational fools" (Brym and Hamlin 2009)—cultural dopes, according to a view that sees suicide bombers as prisoners of fundamentalist Islam, or rational fools, who use suicide bombings as a strategy of maximizing utility, such as the liberation of territory. But systematic analyses of suicide bombers in the Second Intifada reveal instead that retaliation for Israeli acts of repression, many of which were nonlethal, was often their primary motivation.[27] Attention to nonlethal violence can thus help explain what might otherwise appear to be almost arbitrary behavior.

On the Israeli side, attention to nonlethal and indirect violence sheds light on what initially seems like puzzling self-restraint on the part of the IDF in combating the Palestinian insurgency, both relative to its own practices in other conflict episodes and to the practices of other modern militaries engaged in counterinsurgency warfare. This apparent restraint is most clearly evidenced in the Israeli-Palestinian civilian casualty ratio during the Second Intifada, which ranged between 1:2 and 1:3, far lower than in earlier or later IDF campaigns, despite the heavy damage that Israel sustained in this period.[28] This puzzle of relative restraint can be found elsewhere as well. Colin Kahl (2007), for example, argues that contrary to popular perceptions, and in contrast to its earlier campaigns in Vietnam and the Philippines, the United States was notably restrained in respecting noncombatant immunity during both the Second Gulf War and the subsequent period of counterinsurgency in Iraq.[29] The inclusion of nonlethal violence in the

analysis helps explain patterns that underlie what can appear to be restraint based solely on battle death statistics.

Targets of Violence: Combatants versus Civilians

A second way in which the concept of violence used here differs from many studies of conflict dynamics is that it is not restricted a priori to civilian targeting. The research focus on violence against civilians is likely rooted in the laws of armed conflict, which posit a fundamental distinction between combatants and noncombatants, generally shielding the latter from targeting. Given that the targeting of enemy combatants is unsurprising and indeed expected, it rarely poses a puzzle for analysts.[30] Civilian targeting, in contrast, is legally and morally out of bounds, rendering its persistence a thorny normative problem.

Limiting research to civilian targeting, however, is problematic for two reasons. From a normative perspective, it neglects additional principles of international humanitarian law that effectively limit the principle of distinction. Combatants cannot be lawfully targeted when they are injured, surrendered, or taken prisoner (hors-de-combat). And although civilians may not be directly targeted, they may lawfully be harmed as the attendant consequences of a military operation, to the extent that the operation is a military necessity and that the damage is proportional to the military gain.[31] Moreover, civilians lose their legal protection from targeting if they participate in hostilities, for such time as they participate.[32] And unfortunately for those who would wish to rely on international law, "direct participation" is nowhere defined, and opinions differ greatly as to how broad the interpretation should be.[33]

These challenges to the principle of distinction are even more acute in irregular conflict, where the blending of civilian and combatant populations is a hallmark of insurgent strategy. The risk of civilian casualties is particularly high in these circumstances, as is the likelihood of civilian participation in hostilities. Taken together, this means that some of the harm inflicted on civilians in conflict is deemed lawful under international humanitarian law. The use of violence against civilians as a category for analysis does not clearly distinguish between legal and illegal violence, though their patterns may well differ.

More importantly for my purposes here, the focus on violence against civilians takes as given what I see as an empirical question: Does the civilian status of potential targets affect soldier participation in violence, and if so, in what ways? Because the normative distinction between civilians and combatants can be blurred in some cases, how do combatants understand these distinctions and how do they affect their behavior? Expanding the account beyond clear-cut cases of

civilian targeting reveals the processes that lead to soldier violence in environments where combatants and civilians mix.

Research Design and Data

As noted in the preceding chapter, Israel is a comparatively advantageous research setting for a study of conflict dynamics because of the relative availability and accessibility of data and the IDF's extensive engagement in irregular conflict. The details and circumstances of death of nearly every casualty of the Second Intifada are known and recorded, and though there is some debate regarding the classification of some victims as combatants or noncombatants, some sources are widely perceived as accurate and credible. Some data are also available regarding ongoing Israeli counterinsurgency measures such as punitive house demolitions. The ability to access sites of conflict, though varying over time and space, is generally greater than in many conflict settings. Data can thus be collected in a variety of ways even as the conflict with Palestinians continues.

Yet despite the relative availability of data in the Israeli case, some aspects of the conflict remain largely hidden. Nonlethal violence, for example, is systematically underreported. Second, media and NGO observers tend to rely primarily on victim testimony, potentially producing an incomplete account of violence patterns.[34] Third, information about the organization of military units is not readily available. Variation in violence among military units is a topic on which no systematic data exist, despite anecdotal evidence suggesting that there are in fact differences among units in their use of violence against civilians.[35] This hinders the ability to investigate the relationship between unit control mechanisms and patterns of participation in violence. Fourth, existing datasets are, for the most part, unable to distinguish between strategic violence, entrepreneurial violence, and opportunistic violence. Yet, because these forms of violence result from different processes, aggregation of all three forms to examine patterns of participation is misleading. Moreover, existing data typically document cases of violence but not cases of nonviolence or restraint, which again can obscure the processes that produce violence.

To address these challenges I relied on a variety of sources and used several research methods. I conducted nearly two years of fieldwork in Israel in 2009–10, which included in-depth interviews and an original survey of combatants, all of whom served during the Second Intifada. Nearly all study participants had at the time been in *regular* service, the mandatory period of service that begins with enlistment at age 18.[36] The focus on regular soldiers was important for my study, because the bulk of the counterinsurgency effort in this period was carried out

by soldiers in their mandatory period of service and their commanders. The only exceptions to this rule were a small number of "refuseniks," soldiers and officers who served in the reserves during the Second Intifada, until declaring their refusal to serve.[37] I supplemented the ex-combatant interview and survey data with interviews with analysts and observers of the conflict, as well as extensive reading of local and international media and NGO reports. I also conducted limited observation in such locations as a military courtroom.

Inclusion of active service members in the study would have required official permission, which was not likely to be granted for a study of this sort, as I discuss further in the next chapter. I therefore used two methods to gain access to interview participants. First, I generally interviewed released combatants, who, while still belonging to the IDF's reserve corps, were at the time of my interviews civilians who could speak freely. Second, I made use of open online forums and social networking sites, which provided a public venue for discourse among current or former soldiers.

I interviewed approximately seventy former combatants, recruiting most of them through chain referral ("snowball") sampling, in which participants referred me to other potential participants following an interview. To maximize the diversity of the sample and ensure I was not drawing on homogeneous social networks, I began the chain with a diverse group of initial starting points and asked participants to refer me to members of their former unit, in addition to their friends. A few respondents were recruited in other ways, such as through social media sites or through chance encounters. Although not statistically representative, the sample proved to be very diverse, including former soldiers and officers from nearly all of the IDF's ground combat units. Respondents also formed a demographically diverse group, hailing from cities, towns, rural areas (*moshavim* and *kibbutzim*), and Israeli settlements in the OPT. Respondents differed in their ethnic background (Mizrahi, Ashkenazi, immigrants from the Former Soviet Union and elsewhere, and mixed background), levels of religious affiliation (religious, traditional, and secular), and political opinions. Interviews typically took place in cafes or the homes or workplaces of respondents and lasted from one and a half to four hours. To protect respondent confidentiality, identifying details for all participants were obscured, and all names used are pseudonyms, with the exception of those learned from public events or documents.

Based on findings from the interviews I then designed and implemented an online survey of approximately 120 former combatants from the same period. Men who served in combat units constitute a hidden population, meaning that no publicly available sampling frame exists from which it could have been possible to select a random sample and that membership in the group raises issues of privacy or sensitivity (see Heckathorn 1997, 2002; Watters and Biernacki 1989).

Several sampling methods have been used to study hidden populations, including snowball sampling and targeted location sampling, where respondents are sampled in locations they are likely to frequent. Though such methods are not representative by definition, it is possible to increase their reliability through access to parallel networks and the use of complementary methods.

To maximize the diversity of my survey sample I used two sampling methods. Fifty-eight percent of respondents were recruited through chain referral sampling; I aimed for diversity by selecting several initial respondents from different units and social networks. The remaining 42 percent were recruited through veteran groups on Facebook. In Israel, Facebook use is especially prevalent, penetrating more than 47 percent of the population as of the date of my survey.[38] In the age bracket I studied, 25 to 30 years old, Facebook has an even larger presence, cutting across a variety of social cleavages. Demographic information for the interview and survey samples is provided in the appendix.

The accounts of former combatants in in-depth interviews and in survey responses provide rich and detailed data on the micro-foundations of counterinsurgency and on the dynamics of participation in violence during irregular war. I explore these accounts in detail in chapters 4–6. Yet the reliance on the perspectives of former combatants also raises a number of methodological questions, in addition to the general methodological and ethical issues inherent in any field-based study of armed conflict. These issues, the "backstage" of fieldwork, too often remain unacknowledged. In the next chapter, I confront these directly.

2

NARRATING CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Ex-Combatant Accounts as Data

> **A slap or a blow in one situation is dangerous and immoral and a terrible thing and in another situation it's something that's not only legitimate but inescapable. And in the end . . . whoever's not there cannot judge the person who is. At the end of the day the military is a very aggressive framework. What we do is fight, and there's nothing you can do.**
>
> Interview with Elan, September 2009

This book draws extensively on the recollections of soldiers—in interviews, survey responses, and as recounted in secondary sources—to better understand the dynamics of participation in counterinsurgency. Despite the boom in the study of conflict processes, the collection of data from combatants during ongoing conflict is relatively uncommon. More often, scholars survey and interview ex-combatants in peacetime and study the archives of military tribunals, truth commissions, and other investigative bodies, hoping to shed light on the motives of violence.[1] Yet such data may be distorted by the attempts of yesterday's heroes to protect themselves from today's victors. Once their actions have been discredited, ex-combatants are more likely to trivialize or minimize the extent of their participation, to blame others, or to deny outright the commission of violent acts.

The reluctance to collect data from combatants during ongoing conflict can be attributed to many factors. Most obviously, combatant accounts are often hard to access. In some contexts the conflict setting is simply too dangerous to allow for in-depth research. But even when physical danger is not a major obstacle, access to combatants is challenging to negotiate. In the military, soldiers are often legally barred from speaking or fear reprisal if they do. The military itself has little incentive to publicize data on combatant participation in violence. Qualitative methods such as participant observation are usually off-limits to outsiders, and interviews of active service members can be difficult to secure.

But even when combatants can be accessed, other factors impede scholarly engagement with their narratives. Some may find it unsettling to seek the perspectives of those engaged in violence on a regular basis or worry that understanding entails identification (Huggins, Harritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002). Moreover, to the extent that combatant perspectives challenge victim narratives, scholars may also be concerned about the normative implications of such research. As Robben (1995, 84) observes, "We have more sympathy for unmasking abusers of power than doubting the words of their victims." Complicating matters further is the fact that, for soldiers, violence does not necessarily constitute an abuse of power but rather its intended, legitimized exercise. The perspectives of combatants may therefore reveal more than one would like to know about the shadowy workings of state power and about the unscrupulous roles it imposes on its agents.

Yet despite these obstacles, violence in conflict cannot be fully understood without the perspectives of those whose job it is to employ it. Moreover, an understanding of combatant behavior is important for policy reasons. Society bears a responsibility toward its soldiers, which is frequently forgotten when soldiers attempt to reintegrate after participating in armed conflict. The perspectives of individual soldiers and veterans, which often remain hidden from view, can help draw attention to the implications of the intense organizational processes that soldiers undergo to render them professionals in violence. From a conflict-resolution perspective, access to the diverse experiences of combatants can allow for a more nuanced understanding of conflict and of paths toward its resolution.

While the accounts of soldiers who were involved in fighting bring to light a unique and hard-to-capture perspective, the reliance on soldier narratives also raises specific methodological and ethical issues in addition to those inherent in any study of armed conflict.[2] In this chapter I discuss five such issues: the shifting meanings of violence across different contexts, concealment and censorship, the discursive reframing of violence narratives, the data-loyalty transaction, and the role of emotion in combatant accounts. Throughout, I show how recognizing and addressing these issues can generate detailed, contextualized, and reliable data that can reveal what remains invisible through aggregate indicators alone.[3] Moreover, I argue that more attention to the challenges and obstacles of political violence research can illuminate not only how data are collected but also how violence is enabled and sustained in practice.

The Shifting Meanings of Violence: Violence Work as Dirty Work

> Whoever opens up clogs will smell like sewage. There's nothing you can do. What can you do, whoever handles it—something sticks.
>
> Interview with Ofer, February 2010

This book studies an agency of authorized state violence, the military. As with other coercive state institutions, such as the police, the prison system, or state security agencies, the activities of the military involve the regular use of coercive power and violence. Combatants undergo rigorous training that teaches them to employ violence efficiently and productively. They deploy in areas where they engage in violence against a variety of targets. They are measured and promoted by their ability to achieve desired objectives through the prescribed use of violence. In short, they routinely engage in "violence work," employing forceful means on a more or less routine basis in accordance with rules and institutional control mechanisms. This routinization is especially evident for militaries engaged in counterinsurgency, occupation, low-intensity conflicts, and other forms of protracted asymmetric warfare that take place in civilian areas and combine policing with military combat.

The concept of violence work is useful as it illuminates the ways in which state violence becomes normalized, enabled by the routine, everyday practices of work. Indeed, a common refrain for many violence workers when faced with allegations regarding their conduct is that they were just doing their jobs. The theme of work was prominent in my interviews as well: many respondents used the terminology of work to refer to their experiences as soldiers in the OPT, conveying both the routine aspects of the use of force and how it becomes professionalized and standardized.

The concept of violence work also draws attention to the division of labor between state institutions that engage in violence work on the one hand, and those that benefit from it on the other. This division enables society to reap the benefits of violence while remaining shielded from its unsettling details. In this way, violence work is a form of "dirty work," a term first coined by Everett Hughes (1958, 1962) to refer to occupations that are stigmatized by physical, social, or moral taint.[4] Yet violence work is also different from many other "dirty occupations" in that it is not uniformly stigmatized or perceived by society as degrading. Quite the contrary—the work of soldiers, police officers, and other agents of authorized violence is as likely to be glorified as devalued, lauded rather than denigrated. This is certainly true in Israel, where service is mandatory and where the IDF generally enjoys very high societal regard, and

it is also evident elsewhere, such as in the United States where enlistment is voluntary.

The contradictory reactions to violence work are a product of its ambiguous nature and its contested meanings. First, as argued in the previous chapter, the military normalizes violence that serves its strategic purposes while maintaining the construction of self-serving violence as deviant and destructive. An equivocal approach to violence is thus built into the military understanding of the term. Second, the dangerous nature of violence work means that violence workers often suffer pain themselves. They therefore may be perceived by some as sacrificing heroes and by others as harm-inflicting thugs. The result of these conflicts of meaning is that, depending on the beholder, violence work can be understood in a variety of ways, ranging from the heroic to the brutal, from the necessary to the impermissible, from the victimizing to the destructive. As Tilly (2003) observes, and as anyone who has spent time in areas affected by conflict knows, the boundaries between the (legitimate) use of force and (illegitimate) violence are deeply disputed.

The consequences of these conflicts of interpretation for conducting fieldwork in conflict zones are significant, because fighters and civilians, soldiers and insurgents, insiders and outsiders define violence in differing and often irreconcilable ways. The struggle over conflicting definitions is tightly linked to questions of representation and recognition, with each actor seeking to ensure that his or her account of violence survives as the dominant one. In situations of violent conflict, as Feldman (2000, 54) observes regarding Northern Ireland, "the dominant morality is not a matter of choosing nonviolence over violence but of morally legitimizing one act of violence in another."

The shifting meanings of violence between contexts are a recurrent theme in the narratives of soldiers. Many informants told me that they had not shared details of their military service with their families or loved ones because they could never understand what they had gone through. A similar dynamic often emerged in the interviews, as behavior that had appeared completely natural to combatants in the context of their military service suddenly took a different form when describing it under the scrutiny of the interviewer's gaze in a quiet café, home, or office. Simply recounting military experiences could create dissonance between what seemed so normal, indeed desirable, during service and so out of place when relayed to an outsider. Oded, a former infantry officer, told me,

> Here we can sit in a café, it's very nice, everything is very nice, but when you're in [deployment] . . . on the one hand everything is sharper and you know what's right and what isn't; you understand that there's a just side and an unjust side that's fighting against civilians and a side

> that's trying to defend itself. On the other hand, everything is mixed up because . . . what are the boundaries, because you actually have to do something. . . . Here it's very easy to criticize soldiers but there, they see their friend who was wounded a few days ago, or they find a gun in [someone's] house . . . and they have to do something about it.

The deeply contested questions of how violence, legitimacy, and pain are constituted and represented are a constant presence in work in conflict zones and imbued much of the data that I collected. Four strategies in particular stand out in the attempts of soldiers to narrate wartime violence: concealment, transformation of meaning, solicitation of loyalty, and emotion.

Concealment

> I think that no matter how many stories people tell you, I don't know if you'll be able to understand. . . . I understood that no matter what happens, if I try to explain it to people no one will understand. I came home and [people would ask] "how was it?" "OK." I reached the point where it's better not to talk to people because they won't understand. You know that I was a sniper commander. Most of my friends in university don't know that. I don't feel the need to say it at all.
>
> Interview with Gil, December 2009

The violent aspects of combat service are often shrouded in shadows and transmitted in codes, half-silences, and knowing glances. That occurs not only because when force is exercised there are inevitably some excesses or hidden practices that its practitioners would like to conceal. Rather, it is the tension underlying the concept of violence, legitimate in one context, illegitimate in another, that veils violence work from normative consumption. Society does not ask, and its violence workers do not tell, creating both official and unofficial barriers to the study of violent conflict. Security establishments everywhere are highly secretive and place significant restrictions on access to data and personnel, enforced through an array of legal protections. The IDF is particularly difficult to study (Catignani 2008; Peri 1983). Consequently, some scholars have relied solely on publicly available sources to study the IDF, and others have cultivated relationships with the military, providing teaching and research services and thereby gaining access to quality data. Such formal or informal collaboration, however, though it may potentially yield valuable information, can shape the research product, whether because of official restrictions on publication or of self-censorship by researchers who feel indebted to those who have granted them access (Ben-Ari and Levy 2014).

Even if such arrangements had been possible for my study (highly unlikely, given the subject matter), I viewed their costs as far outweighing any possible benefits. On a number of occasions I did attempt to retrieve specific data through official channels, but failed each time, either because my request was denied outright or because pursuing the matter required submitting the project to scrutiny or oversight. Official secrecy therefore precluded access to active service members and even to unclassified data collected by the military. As a result I limited my data collection to former combatants who could speak freely, as described in the previous chapter.

Concealment, however, can also appear in less official ways. There are a number of reasons why former combatants may wish to avoid talking about violence altogether.[5] First, there is the well-documented tendency of people to respond to questions in ways they believe will be favorably perceived (social desirability bias), combined with the general distaste for hearing stories of violence outside the military context. But beyond issues of social desirability, individuals may wish to conceal information on military violence due to concerns about privacy, fear of legal consequences for potentially illicit behavior, the desire to protect others, or pain and trauma. The methodological and ethical implications of these issues are considerable. From a methodological point of view, the sensitivity of the research topic requires adopting methods that are known to mitigate the effects of question sensitivity. Ethical considerations demand that informed consent be received and that participants not be goaded into divulging what they do not wish to divulge.

The issue of concealment takes on different forms for in-depth interviews and for surveys. Interviews are founded on the establishment of rapport, sensitive questioning, and the creation of a space for discussion. The identities of participants are protected and confidential. These measures contribute to the facilitation of open conversation, though it is likely that they do not eliminate concealment entirely. A survey is far less personal and involves more technical interaction. My own survey asked explicit questions about engagement in violence against civilians during military service, a measure that is likely to be susceptible to underreporting. I sought to reduce this risk by conducting the survey online, allowing participants to self-administer the questionnaire anonymously and privately. To further minimize social desirability bias and any perceived threat of self-incrimination, survey respondents were asked to report levels of violence in their units, rather than their own engagement in violence.[6] Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the goal of this study was not to document prevalence rates of violence, and indeed I am unable to do so. Rather, it is concerned with understanding the processes that shape participation in violence. For these

purposes, the concealment of specific events by particular individuals is not a significant limitation.

Transformation of Meaning

Concealment, referring to the issues people do not talk about, is only one obstacle to the collection of data from ex-combatants. Equally important is what people **do** talk about and in what ways. One strategy that I frequently encountered in my interviews was the transformation of the meaning of violence so that it no longer appeared as such. This discursive strategy is not unique to former combat soldiers, but is common across "dirty work" professions. Discussing the strategies that "dirty workers" in a variety of industries use to foster necessary self-esteem and a positive occupational image, Ashforth and Kreiner (1999, 421–24) identify a number of "occupational ideologies" that transform the meaning of such work, rendering what was stigmatized and devalued acceptable and even attractive: workers **reframe** their occupation by focusing on its lofty larger purpose or neutralizing its negative value, **recalibrate** the standards by which the dirty aspects of their work are judged, and **refocus** attention away from these devalued aspects. All of these techniques were evident in my interviews.

A common reframing technique for combatants is to emphasize the honorable purpose of their work, rather than its actual practices. Soldiers do not typically speak of themselves as engaging in violence, but rather in security measures, counterterrorism, self-defense, or legitimate responses to threat—perhaps unpleasant, but always justified. Of course, such reframing techniques are not simply individual strategies but are also institutionally embedded discourses propagated by security elites and largely accepted by society. By neutralizing the harm of wielding violence, both to its victims and its perpetrators, these framing techniques therefore not only shape how violence is talked about but also how it is produced in practice. Indeed, the work of the military is so comprehensively reframed that the very reference to routine military activity as violence could be misunderstood or perceived as threatening.

Yet even the use of institutional discourse to discuss violence can only reveal some of the violent practices in which combatants engage, those that could convincingly be reframed as necessary and valuable. Forms of violence that were opportunistic or entrepreneurial could not as easily be reframed using institutional terminology. Initially it seemed that such accounts of such practices would be less likely to emerge in the course of an interview. Over time, however, it became clear that combatants *did* talk about those forms of violence but in ways that were not always initially apparent. Three particular discursive strategies emerged in my in-

terviews: euphemisms, codes, and metaphors. Each of these allowed combatants to maintain the legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy underlying the use of military violence by allowing them to speak of its use without registering its full effects. These strategies, once recognized, signaled to me to look deeper at what the rhetorical devices conveyed and why they were used.

Euphemisms for violence are common in the narratives of ex-combatants. They "mask, sanitize, and confer respectability," allowing their users to shield themselves and their listeners from the full meaning of their actions (Cohen 2001, 107). In the Israeli context, some of the euphemisms were official, institutionalized terms that were recognizable to anyone familiar with Israeli security discourse. Such terms as "took down" to indicate killed, "exposed" to indicate razed homes or orchards, or "neighbor procedure" to indicate the practice in which soldiers order a civilian to enter the home of a suspected militant and tell him to turn himself in (a procedure later outlawed by the Israeli High Court), are understood by anyone who served in the OPT in the period examined. Other euphemisms were improvised during the course of the interview, such as "lack of ethical normativeness" to indicate aggressive handling of civilians at checkpoints, or "physical confrontation" to indicate that a civilian had been beaten.

Codes, like euphemisms, are intended to mask the true meaning and impact of violence. Their function is to render the precise meaning of an action vague and ambiguous, its consequences encrypted in a term that cannot quite be pinned be down by those not granted the key. They thus serve to mentally and emotionally distance the individual from the act and, in some cases, remove agency altogether. Codes, too, are culturally shared, allowing users to understand each other while avoiding the full meanings of action. For instance, the Hebrew word *shtuyot*, meaning nonsense, was used by many interviews participants to refer to what were perceived as minor or trivial acts of violence, such as harassment and humiliation.

Other codes were embedded in institutional terminology, which used vague language to refer to military tasks that were not precisely defined, thereby allowing junior officers to interpret them as they saw fit. For instance, the common military task "demonstration of presence" seemed to have no official definition and instead referred to various ways of making military presence known to local residents.[7] Though sometimes the term referred simply to patrolling in civilian areas, other times it signified various methods designed to "create deterrence" by instilling a sense of fear in the population, through such means as creating loud noises in civilian areas, searching random homes, or questioning passersby.

A third strategy often employed to talk about violence while avoiding its full meaning is the use of metaphor. One common metaphor used to describe military confrontations with civilians was that of a game, such as when describing

harassment and humiliation at checkpoints or the destruction of property such as ramming cars with tanks. Assaf, a former soldier and officer, spoke of dispersing a demonstration as playing a game:

> You start working your brain, you start with tricks, you play games with them, and if someone tries to pass the fence, you throw a stun grenade at them behind the fence, nonsense like that.

Chasing civilians who tried to bypass a checkpoint or workers who attempted to enter Israel illegally was described as a "game of cat and mouse." Of course, only the proverbial cat would perceive such an interaction as a game in the first place. Such metaphors thus serve to obscure the harm done by infusing the act with a playful or trivial meaning.

Understanding these reframing strategies facilitated the research process by alerting me to the often multilayered nature of combatant accounts. Once I recognized the use of euphemisms, codes, and metaphors, I could use them in conversation, signaling that I understood the rhetorical devices through which information was communicated.[8] This was particularly useful with regard to activities that, though systematic, occurred at the shadowy margins of authorized force and were therefore sometimes less explicit in narratives.

Solicitation of Loyalty

The highly politicized and contested nature of state violence gave rise to another discursive strategy, in which interview participants actively attempted to gauge to what extent I accepted their interpretations of violence, implicitly or explicitly expecting me to take sides. As a result of such demands for loyalty, researchers in situations of violent conflict have often noted that neutrality is not an option (e.g., Sluka 1995; Smyth and Robinson 2001). This is not so much a consequence of the researcher's actions or the research design as an inherent feature of the research setting. Sluka (1995, 287) observed, "Whether or not you take sides, those actively involved in the situation are going to define whose side they think you are on. They will act toward you on the basis of this definition, regardless of your professions of neutrality."

The researcher's own identity thus becomes salient in this process. In my case, I shared some features with my respondents but not others. On the one hand, I had a fluent command of Hebrew language and Israeli culture and had served in the IDF some years earlier in a noncombat role. On the other hand, I was a woman and a researcher investigating the closed, masculine world of combat service. Taken together, these factors both enabled and complicated my research. Partici-

pants sometimes asked about my own background or told me they had investigated it on their own. I imagine others did so without my knowledge. Still others may have made implicit assumptions about who I was, deciding whether to talk to me on the basis of those assumptions.

The problem of taking sides can be exacerbated by current political events. The months during which I conducted fieldwork were tense ones. In entering the field I initially was reassured by the fact that my research focused on a period that had ended a few years earlier, hoping that in this way some of the most contentious aspects of the period would have somewhat dissipated. As it turned out, my fieldwork coincided with the Gaza War of January 2009. In the aftermath of the Israeli incursion into Gaza, several allegations began to surface regarding IDF conduct, culminating in the publication in September 2009 of the *UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict*, more widely known as the Goldstone Report. The final report found evidence that the IDF and Palestinian armed groups had committed war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity during the Gaza incursion.[9] The Goldstone Report was angrily rejected in Israel, and a near-consensus emerged against the UN Commission and international and local organizations perceived as its allies.[10]

This political climate made soldier narratives about conduct in conflict a heated public issue for some of the period when I conducted fieldwork. After the publication of the Goldstone Report, it became more difficult to recruit participants for the study. Participants worried about the uses to which my study could be put, whether through my own (mis)handling of the data or through others' exploitation of my presumed naiveté. I was sometimes asked what the "agenda" of the project was, with one participant expressing concern that to publish it I would need to "create a provocation." Another potential participant argued that this was not the time to conduct such a study, because its findings could easily be appropriated by others seeking only to attack Israel.

There are no easy solutions to the problem of taking sides, and to a large extent it is up to each researcher to develop guidelines for navigating the complex relationship between violence and politics while in the field. In my own case, these included such decisions as refraining from activism during my fieldwork, engaging with potential participants' concerns, and at the same time taking care not to make any statements or commitments regarding what the findings of the study might be. Though these might seem like obvious injunctions, they can be challenging in an environment where quality data are often rewards in a transaction that solicits researcher loyalty.

Violence and Emotion

> I wanted to say, first, that everyone who came out of my squad has a scar. For each one it came out differently. But what we all talk about is that no one, no one understands. You're not looking for . . . I never looked for someone who would . . . but it's absurd, that you're with people and no one has any clue.
>
> Interview with Tom, October 2009

Research in conflict zones can generate intense and difficult emotion. Collecting data from former combatants was no exception. In an industry that deals in violence, harm is not only inflicted but is also suffered. The inherently dangerous working conditions raise the likelihood that combatants or their comrades might become victims of physical or psychological injury. In addition, research has increasingly recognized that personal suffering can also result from bearing witness to or perpetrating acts of violence.[11]

Within the military, such pain is often pushed aside as irrelevant, and suffering is frowned on as weakness. My interviews suggested that a common response to violence-related suffering was to stamp it out through a deliberate and immediate return to the traumatic circumstances. One respondent, for example, recounted how he had been guarding his military base when several mortar shells were launched at his post. His friend suffered a direct hit and fell before his eyes, and shortly thereafter another shell landed close to his body, destroying his guard post. He vividly recalled his knees shaking uncontrollably, and begging to be released from his post. His commander responded that, to overcome any trauma, he needed to remain in the post for another sixteen hours. Another informant laconically described how he and his unit were sent to manually comb terrain for body parts of soldiers who were killed in an rocket-propelled grenade attack. When I asked whether he and his friends had received any special preparation for this task or any treatment following it, he responded with cynicism: "No one ever comes to talk to you about your experiences and feelings and stuff like that."

The dissonance between employing force and suffering pain is an inevitable, but largely suppressed, consequence of violence work. Narratives of pain and suffering undermine the very basis on which the work of soldiers is glorified, naturalized, and sanitized. As a result there is little tolerance for the "ordinary pain" of soldiers, which is seen as a weakness, a failure of character and courage, and perhaps most importantly, a threat to the morale of other soldiers and potential recruits. There are few opportunities for former soldiers to share these painful experiences, and it is therefore unsurprising that they sometimes came up in interviews. Many individuals I interviewed had lost friends and comrades in the insurgency. Some had had direct contact with bodies and severed body parts,

either of Israelis or Palestinians. A couple showed scars they still carried from their service. Several told me graphic stories of pain and death that they had witnessed. A few mentioned they were still haunted by nightmares.

Social scientists are ill-equipped to recognize signs of re-traumatization that informants may feel when recounting narratives of violence. While my intuitive response was to avoid topics that appeared to be deeply emotional for my informants, it is hard to know whether this is always the correct reaction. Many interview participants thanked me at the end of the interview for the opportunity to tell their stories. Many of the interviews did not evoke particular emotions, but for some, the interview was their first opportunity to unload experiences that had been burdening them for years and for which a "society-in-arms" had little tolerance. But regardless of the nature of the interview itself, any interview is temporary by nature, and it is unclear how its effects may manifest later. This problem is an inherent feature of research on violence and other sensitive topics, highlighting the importance of ensuring that participants are aware of their right to choose which experiences to relate.

Emotion as a Reframing Tool

Although painful emotion is an inherent aspect of any discussion on violence, its use in narrative can sometimes serve another purpose, acting as a reframing mechanism through which the full effects of violence are concealed. One participant, for example, told a story of how he had killed an armed insurgent in the course of an attempted attack on soldiers. He proceeded to describe in great detail the tremendous guilt he had felt after the incident. Something about the account struck an odd chord, because I knew that the killing of insurgents during an attempted attack was a cause for pride and celebration in military units. When I asked about this discrepancy, he then shared the satisfaction he had felt and the prestige he enjoyed as a result of the incident, offering a much more complex and nuanced account of his experience.

The process of emotional reframing is not always easy to discern, and it is not necessarily a conscious one. Those who experience violence may raise a variety of defenses to avoid dealing with the implications of their actions. One interview participant told me he was most ashamed of how he had once urinated in front of a Palestinian family, because their very presence had become invisible to him. He had already divulged this story once before, he said, but at that time he told it as though it had been done by someone else and had modified the details. Indeed he had actually come to believe that the act was done by someone else, because for several years he had simply been unable to face his own action and the resulting shame and guilt. This moment of disclosure

provided a brief glimpse of the workings of emotional reframing. As Robben (1995, 85) puts it, in the presence of such defenses "we believe to be seeing the world through our interlocutor's eyes. Yet those eyes are looking away from what we are seeing."[12]

My engagement with the issue of emotional reframing had a specific local inflection. In the Israeli context, combatant narratives of pain and suffering represent a text so recognizable that they have become a cultural trope known as "shooting and crying." The term, which originated after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, refers to the proliferation of testimonies, literature, films, and other cultural products in which former soldiers lament the violence in which they participated. Texts belonging to this genre place emphasis on the dilemmas of soldiers and their subsequent torment. The term is used ironically to express the tension inherent in a discourse victimizing perpetrators of violence, and the dissonance that is created when combatants continue to wield force while assuaging any associated moral guilt through the expression of pain. When used this way, emotion can obscure the details and full effects of violence.

Like other discursive strategies, the deployment of emotion draws attention to the layers of meaning that infuse narratives about military violence, certainly in the context of a popular, lauded national military, and underscores the importance of heightened awareness of interview dynamics. Talking about violence is never simply a straightforward act of documentation, a fact that can be missed by indirect data-collection methods, the use of translators, insufficient local knowledge, or simply taking these narratives—whether from perpetrators, witnesses, or victims—at face value. But the recognition of these layers of meaning goes beyond the generation of nuanced and reliable data: it also sheds light on the hidden mechanics of violence work itself by showing how soldiers navigate between the demands of their occupation and the expectations of broader audiences.

Research in conflict zones is fraught with both dilemmas and opportunities. This chapter has sought to address some of the unique challenges involved in collecting data from former combat soldiers. Military violence is difficult to discuss, because it carries diametrically opposed meanings—legitimate and necessary in one context, deviant and destructive in another. In addition to being politically contested, it is emotionally charged, evoking not just the suffering of others but also the often-suppressed pain of soldiers themselves. In the face of these contradictions, significant institutional and cultural resources are committed to ensuring that the state's interpretations of violence as valuable and heroic are adopted and remembered. The workings of violence are thus shielded by a series of elab-

orate protections designed to ensure that the proper narrative is recognized and remembered.

In some ways these protective strategies are similar to the strategies used by workers in "dirty occupations" everywhere to boost their self-esteem and neutralize society's stigmas. As Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) show, refocusing, reframing, and recalibration are prevalent tools that enable workers in such occupations to discuss their jobs without provoking criticism or judgment. However, I argue that such strategies become even more crucial for violence workers, because ensuring proper recognition means the difference between achieving the status of a hero or a criminal.

In the course of my fieldwork it became apparent to me that only by recognizing the ways in which violence was protected in conversation would I be able to access data regarding how violence work operated in practice. Collecting such data requires sustained, attentive interaction with the actors involved, which enables access to and evaluation of information in a way that is not possible through reliance on indicators compiled in impersonal datasets or through brief forays to conduct formal interviews or surveys.[13] Failure to attend to the discursive strategies used by those involved in conflict has a direct effect on the quality of data gathered and the findings reached. Once I had a better understanding of how violence was concealed, reframed, or exchanged for guarantees of loyalty, I was able to adapt my research methods accordingly. This entailed, in some cases, probing interlocutors further or challenging them when reframing techniques signaled that something was being hidden or neutralized, and in other cases it required respecting boundaries and changing the subject. Combined with a diverse array of sources, these methods of data collection facilitated comprehension of what could sometimes, through an external lens, seem incomprehensible.

3

IDF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE SECOND INTIFADA

I defined [Israel's goal in this war] from the beginning of the conflict: a very deep internalization on the Palestinian side that through terrorism and violence we cannot be defeated, we will not submit. If there is no such deep internalization at the end of the conflict we will have a strategic problem with an existential threat to the state of Israel. If this is not seared in the Palestinian and Arab consciousness there will be no end to demands from us.

IDF General Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon in an interview with Ari Shavit, *Ha'aretz,* August 28, 2002.

On September 28, 2000, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon paid a controversial visit to the Jerusalem holy site known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif. Though the visit itself was brief and was greeted by relatively mild demonstrations, it would soon trigger an outburst of mounting tensions signaling the collapse of the Oslo peace process that, throughout the 1990s, had attempted to bring a negotiated solution to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[1] The day after Sharon's visit, riots erupted in Jerusalem and in other locations across the OPT, soon spreading past the Green Line into the state of Israel itself.[2] In the next few weeks mass demonstrations and riots involving rocks, Molotov cocktails, and occasional gunfire from protestors became an almost daily occurrence. Palestinian gunmen also targeted West Bank roads and Jewish settlements, in some cases nightly.

In those early weeks, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his advisers frantically attempted to reach a ceasefire and return to negotiations. According to Palestinian chief negotiator Sa'eb Erekat, more than fifty meetings were held between Israelis and Palestinians in the months that passed between the failed Camp David Summit of July 2000 and Barak's loss to hardliner Ariel Sharon in Israel's national elections in February 2001 (qtd. in Harel and Issacharoff 2004, 39).Yet while negotiation teams talked, violence raged. Two particular incidents captured on camera served to mobilize the two respective populations in support of escalation. For Palestinians, it was the death of 12-year old Muhammad Al-Dura, crouching behind his father to avoid being caught in a cross-fire and then collapsing across his wounded father's lap.[3] For Israelis, it was an angry mob's lynching and muti-

lation of two IDF reserve soldiers who had mistakenly entered the West Bank city of Ramallah.

Although Israeli political directives called for containing the conflict, responsibility for maintaining security was delegated to brigade commanders in the field who were granted freedom of operation. Many reacted aggressively, imposing harsh measures of collective punishment and employing permissive rules of engagement.[4] Israeli security officials would later report that in the first month of clashes the IDF fired 1,200,000 bullets.[5] More than two hundred Palestinian civilians and twenty-four Palestinian security force members were killed in clashes with Israeli security forces in the conflict's first two months. Seventeen Israeli civilians and sixteen Israeli security force members were killed in the same period.

The asymmetric casualty ratio appears to have been planned: The IDF had prepared for an outbreak of riots at around this time and had considered a forceful response to be the best way to quickly quell them. As Maj. General Giora Eiland, then head of the IDF's Planning Directorate, explained, "It was understood that the intention was to reach a casualty ratio that would demonstrate which side was stronger" (2010, 28). What were likely not planned were the consequences: as a result of the large number of Palestinian casualties, mass demonstrations subsided after a few months, and the conflict evolved into a full-blown armed insurgency waged by a number of Palestinian armed groups with varying levels of coordination.[6] The insurgency eventually came to be known as the Second, or Al-Aqsa Intifada.[7] Initially, the insurgency primarily targeted Israeli soldiers and civilians in the OPT with gunfire and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[8] It then mounted a terrorism campaign primarily targeting civilians within the state of Israel, reaching its height in a surge of suicide bombings beginning in the summer of 2001 and peaking in the spring of 2002.[9] In addition, insurgents launched a growing number of rockets and mortar shells from the Gaza Strip.[10]

The change in the nature of the insurgency presented a threat of unprecedented proportions to Israeli civilians and soldiers. According to official Israeli figures, 26,159 violent attacks were conducted against Israeli targets in the five years beginning on September 29, 2000, killing 1,060 Israelis, approximately 70 percent of them civilians.[11] To counter this evolving threat, the IDF implemented a range of counterinsurgency tactics, which, by 2005, would lead to a near-complete repression of the insurgency and to the deaths of more than 3,300 Palestinians, close to half of them civilians.[12] In the political arena, the peace process was utterly abandoned, and all attempts to revive it in subsequent years have failed. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the IDF further tightened its control over the West Bank, with the number of Israeli settlers there growing at an average rate of approximately 5.5 percent annually between 2000 and 2010.[13] In Gaza, Israel declared an end to its military occupation in the summer of 2005,

after unilaterally withdrawing its troops and evacuating all settlements from the Gaza Strip. However, it continues to retain control over Gaza's border crossings into Israel (and, consequently, into the West Bank), as well as its air and sea space. Since September 2007, following Hamas's takeover of power in the Gaza Strip, Israel has intensified its hold on Gaza, imposing a siege that has severely limited movement in and out of the strip, pursuing policies designed to separate Gaza from the West Bank, and occasionally launching destructive military campaigns.[14] The repression of the Second Intifada thus had far-reaching political effects, shaping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for years to come.[15]

The Israeli Approach to Counterinsurgency

Though there has been considerable research on the evolution of Israel's five-decade occupation of the Palestinian Territories, scholarly work on its handling of the Second Intifada is fairly limited, despite this period's profound significance in shaping the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A number of authors have analyzed Israel's approach to counterinsurgency during this time, typically relying on interviews with security elites and military analysts and on materials released in IDF or Security Ministry publications.[16] Rather than analyze Israeli strategy making or the ways in which its security elites perceived the Second Intifada, this chapter offers a view of counterinsurgency from the ground, based on the perspectives of ordinary combatants and supplemented by media and NGO reports published at the time. In so doing, contradictions and ambiguities are brought to light that cannot be revealed through a sole focus on the senior level. I begin with a brief overview of the IDF approach to counterinsurgency, before moving to a more detailed analysis of specific practices implemented in the Second Intifada.

Theories of warfare against nonstate groups have generally distinguished between two approaches to counterinsurgency: the enemy-centric approach, which focuses on killing and capturing insurgents, and the population-centric approach, which argues that insurgents can only be defeated by winning over the population's "hearts and minds."[17] Israel's approach to counterinsurgency, however, does not neatly fit either paradigm.[18] Two features in particular set it apart from the other approaches: its conception of warfare's objective, and its assessment of the role of civilians on the battlefield.

The overarching goal of Israeli counterinsurgency, and of Israeli security doctrine more generally, has been to achieve what it views as deterrence against its neighbors.[19] The notion of deterrence has been at the heart of Israeli security doctrine since the state's establishment, based on its assumption that Israel faces fundamentally hostile enemies who outnumber it in size and strength. In conse-

quence, the newly founded state, under the leadership of David Ben Gurion, adopted a number of foundational principles, including the maintenance of a qualitatively superior military, cultivating a relationship with a world power, achieving technological superiority, maintaining national cohesion, and, later, nonconventional deterrence through a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Through these principles Israel sought to avoid military confrontations to the extent possible and, if war was unavoidable, to reach a speedy and decisive victory in a powerful offensive that would further delay another bout of violence. This approach, which came to be known as "cumulative deterrence,"[20] calls for "successive and effective uses of force in both limited and massive military encounters" (Maoz 2006, 15). It is designed to persuade rivals, over time, that destroying Israel is impossible or prohibitively costly.

Beginning in the 1990s, a vigorous debate emerged within the IDF about the applicability of Israel's traditional security doctrine—forged in an era of conventional threats and interstate conflict—to a changing geopolitical environment.[21] These debates notwithstanding, in practice Israel's security establishment has maintained that in a hostile strategic environment, with little hope of attaining either complete military victory or a comprehensive political solution in the region, the best option continues to be preserving deterrence through the periodic unleashing of heavy force (see Adamsky 2017; Maoz 2006). Inbar and Shamir (2014), following the tactical jargon of IDF officers, have termed this approach "mowing the grass." They argue that neither enemy-centric nor population-centric methods are available to the IDF: the former involves vanquishing a radical ideology that cannot be defeated through military means (referring, it appears, to Islamist groups), and the latter requires winning over a fundamentally hostile, unwinnable population. As a result, the IDF relies on attrition, periodically turning to extensive force to minimize the capacity of armed groups and achieve a temporary deterrent effect (Inbar and Shamir 2014).

A second distinctive feature of the Israeli approach to counterinsurgency is its conceptualization of the role of civilians on the battlefield. Enemy-centric approaches typically view civilians as an obstacle to the attainment of military goals, a human shield protecting militants. While civilians are likely to pay a heavy price as the incidental, "collateral" damage of aggressive anti-insurgent campaigns, they are not the direct targets of military policy. Population-centric approaches, on the other hand, understand insurgency as a fundamentally political rather than military problem, requiring attention to political grievances. The objective of counterinsurgency in this perspective is to gain the support of the people, leading them to withdraw their support from insurgents. Civilians are therefore the primary targets of counterinsurgency policy, to be engaged through nonmilitary means such as political reform, economic development, and the provision of security.[22]

In contrast to these approaches, IDF counterinsurgency in the Second Intifada neither disregarded civilians nor viewed them as a population to be won over. Rather, civilians were understood as targets to be pressured and coerced so that they would realize that the cost of supporting an insurgency was greater than the price of rejecting it.[23] In the words of then-IDF General Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, the goal was to "sear the consciousness of Palestinians," compelling them to reject the insurgency. Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland described the role of civilians this way: "Wars in the current era occur in places where there are civilians and not on a distant battlefield where an army fights another army and ultimately the stronger army is the winner. Civilians are the center of the arena on the one hand, and they are also to a large extent the primary element whose consciousness, morale, and feelings [we] are trying to influence, and in consequence the pressure that it can exert on the leadership above it."[24]

Although framed in distinct terminology, the approach itself was not new. The idea that the population, when pressured, would exercise leverage on militants to refrain from violence dates back to the early 1950s, when Israel employed a strategy of collective punishment to curb cross-border infiltrations by displaced Palestinians, and had been used extensively both in the OPT and in Lebanon in subsequent decades (Maoz 2006; Ron 2003). Nor does this approach necessarily wreak more harm on civilian populations than other forms of counterinsurgency. Enemy-centric warfare, in particular, has led to extensive harm to civilians through the indiscriminate use of violence and disregard for civilian protection. Population-centric warfare, with its notion of combat as "armed social work" (Kilcullen 2006a), has in practice largely failed to live up to its lofty, if not unfeasible, aims.[25] The role of civilians in the Israeli approach to counterinsurgency is important, however, because it reveals a conflict between the principles of international humanitarian law on the one hand, and the operational approach to counterinsurgency on the other. This basic contradiction between the legal requirement to protect civilians and the operational notion of targeting them (through nonlethal means) led to considerable ambiguity in the statements of senior IDF officers, which was felt keenly by soldiers on the ground, as shall be seen throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Counterinsurgency Practices in the Second Intifada

The IDF's counterinsurgency tactics in the Second Intifada evolved over time, responding to changes in the nature and intensity of the insurgency, domestic politics, and international factors. As violence against Israeli civilians escalated,

public pressure mounted for the IDF to respond more forcefully. In addition, the attacks of 9/11 in the United States substantially reduced international pressure and constraints on IDF conduct, which was consequently framed as part of the emerging Global War on Terror.

Broadly, IDF practices in this period can be divided into three categories: defensive measures, offensive operations, and population-control tactics. Defensive measures were aimed at protecting Israeli soldiers, civilians, and property in the OPT and in Israel from violent attacks. Offensive operations were designed to kill or capture suspected insurgents, target supporting infrastructure, collect intelligence, and capture arms and equipment. The goal of population-control tactics such as curfews, closures, restrictions on the use of certain roads, and permit requirements, was more ambiguous. Israeli spokespeople (and their legal advisers) consistently claimed that the purpose of these measures was to disrupt insurgent activity and the ability of insurgents to move freely and to smuggle weapons.[26] However, in unofficial statements military leaders treated such measures as means of pressuring the population into rejecting the insurgency. This policy, informally termed "the levers policy," called for the imposition of pressure on the Palestinian Authority (PA) and on the Palestinian population as "levers" on insurgent activity (Ben-Yishai 2004; Harel and Issacharoff 2004; Lavie 2010; Petrelli 2013). As explained by a former senior IDF officer,

> Since 1996 we already started to formulate the policy of exerting, we called it exerting pressure levers . . . the harming of hope, the harming of economic security, the harming of innocent people, which is intentional . . . it's done intentionally, since it's viewed as pressure levers that are exercised on elements that are uninvolved in terror, so that they will put pressure on terror, so that it won't happen.[27]

These ambiguities regarding the goals of some of the IDF's counterinsurgency tactics shaped the context in which IDF soldiers operated throughout the Second Intifada. The next sections examine each group of tactics in turn.

Defensive Operations

Before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the OPT were controlled through three different regimes, pursuant to the stalled Oslo Accords signed in the previous decade (see figure 3.1).[28] The West Bank's major cities and towns, constituting approximately 18 percent of its territory, as well as a majority of the Gaza Strip, were designated "Area A" and entrusted to the control of the fledgling Palestinian Authority. The villages and towns surrounding Palestinian cities in the West Bank, constituting an additional 22 percent of the territory, were designated "Area B"



FIGURE 3.1. Map of the Oslo II Interim Agreement.

Note: Used by permission of Shaul Arieli, www.shaularieli.com.

and placed under the security control of Israel and the civilian control of the Palestinian Authority. The remaining areas—approximately 60 percent of the West Bank, which encompassed Jewish settlements and their surroundings, and 24 percent of the Gaza Strip, which included its Jewish settlements, the main roads leading to crossings with Israel, and the border area with Egypt—remained under full Israeli control.[29]

For more than a year after the Second Intifada began, the IDF largely adhered to the restrictions on military entry into Area A stipulated in the Oslo Accords, leaving territorial enclaves in which Palestinian armed groups could operate with relative freedom. To contain the escalating insurgent threat to Israeli civilians and soldiers, the IDF therefore initially relied mainly on a mix of defensive tactics and population-control mechanisms aimed at preventing approach or attack by insurgents on roads, settlements, and military and civilian targets.

Defensive activity primarily involved the use of mobile patrols and static military outposts to guard Israeli settlements, the boundaries between the OPT and Israel, and roads on which Israelis traveled. Military posts ranged from fortified outposts in the Gaza Strip, which were frequently the targets of insurgent fire or attempted infiltration, to temporary outposts in buildings in the West Bank, emptied of their Palestinian residents and converted into makeshift military bases. These defensive measures had substantial ramifications for the Palestinian popu-

lation, by marking some areas as off-limits to civilian access and forcefully enforcing these restrictions.

The effects of these policies were felt most acutely in Gaza, where the IDF's control of territory was more limited and the insurgent threat correspondingly greater.[30] To address the escalating insurgency, the IDF created a series of buffer zones around Israeli settlements, IDF posts, access roads, the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, and along the border with Egypt. The buffer zones were gradually cleared of trees, orchards, agricultural fields, greenhouses, and homes in a process euphemistically referred to in the military as "infrastructure operations" or "exposure."[31] Military forces razed buildings and vegetation that could obstruct their view of approaching threats, could or had served as the site for launching an insurgent attack, or could or had concealed an underground tunnel for smuggling weapons into Gaza from Egypt. Thousands of homes were demolished as a result of military "exposures," displacing thousands of civilians.[32] Throughout the Second Intifada such razing became so common that IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz referred to the D-9, the massive armored bulldozer that executed most of the demolitions, as Israel's strategic weapon in the Gaza Strip (B'Tselem 2002a, 6).

Idan, an infantry soldier who had served as a soldier and a commander in Gaza, described the expansion of the exposure policy and the gradual clearing of areas around his post:

> Over time the whole exposure thing began. . . . I'm talking about little things, not houses, but exposure of vegetation so that the territory would be clear for observation . . . so [insurgents] won't hide in certain places. When I returned to the area [later in my service] I'm talking about much more massive exposure . . . exposure that you decide on [at a much lower level of authority]. I suddenly realized that wow, you can take down entire areas around here. Not entire areas, let's keep things in proportion—I'm talking to you about areas of hundreds of meters, to keep the zone clear and sterile before the last defense lines, and to give you an easier range.

Extensive razing and clearing of territory noticeably changed the Gazan landscape around areas where the IDF exercised control. Gil recalled that when his father drove him to his base on one occasion, he was struck by all the changes that had occurred in Gaza since he himself had served there many years earlier:

> He was utterly shocked that there was nothing there. Nothing. Everything was flat, everything was level. He was shocked. [He remembered] hills next to the ocean, sand dunes, trees, palm trees, and now it just looked dead, an empty plane.

IDF officers cited military necessity as justification for the demolition policy and pointed to its successes in blocking insurgent attacks. According to Major General (ret.) Doron Almog (2004), because of the security buffer zones, of the more than 400 attempts to enter Israel from Gaza during his term as head of the IDF Southern Command between 2000 and 2003, not one succeeded. Human rights groups, in contrast, charged that the demolition policy was implemented disproportionally and constituted collective punishment.[33] When asked by a military reporter whether Israel had excessively razed buildings and trees, Brigadier General (ret.) Dov Sedaka, then head of the Defense Ministry's Civil Administration, the body responsible for managing civil affairs in the OPT, responded in the affirmative: "In Gaza—very much. I think they did some excessive things. . . . After [violent attacks in two Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip] they committed very massive exposure. They uprooted hundreds of *dunam* of strawberries and orchards and greenhouses. . . . In the West Bank as well there are places where we are not innocent of it. Sometimes I approve a certain amount of exposure but when I get to the field I find hyperactive forces."[34]

Defensive practices also increasingly put civilians at risk, the result of a change to the IDF rules of engagement. Before the Second Intifada, the rules of engagement in the OPT were based on a policing paradigm, permitting soldiers to use live fire only as a last resort, for self-defense, or in the course of arrest of an individual suspected of committing a dangerous crime (B'Tselem (2002b). Some months before the Second Intifada broke out, in anticipation of an outburst of violence, the IDF's legal division prepared a new set of rules of engagement that expanded the authority of soldiers to open fire at Palestinians whom they deemed a source of danger.[35] Shortly after the outbreak of the violence, the Israeli government announced that it viewed unfolding events as an "armed conflict short of war," shifting the legal regime from one of policing to one of armed conflict.[36] Throughout the Second Intifada, rules of engagement changed frequently and were kept classified. While in the past soldiers received pocket copies of the rules during basic training, this practice was suspended during the Second Intifada, and the rules became specific to the period and area, transmitted orally to soldiers by their commanders.[37] Designed to allow soldiers to operate more freely against a growing insurgent threat, the looser regulations—when in force in densely populated areas—led to a rise in civilian casualties.

The increased ease of opening fire in Gaza was most evident in the newly established (but unmarked) buffer zones, in which anyone who entered was subject to a substantial risk of being shot (Drucker and Shelach 2005, 33–34).[38] According to the Israeli human rights organization B'tselem, this policy led to the killing of at least 105 civilians between the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the IDF's pullout from Gaza in the summer of 2005.[39] As was typical of the period,

rules of engagement in the security buffer zones were classified and changed often.[40] Nadav, a former infantry commander who served in Gaza between 2001–3, explained how the regulations eased over time:

> At first there was a lot of emphasis on warning the suspect. You yell, and in the worst-case scenario you shoot in the air. Shooting at the knees and downward happened in really extreme cases. At some point [later on] . . . no one had any business approaching us. In other words, you're at your post, defensive posts around the settlement, and whoever approaches you shoot . . . shoot to kill. In other areas it was different because there were still civilians, and Palestinian civilians drove on roads parallel to the roads we worked on . . . so you didn't immediately . . . shoot to kill. But ultimately the [old warning] procedure was disregarded; it just didn't exist much of the time.

IDF regulations also adapted to the steep rise in gunfire, mortar, and rocket attacks launched by Palestinian armed groups. In the case of such fire soldiers were authorized to fire back at the source of attack. However, identifying the precise source of fire was often impossible, and as a result fire was sometimes directed only in a general direction, sometimes at "suspicious points" (perhaps identified in past attacks), and sometimes in no particular direction at all, occasionally leading to civilian casualties. Gil, who served in Gaza between 2001 and 2003, described this practice:

> We were in the military base near [the settlement of] Netzarim just as the area was heating up, during the major mayhem there, and we shifted from not firing for a week to firing every day, until the [Israeli] civilians there complained to my company commander that we were making too much noise. We really fired there like crazy some nights.

In the West Bank, indiscriminate fire from defensive military posts was more characteristic of the Intifada's first eighteen months, before the IDF's entry into and increasing offensive operations within Area A, culminating in its reoccupation of West Bank cities in Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002 (see the later discussion). As in Gaza, lack of control in that first period meant that the IDF often could not identify precisely where insurgent fire had originated. Yoav, a former paratrooper, explained,

> The army in the Intifada—before Operation Defensive Shield and after Operation Defensive Shield—was two completely different things. Because before we went in during Operation Defensive Shield . . . the IDF wouldn't enter [Palestinian territory]. There was Area A, Area B,

> and all that silly stuff. We were stationed outside, and the only thing we would do was fire at the refugee camps with no target. For instance, someone would identify a target; it could even just be something that someone imagined. . . . He would say I identified a target—and everyone would fire. . . . It was all about looking from the outside and firing and firing and firing and not really getting mixed up in there.[41]

In the Intifada's second year, the IDF increasingly began to conduct offensive operations in Area A, eventually retaking control of the territory. Indiscriminate fire in the West Bank therefore declined with time, though it remained a feature of combat service in the Gaza Strip.[42]

THE SEPARATION BARRIER

The lack of physical separation between the West Bank and Israel meant that Palestinians, both civilians and insurgents, continued to enter Israel with relative ease. In June 2002, in response to mounting domestic pressure following a series of deadly suicide bombings inside Israel, the Israeli government approved the construction of a barrier to physically separate the West Bank from Israel. Initially, the IDF proposed a route that ran largely along the Green Line (Drucker and Shelach 2005). However Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon rejected the proposed route, instead planning a route in the West Bank that would encircle many of its Jewish settlements, expropriate large amounts of territory, separate Palestinians from their agricultural land, and seal in villages and disconnect them from vital services in urban centers. Between 2003 and 2007, the Israeli High Court declared parts of the route illegal four times, leading to its rerouting. Still, more than 80 percent of the altered route is located inside the West Bank (Bimkom and B'tselem 2005; B'tselem 2012).

For much of its route the barrier consists of a zone ranging between 35 and 100 meters in width, comprised of a system of fences, patrol roads, ditches, side service roads, and a buffer area. Approximately 4 percent of the barrier, particularly around the urban areas of Jerusalem, Tulkarem, and Qalqilya, comprises a concrete wall six to eight meters high (B'tselem 2012). The projected length of the barrier is 708 km (twice the length of the Green Line), of which approximately 65 percent had been constructed as of 2017.[43]

The barrier route created a series of enclaves sandwiched between the barrier and the Green Line, amounting to some 10 percent of the territory of the West Bank. The IDF declared the area a closed military zone that it dubbed "the seam zone." A strict permit regime was imposed on the area, requiring its 6,500 residents to obtain (and periodically renew) residential permits, and visitors, agricultural laborers, and workers wishing to access the area to obtain personal per-

mits. Access to the "seam zone" from the West Bank for residents and visitors is possible through the major crossing checkpoints and through a series of electronic gates, some of which open and close at set hours daily and others of which open seasonally during the harvest season. The stringent permit requirements and irregular enforcement of opening hours have inflicted severe economic damage on rural communities in the West Bank and hardships on its residents.[44]

Offensive Operations

In the first year of the Intifada, when the IDF mostly refrained from deploying its ground forces within PA-controlled areas, its offensive measures consisted primarily of two main tactics. First, it conducted aerial strikes of Palestinian government institutions and other buildings serving Palestinian organizations accused of contributing to the insurgency. These operations, often communicated in advance so that the buildings could be emptied of their inhabitants, were meant to signify that Israel held the PA responsible for controlling insurgent violence and to appease domestic demands for military action (see, for example, Eldar 2005, 18–19). Second, approximately a month after the Intifada began, Israel embarked on an official policy of targeted killings—killing militants and political figures in Palestinian armed groups. Between November 2000 and the end of 2005, nearly 300 armed group members and approximately 150 civilians were killed in these attacks.[45]

Israel's official policy of targeted killings has received widespread attention and has had a considerable impact on counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere.[46] In particular, the United States, which adopted such a policy following the attacks of September 11, has made targeted killings a cornerstone of its counterinsurgency tactics, employing them extensively in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and, more recently, in Yemen and Somalia. A focus on this much-analyzed policy, however, maintains an emphasis on strategic calculations and consequently misses the majority of military activity in this period. I therefore examine operations that were much more typical of ground force activity at the time, such as fighting in urban centers, searches and raids, and punitive house demolitions, and the implications of these measures for civilians.

LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS

As the Palestinian insurgency escalated, and particularly with the advent of suicide bombings in Israeli cities, pressure mounted both from the IDF and from the Israeli public to deploy troops in the cities and towns of the West Bank. Beginning in the second half of 2001, and especially after the assassination of the Israeli Minister of Tourism by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

gunmen in October 2001, the army began conducting raids into towns in Area A. These incursions were initially brief and required the approval of the IDF general staff (see Hirsch 2004), but these restrictions were eased over time. The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, cleared the way for more aggressive Israeli tactics as international support for counterterrorism measures rose sharply. In early 2002 the IDF effectively abandoned the distinction between Areas A, B, and C and dramatically increased its offensive operations in Area A.

The turn to offensive tactics reached its height in March 2002, the bloodiest month of the insurgency in terms of the Israeli civilian death toll: 105 Israeli civilians and 26 soldiers were killed that month, culminating in a suicide terror bombing that killed 30 civilians during a Passover celebration at an Israeli hotel. Within days the Israeli government authorized Operation Defensive Shield, a large-scale, month-long ground operation that took place in nearly all of the West Bank's major cities. The incursion, which involved the largest emergency call-up of reserve soldiers in twenty years, brought tanks, infantry, and combat engineering forces into the crowded streets of Palestinian towns and refugee camps (Harel and Issacharoff 2004, 237). In Ramallah, IDF troops laid siege to the PA presidential compound, the *Muqata'a,* isolating PA leader Yasser Arafat in his residence until his death in 2004.

Gilad, a former infantry commander, was deployed at the time outside of Nablus, where he could observe the rapid occupation of the city:

> We had the best possible vantage point. The best example of what happened was that initially the *muezzin* would call people to prayer every day like clockwork, but after a few days the *muezzin* stopped and there was silence. . . . We saw the vehicles move in total desolation. Maybe not at first, but after a few days everything looked dead except for the occasional military vehicle. And sometimes we would suddenly see a long line of Arabs, Nablus residents, who surrendered or were arrested, which was pretty amazing to see. . . . We saw a few military vehicles and then several dozen people just waiting to be loaded onto the vehicles and investigated. . . . The first few days it was like listening to a war; there were helicopters all the time, and jets; and then in the last days we just saw a few army vehicles circling the city, a few tanks in the middle of Nablus, and the place was desolate. No one left the house. You see there was nothing there, no movement, just a few isolated tanks circling the city.

During major operations, Palestinian civilians were placed under curfew for days or weeks, with only a few occasional hours to replenish necessary items. The curfew was enforced through permissive rules of engagement, which viewed almost anyone as a suspect (see B'tselem 2002d). Yair, a former infantry office recalled,

> They made sure there was a curfew. I saw it first in Nablus and then in Bethlehem. No one leaves the house, period. They were told that if they left their houses they'd get shot. People didn't dare leave their houses . . . and it was very easy to enforce. If in the past [soldiers] would shout or shoot in the air . . . now if someone left the house and started walking—boom! You fire a round near their legs and they run back inside. People wouldn't go out. If someone went out, then immediately a tank would fire a round near him, or one of our snipers on the roof.

Much of the contact between soldiers and civilians during these operations took place inside Palestinian homes, which soldiers entered to conduct searches and arrests and confiscate weapons and equipment. The behavior of units inside these homes varied (as analyzed in the remaining chapters of this book): some were destructive, sometimes taking private property in contravention of orders; others were careless; and still others made efforts to preserve the space as best they could. In all cases, however, such contact invaded the most intimate spaces of private life, upsetting and often frightening family members. Shai, a former member of an elite unit, explained how the operations were experienced from the point of view of combat soldiers:

> The most contact [we had] with civilians was in Operation Defensive Shield, because you actually went into people's homes. The rules were that once you enter a home you first shut the family in one room under the watch of a guard, and they are not allowed to leave except to get food or go to the restroom or something. . . . Sometimes that meant going into people's homes in the middle of the night, and sometimes it meant making a hole in their wall to move into the neighbor's house.

During the operation the IDF conducted mass arrests, arresting approximately 7,000 Palestinians, the majority of whom were released without charges within days or weeks (B'tselem 2002c). Yair described his perspective on arrests in Nablus:

> In the center of Nablus for instance, nearly every young man was arrested. Everyone who was a certain age went to a detention center and was investigated. Lots of them were subsequently released . . . so they were constantly coming back. People would walk with a note from the security services explaining why they were in the streets, but they were really scared; they usually waved a white undershirt in the street so that no one would shoot them.

To protect its men from ambushes, IEDs, and sniper fire in narrow urban streets, the IDF used several tactics, each of which had grave implications for

civilians and for civilian property and infrastructure. In some areas, most famously in Nablus, soldiers tore through the internal walls of buildings rather than on the streets, minimizing their exposure to snipers but inflicting heavy damage on civilian structures.[47] In the Jenin refugee camp, after twenty-three IDF soldiers were killed in an insurgent ambush, a different tactic was used: IDF forces moved behind armored D-9 bulldozers that cleared roads to allow for the movement of tanks and infantry through the camp's narrow alleyways, in the process leveling between 80 and 140 buildings and wreaking extensive damage to infrastructure, leaving thousands of people homeless.[48] Finally, the IDF sometimes made use of Palestinian civilians during military operations, enlisting them to search buildings suspected of being booby-trapped, to protect IDF forces by checking or removing suspicious objects or walking in front of soldiers, and most extensively, to enter the homes of suspected armed insurgents and order their occupants out—a practice termed the "neighbor procedure."[49] Extensive property damage—to infrastructure, vehicles, furniture, PA offices, and their equipment and supplies—was evident in many of the locations in which the forces operated (Harel and Issacharoff 2004). Approximately 250 Palestinians, militants and civilians, were killed in the operation across the West Bank.[50]

Operation Defensive Shield was deemed a military success by the IDF, because it was able to reestablish its military presence in Palestinian population centers while sustaining relatively few casualties: thirty-four Israeli soldiers were killed, twenty-three of whom were killed in Jenin. The operation ended what was left of the PA's security authority in much of the West Bank, reestablishing Israel's authority throughout the territory. By early May, the IDF released most of its called-up reservists and withdrew its forces from Palestinian cities.

Yet despite the operation's perceived effectiveness in Israel, suicide bombings soon resumed in full force, killing forty-five Israelis in May and June. As a result, the IDF embarked on a second large-scale operation, lasting several months and designed to regain effective control of the entire West Bank. Many Palestinian towns were once again placed under curfew, and IDF troops conducted repeated raids and arrested hundreds of suspected insurgents and supporters. The pattern of brief offensive raids, house-to-house searches, arrests, and strikes in the West Bank would continue throughout the Second Intifada.

While Operation Defensive Shield and its subsequent operations gradually reestablished Israeli military control across the West Bank, a similar operation was deemed impossible and unnecessary in the Gaza Strip for several reasons. First, throughout the Second Intifada, Israeli security authorities considered Gaza a far more dangerous zone of operations than the West Bank. Insurgents in Gaza were more heavily armed, and violence employed against Israeli soldiers and settlers was more lethal and sophisticated. Kobi, a former infantry soldier

who served in various posts in the Gaza Strip from 2001 to 2003, described a typical day in Gaza:

> Almost every day there was a [violent] incident. Every night there was an incident. And it's not just [targeting] military posts, but for example IEDs on the road, attempted infiltrations [of settlements and bases], and mortar fire also. . . . It was like that everywhere we were. . . . I think the Gaza Strip was more intense in terms of [violent] events, fire episodes, confrontations [with militants], etc. . . . It happened much more and I think with a much greater intensity. And different weapons too, like anti-tank missiles and mortars, things you don't have in the West Bank, and [armed] contact at a very short range.

At the same time, the insurgent threat was largely contained within the Gaza Strip, because Gaza was surrounded by a heavily guarded barrier and buffered by a military no-go zone, which made entry into Israel nearly impossible. Gaza also contained far fewer Jewish settlers than the West Bank, with approximately 7,000 residing in the former and more than 200,000 in the latter during this period.[51] In the West Bank, Israeli settlers were more likely to come into contact with Palestinians, whereas in Gaza separation between Palestinians and Israelis was far more stark. Israel's strategy in Gaza thus initially relied largely on its new rules of engagement and extensive razing of Palestinian territory to separate Palestinians from Israelis settlers and soldiers. However, this policy proved inadequate with time, as insurgents in Gaza developed indirect fire capabilities, firing makeshift mortars and artillery rockets first at military posts and settlements in Gaza and later over the barrier into nearby Israeli towns and villages. Though these unsophisticated and imprecise weapons were far less threatening to Israeli interests than the suicide bombings emanating from the West Bank, they nevertheless presented the IDF with a challenge that existing strategies could not counter.[52]

As a result, beginning in the end of 2001, the IDF began conducting brief offensive raids in Gaza's cities and refugee camps (Harel and Issacharoff 2004, 264). The operations had several objectives: demolishing homes of suspected insurgents (punitive house demolitions), destroying rocket and explosive manufacturing sites, destroying tunnels used to smuggle weapons under the border with Egypt, razing territory close to the border to prevent future construction, and capturing or killing insurgents. Many commanders interpreted these objectives broadly. For example, the IDF destroyed many sites with "the potential of rocket manufacturing," including small manufacturing workshops and metalworking sites across the strip, killing more than 150 Palestinians in the process (Eldar 2005, 222–23).

And though Operation Defensive Shield did not extend to the Gaza Strip, IDF troops did conduct two large-scale operations in Gaza more than two years

later, which it dubbed "Operation Rainbow" and "Operation Days of Penitence." The first operation was authorized by the Israeli government in response to several Palestinian insurgent attacks in the Gaza Strip that killed five civilians and thirteen soldiers. The official goals of the operation were to reduce insurgent activity against IDF soldiers on the Israeli-controlled border zone with Egypt, known as the Philadelphi Route, and to destroy smuggling tunnels that had been dug under the border (Eldar 2005, 268). The operation took place under heavy IDF fire in various neighborhoods of Rafah and lasted approximately one week. The precise scope of damage is disputed: The IDF claimed that forty militants and fourteen unarmed Palestinians were killed, and fifty-six buildings were destroyed. Human Rights Watch (2004) claimed, based on local human rights groups and media accounts, that fifty-nine people were killed, of whom eighteen were armed. According to UNRWA, 166 houses were destroyed, leaving more than two thousand Palestinians homeless. The second operation was conducted in northern Gaza in response to the killing of two toddlers by a rocket fired at an Israeli town. Large IDF ground and air forces entered the crowded towns and refugee camps to kill insurgents and destroy rocket production facilities. Approximately 116 Palestinians were killed in the operation, and more than 230 homes were destroyed or badly damaged.[53]

SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS

In the months and years following Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF conducted numerous raids in the West Bank designed to kill or capture suspected insurgents, collect intelligence, and prevent or disrupt insurgent attacks. A common offensive operation was the arrest of suspected militants or others wanted for investigation by the Israeli security services. More complicated and risky arrests were assigned to elite units, but over time the vast numbers of arrests meant that ordinary infantry units also conducted arrest operations. In some periods, combatants recalled conducting arrests in Area A nearly every night, with some respondents, particularly in elite units, reporting having participated in hundreds of such operations.

An additional offensive tactic used to target insurgents was referred to by the Israeli press as the "stimulus and response" operation, in which small teams of infantry soldiers would covertly enter a civilian home and set up sniper positions.[54] Typically, another military force would then noisily enter the area as a decoy. When Palestinian gunmen began to fire at the entering force, the hidden snipers would target them. These urban ambushes lasted several hours or even a number of days. During such ambushes soldiers would confiscate the household's cell phones and shut residents in one room under the watch of a guard for the duration of the

operation. In some cases, the IDF would first rehearse the operation in another, nearby civilian home.[55] Other operations included searches of homes and offices, whether as part of major house-to-house search operations or in response to information regarding the location of arms or explosives.

A final tactic with grave consequences for civilians was the demolition of homes belonging to militants who had planned or carried out violent attacks against Israelis.[56] In the Second Intifada, 664 homes were demolished under these circumstances, leaving several thousand homeless.[57] Israeli security officials argued that demolitions were a powerful deterrent against violent attacks against Israelis and, in the case of suicide bombings, were one of the few ways to deter attackers who, though willing to give up their own lives, might nevertheless wish to protect their families from losing their homes. Such demolitions, however, were ordered not only against suicide bombers but also against others who were involved in the attacks (including failed attacks) and who had assisted in planning or dispatching them. In addition, nearly half of the demolitions were of homes adjacent to those of the suspects (B'tselem 2004). Punitive house demolitions were stopped for several years in 2005 after an IDF internal committee found that they were not an effective deterrent and that their legality was questionable.[58]

In Gaza, offensive operations were typically larger in scale and heavily fortified, including infantry, armor, air cover, and Special Forces. Over time IDF attention increasingly turned to the border with Egypt, where dozens of underground tunnels were constructed connecting the Egyptian side and the Palestinian side of Rafah, some of which were used to smuggle arms and explosives. Many operations were conducted to bomb these tunnels and demolish the surrounding homes. Other operations sought to address the growing number of mortar and rocket launches. Dror, who participated in several such raids in Gaza between 2002 and 2004, recalled,

> Every operation was a war movie. . . . After [the summer of 2003] we were surprised when we didn't find a tunnel. Every other building hid a tunnel. Weapons were scattered around like peanuts. So of course operations required many more forces . . . and the objectives of the operations were much deeper. That is, to destroy infrastructure, weapon workshops for instance, to look for the production system, rather than the gun.

Brigadier General Shmuel Zakai observed that "Gaza was the IDF's punching bag" in the Second Intifada (qtd. in Eldar 2005, 268). Finding it difficult to locate rocket-manufacturing sites, the IDF broadly targeted metalwork workshops and, when that failed, sought to reduce Palestinian motivation to fight by inflicting heavy damage and killing insurgents (Eldar 2005).

Population-Control Measures

Population-control measures had been administered by Israeli security forces in the OPT since their occupation in 1967 (Berda 2017). However, the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, and especially the Second Intifada, precipitated a steep and unprecedented rise in the use of measures designed to monitor and control the population.[59] This increase was achieved by fragmenting the territory into separate cells and imposing strict restrictions on the movement of people, goods, and services both within the OPT and between the OPT and Israel.[60]

The principal population-control strategy was the severe restriction of Palestinian movement through physical obstacles and administrative measures. Physical obstacles included the placement of roadblocks, ditches, and earth mounds, as well as partial and full-time staffed checkpoints, around towns and villages in the West Bank. Movement between these obstacles was governed by a labyrinthine permit system administered by regional District Coordination Offices (DCOs), branches of the Ministry of Defense's Civil Administration Authority. Movement permits required a magnetic ID card, subject to regular renewal, for which eligible civilians, who had not been classified by Israel's security services as "denied entry," could apply.[61] Those who possessed an ID card and were able to access the regional DCO office, an act that itself often required movement through checkpoints (as well as long waits and, in many cases, multiple visits), could apply for a dizzying array of permits valid for limited periods, depending on the purpose of travel.[62] Even a valid permit did not guarantee movement, however, since permits could be revoked at any time without notice for political or security considerations, and whether or not they were honored often depended on the discretion of the soldiers at the checkpoint. As a result many civilians traveled without a permit, using improvised bypass roads to circumvent checkpoints.

The checkpoints created constant friction between soldiers and Palestinian civilians and became symbols of civilian suffering in the Second Intifada.[63] In ever-shifting and often arbitrary ways, obstacles to movement barred access to schools, medical care, and jobs; imposed long waits at multiple locations in difficult physical conditions; separated friends and family members; and created constant uncertainty as to whether movement on any particular day would be possible. Moreover, the behavior of soldiers at checkpoints was often aggressive, including shouts, threats, and brandishing of weapons. Yoav, the former paratrooper, explained,

> You have to control all these people, so you have to be aggressive so they won't overwhelm you. Think about it: it can be a situation of 2–3 soldiers and suddenly 100 people [approach]. If you're not aggressive

> they can run at you. . . . It's only possible to the extent that you communicate aggression.

Media attention tended to focus on unusual and dramatic events, such as women giving birth while detained at checkpoints or sick and elderly people collapsing for lack of prompt medical care.[64] The primary focus of this section, however, is the everyday violence of the checkpoint—the long waits, lack of basic facilities, arbitrary changes to regulations, and the often insurmountable difficulties of obtaining permits—that is the primary focus of this section. Although difficult to quantify because it does not divide easily into neat indicators, such ordinary violence was often the most insidious source of harm to civilians inflicted by the military during the Second Intifada. As Hammami (2004, 27) argues, "The world witnesses the tank invasions and aerial assassinations, but rarely sees the relentless everyday of 'internal closures,' whose impact has been to create a crushing regime of sanctions that has forced 60% of the population into poverty."

COMPREHENSIVE CLOSURE

The Israeli government declared the West Bank a closed military zone on its occupation in 1967. In 1972, however, then-Israeli minister of defense Moshe Dayan instituted a general exit permit from the OPT into Israel (Berda 2017). For two decades, Palestinians moved relatively freely across the Green Line, leading to growing Israeli reliance on Palestinian workers. The blanket policy was revoked in 1991, and the OPT were placed under general closure, enforced by checkpoints at border areas, forbidding Palestinians to enter Israel or to travel between the different territories without an individual permit from Israeli security authorities. Throughout the 1990s, the level of enforcement of the closure varied. On occasion, such as during Israeli holidays or in response to violent attacks, Israel would tighten its closure policy, imposing comprehensive closure on the OPT. Under comprehensive closure, all entry permits were revoked, no additional permits were issued, and commercial crossing points were closed, barring commercial goods from entering or exiting areas under the control of the PA.

Immediately after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in October 2000, comprehensive closure was imposed on all of the OPT, reaching a peak of 244 days in 2001. After 2001 Israel began issuing restricted work permits to limited numbers of Palestinian workers, as well as permits for necessary medical treatment, reimposing comprehensive closure from time to time, as illustrated by figure 3.2.

Workers continued to enter Israel illegally through the West Bank's porous border, but movement out of Gaza, surrounded by an elaborate barrier system, was largely halted.[65] Before the Second Intifada, more than 20 percent of the Palestinian workforce was employed in Israel. As a result of the comprehensive



FIGURE 3.2. Percent days of comprehensive closure per quarter, October 2000–December 2005.

Note: Data compiled from "Figures on Comprehensive Closure Days," B'Tselem, accessed August 8, 2019, https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/siege_figures.

closure, tens of thousands of Palestinians lost their jobs, causing a severe blow to the Palestinian economy.[66]

The imposition of comprehensive closure also severely curtailed the flow of goods in and out of the Palestinian territories. At one point in the Intifada's early months, Israel's deputy minister of defense, Ephraim Sneh, requested that the export of strawberries be allowed from the Gaza Strip. An officer close to then Chief of Staff Ya'alon would later remark that "the Palestinians were on the verge of breaking, but the strawberry issue ruined the chance of breaking them." (Drucker and Shelach 2005, 83). In a similar vein, the commander of one of the regional brigades in the West Bank blamed the IDF's failure to "break the Palestinians" on the decision to allow a shipment of cement into one of the Palestinian cities.[67]

Checkpoints alongside the boundary between Israel and the West Bank (known as "Green Line checkpoints," though often located inside the West Bank) were initially fairly crude installations, consisting of a few cement blocks, a makeshift shelter for soldiers on duty, and perhaps a watchtower. At peak hours, hundreds of civilians would crowd around the checkpoint, making the task of monitoring nearly impossible. Yair described his experiences in the early months of the Second Intifada at the Qalandia checkpoint, which separated the Palestinian city of Ramallah from the Jerusalem area[68]:

> It was a major mess back then. One of our guys lost an eye . . . because there was such chaos. There were demonstrations every day; people threw rocks and [soldiers] didn't know how to handle it. . . . It was a huge checkpoint and it wasn't clear [what to do]. They told us our job wasn't to check people . . . just to make sure suspicious people didn't cross. . . . They told us not to start checking every car because there were too many cars and it would create huge traffic jams, and there's media there all the time. Just protect each other, open the hood and look under, don't ask people to get out of their car. . . . Every time something else. It was really difficult . . . and there were demonstrations right up to the checkpoint. We used to stop them 10 meters from the checkpoint. It was really hard to control the chaos there. All the vehicles pushing forward, and all those organizations like "Women in Black" would yell at us, "Why aren't you letting the ambulances through?" There was a special ambulance lane. . . . It was total, total chaos.

Adding to the feeling of chaos at the checkpoints themselves was that fact that in many locations they could be bypassed with relative ease. As a result, one of the main tasks of soldiers was to patrol the areas around checkpoints to ensure no one entered Israel illegally. Soldiers were charged with apprehending Palestinians; checking their papers to ensure they were not blacklisted, wanted for investigation, or otherwise suspected by the security services; and then sending them back to the OPT.[69]

Ben-Ari et al. (2005) describe the governing regime at checkpoints as based on three parallel modes of control: administrative, security, and humanitarian. The administrative mode involved enforcement of the permit system that determined who could cross and when. Although ostensibly based on a series of bureaucratic rules and regulations, in practice the permit system was difficult to enforce, because it had grown to unmanageable proportions and regulations were shifting and often seemed arbitrary. Daniel, who served as an infantry officer in the West Bank in 2001, described this confusing situation:

> At 6:00 a.m. the people begin to flow in, lots of people. But they only tell you which cars are allowed to cross that day at 5:30 a.m. And the orders change every day. Today it's just construction materials and tomorrow only corn . . . and you know, there's no way there's any logic to it, it's not like [they're saying] "today we're afraid of a terrorist who will come in a vehicle carrying corn"; there's absolutely no logic to it whatsoever.

At the same time soldiers enforced a system of military control in which there was an ever-present risk of attack, either against the soldiers themselves or through

the smuggling of arms or insurgents into Israel. For soldiers, this meant viewing each Palestinian as a potential terrorist threat and treating him or her accordingly. This mode of control was particularly salient following attacks on checkpoints or the interception of arms or insurgents, as described by Eran, who had served as an army paramedic in Gaza in 2000–2002:

> We got to the checkpoint and there was a frantic ambulance there that wanted to transfer a woman in labor from a hospital in the south of Gaza to one in the north. The soldiers there had only been there for a week; they were very humanitarian [*sic*], and immediately let them pass. We stopped them at the last moment; something didn't look right to my officer. . . . We lifted up the woman, really it was a woman in her tenth month, her water had broken, I can testify, and there were three IEDs under her. She was lying on them. And then you have a really tough dilemma, she's about to give birth; eventually she gave birth at the military clinic and was then arrested, no joke . . . 3 explosive belts—it doesn't matter what happened to her. . . . But a week later at that same checkpoint an 80-year-old Palestinian with a heart condition died; he was detained, they didn't let him pass, they detained him. And then you say, it's so inhumane, it's so unjust, but you understand the situation that a week earlier the same soldiers wanted to let someone pass and were taken advantage of. You're between a rock and a hard place; you can't win no matter what you do. . . . That checkpoint commander there went to jail for two months.

Finally, a humanitarian mode of control was instituted to allow for the passage of emergency cases, often after the intervention of local human rights groups. However, the decision of which cases should be considered "humanitarian" was generally left to the discretion of individual soldiers, leading to substantial variation in how such cases were treated.

INTERNAL CLOSURES

While closure of the Occupied Territories had been imposed in the past, a hallmark of IDF policy in the Second Intifada was the internal closure. Beginning in October 2000, in response to the lynching in Ramallah of two Israeli reserve soldiers, many of the West Bank's towns and villages were placed under internal closure by blocking their access roads both with physical obstacles and with permanent and temporary checkpoints. These unmanned roadblocks and, in some cases, even manned checkpoints could be bypassed on foot through makeshift dirt paths. In early 2001, after the election of hardliner Ariel Sharon as prime minister, the policy of internal closure became stricter: the IDF Central Command de-

cided that each village in the West Bank would be completely blocked with the exception of only one exit (Drucker and Shelach 2005). Through severe restrictions on movement, internal closures cut off villages from adjacent urban centers; impaired access to medical care, educational facilities, and workplaces; and had a devastating impact on the Palestinian economy.[70] Closures were usually tightened after Palestinian attacks in Israel, reflecting IDF policy of demonstrating the "price of terror" to the population.

Hundreds of internal roadblocks and dozens of manned checkpoints dotted the West Bank, their numbers fluctuating in response to political and military events.[71] The internal closure policy effectively severed the West Bank into six territorial units, separated by a network of checkpoints and roadblocks with shifting levels of restrictions on movement, as well as internal fragmentation inside these units.

Physical roadblocks and ditches were created by soldiers in a variety of ways, as explained by Josh, who served as a tank commander in the Nablus area in 2002:

> I went in a few times for "infrastructure activity," meaning to accompany a D-9 to block [roads]. . . . We got to the path and I told him to block it. There was an orchard close by so I thought he'd bring dirt from there. But no, he just dug into the ground, opened up the entire infrastructure, sewage, whatever was there, and created a hill. So you think, "OK, that's how it's done; well I didn't know, but go for it."

The physical obstacles funneled pedestrian and vehicle traffic into military checkpoints throughout the West Bank. As at the Green Line checkpoints, the rules at internal checkpoints were ever changing. At some times and in some areas, permits were required to travel in vehicles, to move inside the West Bank during internal closure, or to access health services. Other times, blanket prohibitions were imposed on movement based on gender, age, and residence. Blanket prohibitions were particularly common in the first years of the Intifada, but in certain locations they remained in force for much longer. In Nablus, considered by the IDF to be a center of insurgent activity, entry and exit were only permitted through one of four surrounding checkpoints, and blanket restrictions were particularly far-reaching. Private vehicles were completely barred from entering the city without a special permit, and throughout 2002 and 2003—and periodically in 2004–7—certain categories of people (typically men aged sixteen to thirty-five) could not enter or leave the area without permits, which were granted primarily on medical or other urgent humanitarian grounds (B'tselem 2007).

Because soldiers staffing the checkpoint were given the ultimate discretion in determining who could pass and who could not, there was substantial variation in patterns of enforcement of administrative rules at checkpoints. Typically,

enforcement was much stricter in the wake of insurgent attacks on soldiers or civilians. For instance, after a series of attacks on checkpoints in the Ramallah area in early 2002 in which seventeen soldiers and civilians were killed, the behavior of soldiers at checkpoints reflected the soldiers' tension, as described by Yair:

> People were really on edge [after the attacks]. . . . You don't know when someone will flash a gun. . . . There were clear regulations for all commanders and soldiers. . . . A vehicle or a person would approach, and you'd stop him 30, 50 meters from the checkpoint. Everyone lifts their shirts, turns around, one guy brings their papers, and you check all the papers with the GSS [General Security Services]. and then check them one by one. You take apart the entire vehicle while one or two soldiers stand close by with loaded rifles pointed at all the people. Everyone stands in one place; no one takes any risks. We all point our rifles. That was the situation.

However, actual monitoring at the checkpoint was often ineffective, as a handful of soldiers tried to control the movement of masses of civilians. Hammami (2004, 26–27) described the commute between Ramallah and Birzeit University that required crossing a pedestrian-only checkpoint:

> Commuters would disembark from transit vans that jammed both ends of the no-drive zone. Skirting rubble and concrete blocks, they would trip down the valley and hold their breath as they passed the Israeli soldiers, before finally trudging up the incline to the vans on the other side. Thousands made the walk every day. . . . On the worst days, trigger-happy soldiers suddenly prohibited pedestrian traffic, and students and villagers were stranded on the wrong side of getting to work or home. More commonly, soldiers would drop in at the checkpoint for a few hours, to toy with the droves of walking commuters, stopping all—or a select few—for interminable identity card and baggage checks.

Internal closures were much more prevalent in the West Bank than in Gaza, where a fortified barrier sealed in the strip, creating complete separation from the state of Israel, and where most Palestinian towns and villages were territorially contiguous. However, on several occasions after Palestinian violent attacks, Israel would block the main road traversing the Gaza Strip, thereby partitioning the strip into separate areas and severing north from south.

Internal and external closures were not the only forms of population-control mechanisms that Israel employed. Throughout the Second Intifada, Palestinian travel on major West Bank roads was fully or partially restricted,

making travel within the West Bank much longer and more costly and creating "Israeli-only" roads in the Occupied Territories.[72] Random or "flying" checkpoints were set up frequently across the West Bank, imposing spot checks and prolonging travel even more. Lengthy curfews were often imposed on Palestinian towns and villages during the first years of the Second Intifada to facilitate military activity. In all, the harsh population-control measures that the IDF implemented during the Second Intifada were a major source of civilian victimization.[73]

Throughout the Second Intifada Israel employed a range of defensive, offensive, and population-control measures to repress the Palestinian insurgency. Some of these measures were familiar from the IDF's administration of the OPT in previous decades. Others were new or employed at unprecedented levels. Some of the IDF tactics described here were later adopted by other militaries engaged in counterinsurgency.

From a strictly military standpoint, IDF counterinsurgency in the Second Intifada achieved its objectives: the insurgency was repressed, and Palestinian armed groups failed to reach their strategic goals. The occupation of the West Bank was reentrenched and Israeli control over the Palestinian population further cemented. And though the IDF pulled out of Gaza in 2005, it retained extensive control over the territory and its population by controlling its borders (together with Egypt) and its air and sea space. As Sufian Abu Zaida, a former leader of the Fatah party in Gaza, remarked, "Show me one achievement of that Intifada. . . . We were afflicted by all possible disasters—the separation barrier, the checkpoints, the expansion of the settlements, the split in the Palestinian people. I'm trying to think of a single benefit we received from this campaign and am unable to do so."[74] Since 2005, levels of insurgent violence against Israeli soldiers and civilians have dropped dramatically.

It also bears noting that, while Israel reacted forcefully to the Palestinian insurgency in 2000–2005, it did not adopt a policy of deliberate or indiscriminate lethal targeting of civilians.[75] Yet Israel's counterinsurgency policies inflicted heavy damage on civilians in ways that are not immediately apparent through casualty statistics. The IDF's policies of widespread nonlethal violence, territorial annexation and fragmentation, destruction of political and social networks, total separation of the West Bank and Gaza, and intense surveillance and control have led to civilian victimization far beyond what can be captured in conventional casualty figures.[76] Moreover, these policies have been the cause of sweeping political changes that have all but destroyed hopes for a negotiated resolution to the conflict in the foreseeable future.

Ordinary soldiers, the agents of Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, were the direct cause of much of this victimization. Interaction between soldiers and civilians was extensive and ranged from engagement from a distance by gunfire, through endless direct contact at checkpoints, to the most intimate contact of all, when soldiers forcibly entered Palestinian homes and stayed for hours or days. The ways in which soldiers understood these policies and produced the violence required of them are the subject of the next chapter.

4

THE PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC VIOLENCE

This is what an infantry soldier is supposed to deal with: To destroy. Period. Bye. Leave me alone. What's a civilian, [what's] not a civilian. . . . I'm an infantry soldier. I know how to take territory, destroy it, turn it into dust, and move into the next territory. That's what they taught me; that's my job.

Interview with Eyal, February 2010

Amir, a young man from the north of Israel, served as an IDF tank commander at the height of the Second Intifada. An engaged and committed soldier, Amir was well liked by his commanders and peers and rose quickly up the ranks of command. During his regular service he was deployed to the West Bank twice. The first time, he deployed to Nablus for Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF's large-scale reoccupation of West Bank cities in the spring of 2002. His unit was charged with opening and clearing roads so that infantry forces could enter the city and with cordoning the area to ensure no one exited or entered during the operation. The following year Amir returned to the area as a tank officer. Operation Defensive Shield had long ended, and his unit was charged with the more routine task of enforcing the closure of Nablus by preventing people from entering or leaving the city.

In both periods Amir encountered civilians. During Operation Defensive Shield he saw them in the crowded residences of the West Bank's cities and refugee camps, where he maneuvered with his tank. Less than a year later he faced civilians at a makeshift checkpoint, examining their papers and instructing them to turn back. Yet in each of these periods, Amir's attitudes toward civilians differed. During Operation Defensive Shield, he was fully prepared to fire in crowded urban areas even if that meant killing, injuring, or rendering people homeless in the process:

> Every movement you see is a terrorist as far as you're concerned. . . . We fired plenty. We fired plenty. Tons of shells, tons of all sorts of things,

> everything. . . . We shot at houses, even houses where there's just a risk and you don't see the terrorists. Most of the time we didn't see who we shot . . . we just fired plenty; it was crazy, tons, tons, the tanks fired. . . . And you don't necessarily know what [the results were]; it's hard to know. . . . You do see the house; you make holes with your shells so you see the walls; you see the physical damage.

The second time he deployed to the area, however, Amir's attitude toward participation in violence had changed considerably. His orders required him to forbid passage to all people except "humanitarian emergencies." Yet when confronted with a steady flow of men, women, and children, Amir found the orders increasingly difficult to obey, and over time he began to relax the restrictions:

> It was strange and it was difficult, dealing with that . . . because you don't know. You see people, pretty miserable, often women who don't have anything . . . families that want to go to their homes, to their families, you hear a thousand stories. . . . Eventually I started letting some people pass, people that seemed ordinary, like they didn't have a problem. . . . You decide it's OK because you see they have nothing; you see that it's kids with a backpack, and they're overjoyed and you feel like you did something good; you really feel like you did something right.

What accounts for such divergence in attitudes toward and ultimately participation in military force? Social-psychological explanations that highlight obedience to authority cannot explain Amir's behavior, as he was disobedient when he allowed people to pass. Nor can the differences be explained by objective threat. Although Amir's unit encountered some insurgent resistance during Operation Defensive Shield, such as an occasional gunfire attack or Molotov cocktail, he and his comrades were repeatedly surprised to find much less resistance than they had expected: "In all those incursions, it was always less than we expected. . . . We were prepared for a lot of resistance, antitank missiles, IEDs like in a war, and at the end it was like, 'Where are you?' We had to look for them."[1]

One factor that may have contributed to Amir's divergent attitudes and behavior was his proximity to civilians in each case. While firing from inside a tank at the walls of buildings during Operation Defensive Shield, Amir did not see most of the damage to civilians (although he did see damage to their property); in contrast, his post at the checkpoint brought him into close interpersonal contact with civilians. Yet this explanation is insufficient as well. In other soldiers' accounts, I found a similar eagerness to participate in tasks that lacked the protective cover of physical distance, such as arrests or raids. Many respondents appeared indifferent, even hostile, to the plight of civilians in some circumstances, yet troubled and sometimes resistant in others, even when both circumstances involved

physical contact. What accounts for the willingness of ordinary soldiers to participate in authorized violence in some instances and their reluctance to do so in others? Put differently, how is strategic violence produced in practice, and why does its production sometimes fail?

I argue that the divergent attitudes and behaviors of ordinary soldiers are best explained by variation in organizational control, which made some forms and targets of violence, but not others, appropriate in the eyes of combatants. As argued in chapter 1, organizational control in modern, bureaucratized militaries is exercised in two broad phases: training and deployment. In the IDF, social control processes aimed at generating soldier identification with the military begin before enlistment and continue throughout military training. These processes normalize some (but not all) violence, neutralizing its harm and reframing it as valuable and thrilling. Indeed, social control mechanisms render participation in such violence an element of the very identity of soldiers. Insofar as the violence required of soldiers during deployment was consistent with the violence constructed as legitimate, it was thus likely to attract high levels of identification and compliance. Amir's mission in Operation Defensive Shield reflected the norms and values that he had internalized during training, and he was therefore prepared, even enthusiastic, to use heavy fire in populated areas, despite the resulting injury to life and property.

Yet the realities of deployment often interfered with the clear norms conveyed during training, weakening the power of centralized control to align the values and identities of combatants with those of the military. For Amir, the assignment to the checkpoint was one for which he had been unprepared, physically and mentally. He therefore found it difficult and, at times, impossible to identify with his assignment and carry out his orders. It was up to his unit commanders to overcome challenges to military control like the ones posed by Amir's behavior and re-instill in soldiers an identification with the mission. In the event that they failed to do so, as they had in Amir's case, the likelihood of compliance with strategic violence decreased, and shirking resulted.

This chapter examines the role of organizational control processes in producing "strategic violence," which I define as violence that is planned, ordered, or authorized by military superiors to advance the military's objectives. I use the term "strategic" to indicate what soldiers *perceive* as strategic, based on the existence of clear orders from above and on the fact that these practices are intended to serve military rather than individual goals.[2] This chapter thus highlights the often-overlooked fact that organizational efforts must be invested not only in curbing violence but also in producing it.

The first part of the chapter analyzes the trajectory of control in the IDF in some detail, beginning with efforts to shape and direct the disparate interests of

Israeli youth before enlistment, continuing in military training, and culminating in operational deployment. Throughout, I note the relationship of control mechanisms to the normalization of violence and show that, although mechanisms of formal control are ever present, mechanisms of social control, which aim to instill identification with military goals and internalization of its mission, are far more powerful.

In the second part of the chapter, I focus on the organizational control mechanisms employed during the Second Intifada to prepare soldiers for wielding violence, showing that these processes normalized violence that was aggressive, dangerous, targeted at a concrete enemy and that promised tangible results. To the extent that violence met these criteria it was accepted by the vast majority of combatants as legitimate, even desirable, and it was therefore characterized by high levels of participation and often enthusiasm. When it did not meet those criteria, participation levels declined. The third and final section discusses the strategies that small-unit commanders employed to realign soldiers with the military in cases where the realities of deployment caused their attitudes toward violence to diverge from organizational interests. I argue that to the extent that commanders were successful in reestablishing control, soldier participation in strategic violence increased once more. However, when commanders failed to establish control, identification with and participation in strategic violence declined, drawing attention to the continuous and negotiated aspects of military control.

The Trajectory of Control in the IDF

Under Israeli law, all citizens are conscripted at the age of 18, though several groups—most notably Palestinian-Israelis, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and religious women—receive exemptions from service.[3] Mandatory, or regular, service for men in the period examined was three years, and for women two years.[4] After their release from service, male soldiers are transferred to the reserve force, where they may be called up for service for several weeks each year until final release between the age of 40 and 50, depending on their military role.

Writing in the mid-1980s, Reuven Gal, a prominent IDF psychologist, argued that motivation to serve in the IDF relied on an "extremely powerful normative system which makes serving in the IDF so highly appreciated, so socially desirable and—for most Israelis—so taken for granted" (1986, 74). To some extent this is still true today. Israel continues to be "a nation in arms" in which the combat soldier is identified with "the good citizen" and symbolizes hegemonic masculinity (Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008).[5] The IDF consistently ranks as the state institution with the highest level of public trust (Tiargan-Orr and Eran-Jona

2016), and motivation for combat service is generally high. As a result of these societal norms the conflict between individual interests of Israeli youth and the manpower needs of the IDF is reduced to some degree.

Nevertheless, accumulating evidence suggests that these societal norms have eroded. During the 1990s, Israeli security elites declared a "motivation crisis" that was evidenced by a slow but steady decline in willingness to enlist in combat units and an increase in attempts to evade military service through draft dodging or deliberate efforts to enlist in noncombat roles (Adres, Vanhuysse, and Vashdi 2012; Levy 2009; Nevo and Shor 2002). This development had several causes. First, some among Israel's more marginalized groups hold ambivalent and sometimes outright resistant attitudes toward combat service (Carmeli and Fadlon 1997; Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008; Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport 2003; Sasson-Levy 2003). Second, a decline in combat motivation is evident among the secular Ashkenazi sector, which had previously formed the backbone of the IDF's combat force.[6]

Thus, while the IDF continues to enjoy widespread public support and while combat service is still highly regarded, social and demographic trends are increasingly eroding its appeal, both among marginalized groups and among Israel's secular elites. Although the precise scope of this trend is a matter of debate, there is widespread agreement that the Israeli military is losing its sacred status in the Israeli public space and is increasingly a subject of criticism. In other words, the preferences and inclinations of Israeli youth regarding combat remain diverse despite the social norms and political socialization processes advocating military service—making organizational control by the military crucial for aligning the motivations of Israeli youth with its strategic goals and needs.

Before Enlistment: Instilling the Motivation to Fight

While formal control mechanisms, chief among them mandatory conscription, exist to ensure widespread recruitment, the military places a strong emphasis on social control mechanisms intended to shape and direct individual motivation, values, attitudes, and emotions in the interests of the IDF. As explained in 2010 by Brigadier General Amir Rogovski (ret.), former head of the IDF's personnel planning unit:

> You ask me, "Why do you have to convince or promote service when you have compulsory service?" If we don't explain every day the importance of serving the country and the importance of being in military service, we won't fill the quantity and quality needs for the next decade.[7]

As Rogovski's statement makes clear, it is not the self-interest of potential combatants that must be shaped through coercion or incentives, but their beliefs and

values. The IDF therefore invests in social control mechanisms such as education and socialization to foster combat motivation or, in the IDF slang term, *ra'al,* (literally meaning "poison.")[8] The most important of these mechanisms is a series of mandatory high school programs that the IDF administers together with the Israeli Ministries of Defense and Education to prepare youth for military service with an emphasis on combat roles.[9] Motivation trends among Israeli youth are meticulously tracked, and the results are monitored by the Ministry of Education so that preparatory programs can be tailored to the draft rates of schools, which are then incentivized to increase those rates. Although implementation of various elements of the program is flexible, the preparatory program is compulsory and is administered in each of the final three years of high school. Its stated goal is "to raise the rate of enlistment to the IDF by strengthening the willingness and preparedness of youth for significant service, with an emphasis on the importance of the combat force."[10]

The preparation program includes three key elements: information, values, and experience. "Information" is conveyed through talks and lectures by currently serving soldiers who present the various options available to enlisting youth. "Values" are inculcated through lectures, workshops, and stories of famous battles and fallen soldiers. "Experience" includes such programs as the veteran Gadna Youth Regiments program, a weeklong quasi-military training camp in which students wear uniforms and experience military discipline, target practice, and lessons about historic battles and battle heroes, as well as shorter programs such as visits to military bases, memorial ceremonies, and expositions of military technologies and weapons. These education and socialization efforts are an important means of social control designed to foster identification with the IDF and internalization of its mission.

Although the terms "violence" or "use of force" are conspicuously absent from preparatory program and materials, the fostering of combat motivation is closely related to the production of violence. Some of the educational materials, such as heroic stories of battle, bravery, and sacrifice, are intended to stir emotion and idealism. Others are designed to evoke thrills and excitement through the presentation of advanced weapon technologies. Cultural artifacts, such as the rapidly growing genre of "poison videos," short videos set to thumping soundtracks that celebrate weapons, firepower, and explosions, are also designed to increase combat motivation.[11] The darker side of violence, the suffering of its victims, and the strain it imposes on soldiers themselves are completely absent from these materials, thereby neutralizing the implications of violence and reframing it as thrilling and inspiring. Such neutralization techniques are a fundamental element of control, enabling behavior that in other contexts would be viewed as aggressive and unacceptable to be transformed into the fulfillment of values

and heroism or the pursuit of fun and thrills when committed in service of the military organization.

The link between combat motivation and the normalization of violence is further evidenced by the rise in motivation that accompanies reports of a unit's combat achievements.[12] Discussing relatively low motivation rates for enlistment into the armored corps, Roee, a former tank commander I interviewed, observed,

> In the past, the news would report an operation conducted by "Golani" (an infantry unit) and an "IDF force." . . . It was forbidden to mention the names "Combat Engineering" or "Armored Corps." The same was true for instance when a terrorist was eliminated. They would say "Golani" eliminated him, or "Nachal" (an infantry unit) eliminated him, or "an IDF force." They were never allowed to mention [the armored corps], for one security reason or another. . . . Those reasons are no longer relevant and now it's allowed, and motivation shot up to such a degree that today there is a match between available spaces and candidates.

Josh, another former tank commander, told me that he decided to serve in the armored corps during high school after taking part in an IDF preparatory program at his school that took students to watch an armored brigade exercise. He said, "The sight of 100 tanks making noise definitely 'does it to you,' and three of my friends and I decided that day that we're only going to armor, and we all went to armor."

In my interviews I asked participants to rank their motivation for combat service **before** entering the IDF on a scale of 1–5. A full 60 percent indicated they were highly motivated before entering the military, ranking their motivation as 5 or higher. An additional 25 percent ranked their motivation at 4. Approximately 11 percent said their motivation was moderate or had oscillated between low and high. Less than 5 percent indicated that their motivation had been low.[13] It is difficult to determine to what extent such extraordinarily high rankings are affected by the social control mechanisms the military implemented during high school, rather than other factors such as family, peer, or societal norms. For many soldiers, it is likely that these sources reinforced each other, increasing their motivation to serve in combat.

The vast majority of these men did not decide to serve in combat units because of coercion and certainly not because of material incentives. When asked why they had wanted to enter combat service, several respondents justified their service on principled grounds, citing ideals such as service of nation and country, the performance of a meaningful duty, and making a contribution to society. Others saw combat units as the true melting pot of Israeli society, a place where race, class, and background did not matter and where anyone could get ahead based on skill

and charisma alone.[14] Still others were brought up on heroic stories of parents and grandparents who had fought in Israel's wars. For them, joining a combat unit was the fulfillment of a family ideal.

For other teenagers on the verge of enlistment, idealistic goals were less of a motivator than the promise of increased prestige, masculinity, and social status associated with combat units. The insignia of the different combat units, the colors of their berets, the badges they wear, and the weapons they carry are all immediately recognizable markers that for many youth are reason enough to join elite combat units and enjoy increased status and esteem. Several respondents reported being rejected from a selective elite unit as one of the greatest personal crises they had experienced; a cause for depression and a pervading sense of failure. But regardless of whether the desire for combat service is a product of idealism, a youthful desire for masculinity and social status, or a combination of these, the idealization of combat service entails the neutralization and reframing of violence in ways that render it valuable and obscure its ability to inflict damage on both victims and perpetrators.

Nevertheless, although adoption of such values is dominant, it is not complete. A few respondents did note low levels of motivation, citing primarily individual interests. For instance, one respondent, a star athlete, had unsuccessfully attempted to evade combat service to pursue his athletic career. Others simply resisted any form of social control and remained uninterested despite efforts at persuasion. Still others tempered enthusiasm for the military with such traditional "everyday forms of resistance" as irony and dark humor (Manekin 2017; Scott 1985). In such cases, formal mechanisms such as the legal power to enforce mandatory conscription were employed to ensure that organizational interests overrode personal ones. But in general, social control mechanisms implemented before enlistment helped create a large pool of young men who subordinate their individual interests to the strategic goals of the IDF.

Military Training: Creating Violence Professionals

The exercise of IDF organizational control reaches its peak in the military training period, which, for combat soldiers, lasts anywhere between six and eighteen months, depending on the military unit. Upon induction into the military, new recruits are given uniforms, their hair is cut, and any facial hair must be shaven. They are assigned a strictly enforced schedule and are severely restricted in their means of communication with family members and friends outside the base. Cadets must relearn skills that they had mastered long before, from properly tying shoelaces to ways of addressing young men only several months their seniors, now occupying a command position. They are shouted

at and harassed, and their most minor infractions are punished. They undergo rigorous physical exercise and suffer immense physical strain and mental stress.[15] Commanders are given extreme authority, and soldiers must demonstrate complete obedience. Although stories of commander abuse were common in the past, the general trend in the IDF has been to clamp down on the abuse and harassment of cadets. Nevertheless military training remains a period in which recruits into combat units are toughened through exposure to constant aggressive behavior.

At the same time, combat training is a site for socialization into and identification with the recruit's new unit and his combat role. Soldiers are introduced to their unit's unique traditions, rituals, and songs and encouraged to take part. They are told inspirational stories of bravery and dedication in their unit and are exposed to new technologies of warfare. They learn to treasure their rifle and not separate from it and are taught about the value of camaraderie and the expectation to make sacrifices for their peers. The initial months of military training thus instill discipline and obedience, inculcate norms and values, and forge cohesion and a shared cultural identity that subordinates individual interests and concerns to the military framework. Matan, a former infantry soldier, reflected on his combat training:

> Part of what I find amazing about this system is its ability—in the training process—to simply program the person. It's programming! It's so crazy and extreme. The training period is when you learn to do things that make no sense to a normal human being, whether it's to crawl in a field of thorns or run forward when you're being shot at, or stuff like that, that isn't logical. It's not something that a reasonable person would do of their own free will, and part of the programming is really . . . internalizing your place. Internalizing.

The intensive training period inspires in most soldiers not only an acceptance of but also a fervent desire for combat, colloquially referred to as *ekshen* (action).[16] Matan recalled the feelings among his comrades when, after completing their training, they were deployed to the increasingly volatile Gaza Strip:

> The atmosphere was becoming one of a war zone. When you're inside it, the truth is that it feels less like danger and more like adrenaline, because that's what you're there for and that's what you've been programmed for, for an entire year, so there's definitely an atmosphere of adrenaline, an atmosphere of *ekshen*.

The desire for *ekshen* among ordinary soldiers was one of the most common themes in my interviews, reflecting soldiers' eagerness to participate in what they

were trained to do: the use of violence to serve military goals. When I asked Micah, a former infantry soldier, if he and his friends were afraid, he observed,

> No, there's no sense of fear at all. None at all. Everyone lives in the present, you don't think about it. . . . Listen, in retrospect there's no doubt that this is the accomplishment of the brainwashing that the army did. It's like, "Wow, there's action, fun!" In Basic Training there was nothing, nothing, nothing, and here there's *ekshen* and it's cool.

The widespread soldier desire for *ekshen* underscores the role of neutralization strategies in the exercise of social control. To encourage eager participation in violence on behalf of the military, violence is defused of its dangerous, frightening, or harmful meanings and is recast as thrilling, fulfilling, and admirable. Nadav, a former infantry soldier, deployed just before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, put it this way:

> We enlisted, and my unit [traditionally] serves in the South. Four to five months earlier the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, and the North was considered the "hot" zone. We were heading south, so our commander gave us a pep talk and said, "Listen, there's nothing we can do, we're going to be in Gaza even though the North is the 'hot' zone but that doesn't mean anything." He started to tell us not to be too upset by it. . . . Because, after all . . . you undergo a process where they try to "poison" you, a sort of brainwashing. There was a period where we even woke up every morning and the loudspeakers blasted our unit's anthem. So you reach this state, a state that's a little absurd, because you wake up in the morning and say, "I want to go. I want to go take down terrorists." . . . But there's no real training that can prepare you for an encounter with a terrorist. No one shoots at you [during training], you don't know what a bullet flying over your head sounds like, you don't know what a mortar shell landing close to you sounds like. . . . Nothing can really prepare you for that.

Yet even such powerful conditioning is never completely successful. Some soldiers cannot (or do not want to) handle the pressure of basic training and drop out along the way because of physical or mental conditions that warrant an exemption. Others remain part of the system but are more resistant to its attempts at inculcation. Yet, ultimately, the vast majority of respondents emerged from their training period having internalized the values of the organization and eager to employ violence on its behalf.

Operational Deployment: Erosion and Reassertion of Control

After training is complete, those soldiers who successfully endured the process and have not been immediately selected for commander training generally enter their units in deployment, where they join older cohorts in performing missions. Whereas the training period is characterized by intense, nearly totalizing control, during deployment control weakens considerably for a variety of reasons. First, powerful unit subcultures can interfere with the exercise of centralized control, imposing their own set of norms and values that soldiers must learn and follow. Young commanders are often weak and ineffectual in face of these powerful local forces. Second, soldiers who have completed their training are assumed to have already internalized the IDF's objectives and accordingly are treated with more trust. Hillel, a former infantry soldier, noted,

> A major difference between the senior companies and the training period is that [the commanders] trusted us. During the training period the entire goal of the NCOs is to catch you and make sure you're [behaving] OK, whereas in the senior companies they have a job to do; they lead operations.

At the same time, as soldiers grow more experienced and confident they become more resistant to overt attempts at social control. Aryeh, a former officer, explained,

> Commanders in the [senior company] are primarily mission commanders. . . . This is different from commanders in basic training, who lecture a lot and speak about values, blah blah blah. There are no talks about values in the [senior company] . . . because you've been in the army for a year and half already, and if someone comes and talks to you now about values, then really, good luck to him.

Finally, the nature of operational deployment in irregular conflict is such that soldiers often operate in small teams, far from the supervision of the commanding officers: control becomes much more difficult, because soldiers are dispersed and difficult to monitor. Thus organizational control shifts in form and scale when soldiers enter senior companies.[17] Centralized control decreases considerably, and the control and leadership exercised by small-unit commanders begin to play a much larger role in shaping the degree to which violence is harnessed in favor of the organization. When junior commanders are able to overcome the challenges posed by deployment and enforce the boundaries constructed in the training period, organizational control is restored, and participation patterns align more closely with organizational interests.

Violence and Control in the Second Intifada

The men I interviewed conducted their regular service between 1999 and 2006 and, as a result, spent much of their deployment carrying out Israel's occupation and counterinsurgency policies in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, for much of that period, IDF combat training largely focused on preparing its soldiers for conventional, high-intensity war. Recruits practiced combat in the open,[18] charging forward on simulated posts of enemy soldiers and re-creating scenarios from historic Arab-Israeli wars. In military terms, this training instilled in soldiers a "warrior ethos," in which the main emphasis is on confronting and defeating the enemy.[19]

Before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the training period did sometimes reference southern Lebanon, the arena where the IDF had been most intensely engaged at the time and to which most soldiers had expected to deploy before the IDF withdrew from the area in May 2000.[20] In general, however, training prepared soldiers for a conventional war between states, of the type last fought by Israel in 1973. As such, soldiers received little preparation for what would ultimately become their mission. A senior officer I interviewed put it this way:

> A soldier is taught to conquer, charge forward, fight. He doesn't learn how to handle a checkpoint; he's not trained for that. They teach you to charge forward under fire, to kill, to storm. The figure with the *kaffiyeh* is the enemy. And [at the checkpoint], you suddenly have to protect him.

Sometimes the training period also included brief instruction for combat in built terrain, or urban warfare. Urban operations are considered more complex than operations in the open because the terrain is three-dimensional (combatants can be engaged from above or below the ground), mobility of armored vehicles is limited, civilians and civilian infrastructure present a significant obstacle to operations, observation and firing ranges are limited by built space, and movement is decentralized and conducted in small teams to avoid detection and attack. All of these features pose substantial challenges to command, communication, and operations.

However, even the minimal urban operations training that soldiers received in this period was far removed from the operations they would later conduct in the cities and villages of the West Bank and Gaza. As several respondents explained, the training focused on high-intensity urban combat techniques designed to seize and clear urban terrain. Such techniques involved, for example, the use of grenades and heavy fire to enter and clear buildings. In the low-intensity conditions of much of the Second Intifada, where most operations were covert and targeted,

and were intended to kill or capture a pre-identified individual while not sparking resistance elsewhere, these techniques were largely irrelevant.

Based on my interviews it appears that the ongoing insurgency in the OPT only began to be reflected in training in the later years of the Second Intifada. At that time, more commander courses included training for dilemmas likely to be encountered in the OPT at such sites of contact with civilians as checkpoints and arrests.[21] Such training expanded in the Intifada's fourth year and beyond to include both ethical and operational aspects of fighting in civilian areas. Yet it is less clear to what extent this change in training was distributed across units. In 2004–5, some respondents reported an increased incorporation of training for service in the Occupied Territories, but others described training similar to the Intifada's early years, with most of the emphasis on conventional warfare.[22]

In sum, for much of the Second Intifada, combatants received training focused predominantly on conventional war, characterized by a clear and well-defined enemy that could be targeted with impunity and by the absence of such complicating factors as civilian populations or infrastructure. In this way, training maintained the disjuncture between the glorification of combat and the neutralization of the prospects of violence. Combatants-in-training had not yet experienced the physical and mental stress of prolonged deployment or the toll that violence can exert. Soldiers thus emerged from training wanting *ekshen* and excited to put the skills they had learned into practice.

The outbreak of the Second Intifada, with its prospect of engaging in actual fighting, was therefore greeted with enthusiasm by many combatants, who felt it would allow them to engage in real combat rather than in such lackluster tasks as guarding quiet borders. Aviv, who had served as a commander during paratrooper boot camp, explained how the experience of being under insurgent fire on his base during training increased his soldiers' motivation:

> The added value for my soldiers was really the professional experience, because they're getting shot at. So if typically in basic training the squad or platoon commander explains to soldiers what it feels like to be shot at and tells heroic stories, here they were actually under fire and so understood what it was like. They understood matters very quickly and had a whole lot of motivation. . . . They see that "Wow, there's *ekshen*! It's cool to be in the [non-elite] units; there's stuff to do here too!" And that really increased their motivation.

New recruits thus perceived participation in counterinsurgency as going to war, the thrilling activity for which they had trained. Interviewees who were not initially deployed to the OPT recalled being frustrated and eager to join the fight. Aaron, for example, a former infantry officer, recalled that when the Intifada first

broke out he had been on temporary leave from the military. He kept calling his former company commander asking whether he should return, whether the company needed him, and pleading to join his comrades. When he finally returned and entered the OPT, he recalled his excitement: "You're going to battle. You know something big is going to happen and we're going there."

Even coming under attack was initially perceived as thrilling. Avi, who shortly after the outbreak of the Intifada was deployed to an Israeli settlement in a relatively quiet and uneventful corner of the West Bank, remembered how envious soldiers felt of another platoon in the company that deployed to a different area and came under insurgent fire:

> Ultimately, yes, you look for *ekshen*. . . . You're upset that you're stuck with these [settlers], while others in the company are getting shot at all day, and your brigade is deployed to Gaza with the mayhem there, and here you are . . . missing out on everything. What am I a soldier for, if in such a period I'm stuck with these settlers?

Compounding the effects of training for conventional war and the desire it instilled for combat and *ekshen* was the totalizing nature of army life, which further shaped the mental state of young combatants. Many ex-combatants described a process of gradual disengagement from their families. Aaron, for instance, recalled how he was teased in officer training for still having a girlfriend, with his fellow soldiers promising that the relationship would not last long (they were right). It was quite common for respondents to note that they did not share their military experiences with their families, whether because they did not wish to worry them or because they did not think they would understand. For recruits, combat training and the totalizing nature of army life are intense and transformative experiences. Gil, who had served as a soldier and commander in Gaza, explained,

> How shall I put it: You get smacked around and it's just terrible. And when you go home you don't understand so many banal things, like how come there are colors here, I didn't see any colors in the desert. Or things that drive you crazy, like waiting in line for more than 30 seconds. Do you know how much I could accomplish in basic training in 30 seconds? So these are the types of things [you experience], emotional upheavals, you might call them.

The goal and consequence of the intense and totalizing experience of combat training, then, are to instill in combatants an eagerness for engaging in combat, targeting the enemy, and experiencing violence in practice and not just in theory. Combat training thus serves as an extreme method of organizational con-

trol aimed at aligning the beliefs, values, and interests of combatants with those of the military organization, generating an enthusiasm among the former to carry out the mission of the latter.

Strategic Violence and the Continuum of Legitimacy

The training experience, with its normalization and valorization of battle, prepared soldiers for the "warrior" violence associated with conventional war. Such violence was dangerous, targeted a clear enemy, and resulted in concrete military achievements, such as the conquest of territory and killing or forcing the enemy to retreat. In this way, military training produced a continuum of legitimacy in which forms of violence that were consistent with training were widely perceived as appropriate and desirable behavior, whereas those that were not aligned with training enjoyed less legitimacy and acceptance.

The preference for "warlike" missions over policing ones is not unique to the Israeli context. Writing in 1960, military sociologist Morris Janowitz predicted that, with the decline of conventional interstate warfare in the nuclear age, the military would evolve into what he called a "constabulary force." He cautioned, however, that "the military tends to think of police activities as less prestigeful and less honorable tasks," adding that "in varying degrees, military responsibility for combat predisposes officers toward low tolerance for the ambiguities of international politics" (Janowitz 1960, 419–20). In the following decades, a number of empirical studies examined whether cadets, soldiers, and officers do indeed exhibit greater resistance to military missions other than war, reporting mixed results (e.g., Avant and Lebovic 2000; Miller 1997; Moskos 1975; Segal, Reed, and Rohall 1998). What has not been examined, however, is how these attitudes affect participation in violence and, more importantly, how they are subject to change over time through processes of organizational control. In this chapter, I show how these processes can increase shirking. Chapter 6 discusses how they can lead to opportunistic violence.

One result of undergoing training for high-intensity combat and then deploying during the Second Intifada was a divergence in soldier identification between missions that appeared to fit the warrior mode and those that did not. Practices in the former category included offensive operations in the heart of Palestinian cities and towns, where soldiers often encountered gunmen or IEDs and where arms and militants could be captured or killed. These missions were popular and attracted widespread participation. Other missions that combatants routinely performed, such as population-control measures of manning checkpoints and

TABLE 4.1. Organizational control and the legitimation of violence

	NORMALIZED VIOLENCE	NON-NORMALIZED VIOLENCE
Type of operation	Offensive	Population control
Governing logic	Combat	Policing
Form of violence	Shooting, explosions	Movement restrictions, administrative measures
Target of violence	Selective: Enemy combatants	Indiscriminate/collective: Civilians unconnected to the insurgency
Threat	High	Low
Achievements	Concrete and tangible	Unclear and negligible

enforcing internal closures, lacked this aura of risk, thrill, or glory. Such policing missions required combatants to work long, routine shifts; were primarily targeted at civilians; and involved largely administrative tasks.

Table 4.1 summarizes the differences between normalized and non-normalized violence, as produced through processes of organizational control in the training phase. For ease of presentation the distinctions are presented as binary, though in practice they form a continuum. Each distinction is then discussed separately.

Type of Operation

Excitement about taking part in violent action was most evident in large-scale operations such as Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank. Several respondents likened the operation to war and expressed their satisfaction in taking part in something meaningful and important. Many noted being excited about finally putting their training into practice. Doron, a former officer in an elite infantry unit, recalled the thrill of entering Nablus in a large armored convoy during Defensive Shield as a newly deployed soldier:

> You haven't experienced anything like this before except in your imagination. And your imagination flies to very far-off places. But the truth is that the first moment we dismounted really matched my imagination. I remember the moment I got off the APC [armored personnel carrier] there were bullets everywhere. . . . It was a real trial by fire for any new soldier. There was no question of motivation there.

Similar reactions were reported by combatants who had participated in special operations in Gaza. Tamir was a member an elite infantry unit between 2002 and 2004 that had participated in many offensive operations inside Gazan cities; he explained that, unlike in the past, during this period of his service even the

most senior soldiers did not want to leave the unit for more comfortable, less demanding positions:

> No one wanted to leave. . . . First of all you feel like you're doing something. You're really, really doing something. . . . We felt it on a daily basis. We'd go in, blow up manufacturing workshops for weapons and bombs, blow up houses that sheltered weapons or bombs, blow up terrorist homes, or arrest insurgents. . . . Every day you feel like you're doing something.

This sense of active, meaningful combat led to high levels of compliance and identification with large-scale operations, regardless of the damage that they inflicted.

Although perceived as somewhat less heroic than large-scale operations, targeted, small-scale offensive operations such as ambushes and arrests also enjoyed high appeal. Assaf put it succinctly: arrests were "quality missions—combative and cool." They were meticulously prepared in advance, soldiers' faces were painted, guns were loaded, and missions often deployed surreptitiously under the cover of darkness. As such they incorporated a thrilling element that was absent from many other missions. Micha, a former infantry commander, explained,

> Arrests are the [height of] *ekshen*. They're the meat of combat service. It's like a movie—if you added Hollywood music it would look like a movie. You stop the vehicles and jump out, or arrive stealthily at the house and surround it. You never know how it will develop; there could be trouble with the family, or you might really find something there, like guns or ammunition or even a poster of someone with an AK-47. . . . There's no end to the experiences. . . . In short, it's *ekshen*.

Arrests, of course, are not truly "combative" in any traditional sense, and they are very different from combat in conventional war. The eagerness to conduct arrests was therefore somewhat ironic. A few respondents were keenly aware of this. Yair, who served as an infantry commander between 2002 and 2004, recalled his annoyance when one of his soldiers complained that he was primarily charged with guarding static posts, even though his commander in basic training had led him to expect he would take part in more arrests:

> Is that what they told you in basic training? What are you thinking? You're a combatant! You need camouflage and [preparation] for urban warfare if necessary, but it's about combat! Is that what you're interested in? Arrests?? You usually don't shoot during arrests; arrests usually end without a bullet fired.

Nevertheless, for the majority of combat soldiers, arrests and other offensive operations were typically considered the height of combat activity because of the features of combat they possessed: they were relatively risky and aggressive, and they resulted in concrete and tangible achievements.[23] In the online survey I conducted of former IDF combatants in the Second Intifada, 87 percent of respondents indicated that offensive operations, particularly large-scale operations, were the missions considered most attractive in their units (N = 63).[24]

At the other end of the spectrum were population-control measures, which primarily included the enforcement of closure and internal closure. Nearly all respondents reported that they disliked checkpoints, though the degree of aversion varied. Many respondents expressed frustration at having to take on checkpoint missions, which were perceived as inappropriate for combatants and inconsistent with their training. Others simply disliked the boredom and absence of *ekshen* and constantly pushed for more offensive activity. David, a former infantry commander, said he often felt like a monkey may as well have carried out his mission at the checkpoint. Eran, a former infantry soldier, explained,

> I think it's screwed up to begin with. In my opinion it's not us, not the army, who should be standing at checkpoints but the border police and the police. I think it's their job, not ours, since it's not what we learned. Combatants are trained to charge forward, to conduct urban warfare, to fight! And suddenly they tell you to stand at a checkpoint.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of service at checkpoints was the need to adjudicate between ever-changing Israeli regulations governing movement and a never-ending stream of civilian requests and pleas to cross. This task, which checkpoint commanders were expected to perform with very little guidance, was a consistent source of frustration and anger, which sometimes were taken out on civilians.[25] The soldiers' decisions were influenced by a wide range of factors, often fluctuating daily. As Hillel, a former infantry soldier, put it,

> In the beginning you're more generous and let the old lady with the shopping baskets pass, and by the end of your deployment when the same woman comes again, with the same complaints again, and the same requests again, you have no patience anymore and you say, "Come on, you've been here 1,000 times and you know you're not allowed to pass. Sometimes you passed, sometimes you didn't, enough already!"

Several combatants commented on the absurdity of manning checkpoints when it was patently clear that people were easily bypassing them or when the sheer number of people attempting to cross precluded any meaningful security

check. Some expressed anger at being expected to perform tasks that were impossible to effectively carry out. One former infantry soldier recalled,

> The checkpoint is fairly simple. If you have the right papers you cross. . . . [The problem is] that the more you are in the army, the more you start to ask, "Wait, why are we here?" They can't "poison" us anymore; you understand it's one big bluff I think, all that "poisoning," like "you are protecting your country, you're preventing explosions," and really, come on, we check 1,000 cars a day. We're not actually going to take apart each car, so it's pretty easy to hide stuff from us. . . . The more time you spend there the more you know that no matter how much they tell you about the threat here and the threat there, no one takes it seriously anymore.

These recollections show both the failure of organizational control mechanisms to inspire belief among combatants that checkpoint duty imposed by military authorities serves its stated purpose and the decline in participation that occurs as a result.

In general, then, combatants were eager to participate in offensive operations, but much less enthusiastic about participating in population control. There were some exceptions to this rule, however: in some cases former combatants reported a waning of interest in offensive missions as well. Such a lack of interest was most likely when combat operations could no longer credibly be reframed as thrilling or glorious or, in Guy's words, when soldiers could not be "poisoned" anymore. For example, the desire for *ekshen* was abruptly curtailed when a violent threat materialized, wounding or killing a fellow combatant. The pain associated with violence was sharply felt and could no longer be defused or reframed. Amos, a former infantry officer, told me, "Until you get wounded, until you see the blood flowing, you don't get that it's real."

Disinterest and reduced participation could also result from performing offensive operations again and again, as was the case for some elite units, who spent much of their service conducting arrest operations in the West Bank. Although initially perceived as exciting, such operations lost their appeal after being performed dozens of times and could no longer be convincingly portrayed as exciting or glorious. Over time, exhaustion set in, as did cynicism regarding the purpose of many of the arrests. Still, when individuals whom the IDF considered particularly important or dangerous were targeted, soldiers could typically be motivated once more to participate.

Governing Logic

Population-control measures stood in sharp contrast to the control processes in the initial training period that cast military violence as meaningful and thrilling.

However, when I asked respondents whether additional training could have prepared them better for their tasks, many responded that military training was unnecessary for checkpoints and that no amount of it could have prepared them for eight-hour checkpoint shifts. The military aspects of checkpoints, such as how to behave during an attack, or the rules of engagement, were clear to them. Yet these scenarios were rare and largely irrelevant to daily life at the checkpoint. Rather, soldiers spoke of requiring mental preparation for what was essentially not a military task. Nir explained,

> The main problem is that [the IDF] doesn't mentally prepare people for [checkpoints]. It's no problem learning military doctrine for the checkpoint. . . . The problem is preparing people mentally for standing at a checkpoint for 16 hours and preventing an 80-year old man from passing on his way to a [medical] operation. Those are the problems I experienced as a soldier. It's not a professional problem and there are hardly any professional problems in the field. There are conceptual problems of soldiers who don't understand where they are and what they're doing.

Unlike offensive operations, which were perceived by most combatants as combat activity, population-control operations followed a logic of policing. As Yair put it, "You become a cop at the checkpoint. You walk like a cop, you check papers all day, you check vehicles. . . . It wears down your combativeness, your soldierly-ness." Yet combatants did not receive training to perform policing activities, nor were they equipped with policing gear. There was a large degree of ambiguity about the measures that soldiers could employ to handle civilians and respond to non-armed resistance. This was likely a product of the ambiguity at the strategic level regarding the purpose of population-control measures: pressuring the population or disrupting insurgent activity. This persistent ambiguity led soldiers to improvise their own solutions that sometimes involved violence (see chapter 5).

As a result of the disjuncture between military training and population-control missions, shirking was more common at checkpoints than during offensive operations. Several respondents reported that they sometimes let people pass without the proper permits, whether because they felt sympathetic toward particular civilians, because they exercised judgment and did not view them as a threat, or because they were simply too drained, bored, or tired to enforce movement restrictions. Similarly, some respondents reported that during patrols intended at catching people bypassing checkpoints they dodged their assignment without their officer's knowledge, instead taking road trips or resting somewhere out of sight.

Forms of Violence

The processes of organizational control also produce differences in the perceived legitimacy of different **forms** of violence. Forms of violence that conformed to military training and expectations, such as firing weapons or using explosives, were viewed as legitimate and desirable. Tomer, a former combat engineering officer whose unit had been responsible for demolishing homes and other property across Gaza, recalled his soldiers' reactions to the prospect of a home demolition:

> I have to say that soldiers would get really excited and there were always arguments about who would [blow up the house], because those are the cool tasks, the bread and butter of operations. Everyone wants to demolish a house; it's the coolest. They don't want to flatten the ground or clear a road, they want to demolish houses. That's what they're there for. And the infantry soldiers too, they think it's cool. . . . Soldiers really love it. And I have to say, I totally understand them. . . . I did it several times and it's cool; you bang, bang, bang and it's every child's dream. . . . People really love it; they get really excited and there's always a battle about who will get to demolish the house.

In contrast, many combatants perceived the task of enforcing movement restrictions as inappropriate for soldiers, an undue burden, and generally one that was to be avoided if possible. As David put it, "Checkpoint [duty] bothers some people more and some people less, but in general, no one really likes [being at] the checkpoint."

Targeting of Violence

Processes of organizational control during military training also legitimate violence against certain targets. The training period instills among soldiers a clear distinction between friend and foe, and a desire to protect the former and fight the latter. In conventional war this is straightforward—the enemy is a member of the opposing military. In counterinsurgency, however, the distinction between insurgents and civilians can be less clear. In the case of the Second Intifada, the insurgency involved a range of loosely connected actors, some with official ties to the Palestinian Authority and others to opposition movements, making the identification of targets more complex. Although Israel officially declared the insurgency an armed conflict, military leaders were often ambiguous about who the enemy actually was. The former head of Israel's national Security Council, Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland (2006, 307), observed,

> The classic question that a commander used to ask his intelligence officer in a normal war was "where is the enemy." In new wars this question is less relevant. The more relevant question is "who is the enemy?" . . . The conflict between us and the Palestinians is an armed conflict, and the question arises: Who is the enemy? All the Palestinians? Some of them? The terror organizations? And who are [those] organizations?

And if senior officers would not easily identify the enemy who could legitimately be targeted, the situation was all the murkier for ordinary soldiers, charged with implementing strategy. Yoav, a former infantry soldier and commander, reflected on this confusion:

> Towards the end of my service things got really blurry; it becomes really blurred who is an enemy and who is not, since you come from a place that emphasizes "us" and "them," and because of all this mixing in with the population you begin to look at them a little differently. . . . You understand that there are extremists among them, but they are not a high percent, so what's going on here?

The absence of a clear demarcation of the enemy was particularly true in population-control operations that, depending on whether checkpoints were perceived as a means of pressuring the populace or of obstructing insurgent activity, involved collective or indiscriminate targeting. Soldiers dealt in different ways with the dissonance between their expectations of an unambiguous enemy and the civilian targets of population-control operations. Some constructed civilians as enemies, interpreting population-control operations to the extent possible as combative tasks. Others became uncomfortable and confused, finding it increasingly difficult to produce the violence expected of them. Nir, for example, a former company commander, expressed his frustration at soldiers who treated each civilian at the checkpoint as a potential threat:

> I had friends who enjoyed it. Enjoyed the feeling of "I decide, I'm the boss, I'm 20 years old and I tell whoever I want to do what I want." Some guys enjoy it. They have mental problems or something. . . . When I would say something to them they'd respond, "What, are you a wimp? Why are you even thinking about these things? She's a terrorist, she's this, she's that . . ." OK, it could be that she's a terrorist but she probably isn't. You too could, for instance, take your gun out and shoot everyone in the base. Does that mean you're going to do it? Maybe, but probably not.

After relaying his discomfort at the lack of distinction some soldiers made between civilians and militants in population-control operations, Nir emphasized,

lest I misunderstand, that he fully identified with the IDF and its missions, describing himself as "militant." He had served for more than six years in the military and still worked in the security field. He was certainly not an antiwar activist or someone who shied away from violence. Yet, he had a hard time justifying operations whose targets were primarily civilians, telling me,

> It's hard to connect the face of a 90-year-old woman to a suicide bomber. And that's what they ask you to do all the time. And it's hard to take a suspicious woman into a tent and call a female soldier from the base [to check her], and by the time she shows up [the woman] has waited for two hours. . . . Ultimately, it's true that anyone who passes might be a terrorist. No doubt. But after some time you say to yourself, enough already, poor woman, let her pass. And that's one problem, because she might really be a terrorist. But on the other hand, if you're completely focused on the mission and don't let her pass there's a 99%, 100% chance that she's completely [innocent], she just forgot her permit or it ripped or I don't know what. And she can't pass because those are the directives. So eventually you say, damn it, let her pass, what can happen already.

Nir's story demonstrates the shirking that can occur when control processes weaken and combatants are no longer able to identify with military goals, and the consequent decline in the production of strategic violence at that particular juncture.[26] Another example of the underproduction of strategic violence can be found in Guy's account of an operation designed to capture and send back illegal Palestinian entrants into Israel:

> That was my biggest crisis, the time that was hardest for me in the military in that sense. . . . There was a gap in the fence where we knew there were always illegals. So what we did basically was not just stand there and stop people from exiting or entering, but we waited a bit farther away, and every time someone came we took him aside . . . until there was a large group assembled. We kept them there for a few hours and didn't let them talk on the phone or talk to each other. We didn't want any information leaking out. . . . We just stood them against the wall. There were old women, old men, all types of people, and it was a really bad feeling standing there with guns guarding people, population; it's not what we came to do. . . . We had to take them back [to the West Bank] . . . and the soldiers who happened to be with me there were not the authoritative types . . . not the type of people who would tell someone to shut up, or take their phone away if they didn't listen and

> continued talking on the phone; so the task fell to me even though there was a commander there. We just walked and each time I had to yell at people, "Don't push!" and get in uncomfortable situations, and I was walking and walking and suddenly I choked up because I thought of my grandparents and how they were on the other side a few years ago, and it was unpleasant.

Among the soldiers who were with Guy during this incident, almost no one, including his commander, was able to summon sufficient aggression to execute this task of population control. Soldiers, who in more combative circumstances would likely have been eager to participate in violence regardless of the damage they might have inflicted, found themselves unable to participate in more limited violence due to the disparity between the targets they had been trained to fight and what they were assigned to do in practice.

In contrast, offensive operations presented combatants with fewer dilemmas. In terms of targeting, strikes or raids based on concrete intelligence were much more similar to the conventional scenarios for which soldiers had trained, rendering such operations more attractive and legitimate in the eyes of soldiers and increasing compliance and enthusiasm. In reality, the targets of these operations were not necessarily "enemies" as typically defined. Arrests could take place for the purpose of gathering intelligence, to disguise potential collaboration, or even for such reasons as involvement in criminal activity. Nevertheless the selective and concrete nature of these operations allowed soldiers to more easily construct targets as enemies, regardless of their true identity.

Several respondents pointed out how much easier it was to serve in the Special Forces and in elite units, which participated primarily in offensive operations, than in ordinary units. Ori, an officer in an infantry unit regularly assigned to the Nablus area, explained,

> It's really easy to be in a commando unit, because your black and white are black and white, and very clear. You have a mission, there's a terrorist, so you shoot him. But when you're in the reality of the Territories as a soldier in an [ordinary] battalion, you're at the checkpoint and it's not clear who's good and who's bad. And they change the definitions every day—now check this one, now check the other one; now they're allowed [to pass], now they're forbidden. It's very confusing. It's hard for soldiers and for officers too.

Although offensive and defensive operations sometimes led to civilian casualties, soldiers rarely perceived them as the targets, but rather as the incidental effects of legitimate combat activity or, in some cases, not as civilians at all. In

defensive operations, this perception was often evident when soldiers transferred the onus of the duty of civilian protection to the civilians themselves. For instance, when justifying lax rules of engagement, combatants often explained that "civilians knew" that they were not allowed to advance beyond a certain point or exit their homes during certain hours, whether or not those rules were actually explicitly conveyed to civilians. Indeed, they often were not. For instance, buffer zones were rarely demarcated and sometimes shifted. Civilians who violated the rules nevertheless became legitimate targets. Eran, who had served in Gaza, calmly explained,

> In some places there is no such thing as innocent [civilians]. That's your basic assumption. No matter how sad or painful it is, they know they'll get shot. It's not something they don't know. Even a kid who crosses the Philadelphi Road [separating Gaza from Egypt], he lives there, he knows he might get shot.

Put differently, from the perspective of combatants, people could lose their civilian status by simply being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Similarly, combatants might perceive individuals as non-civilians by association. Eitan, who had served in an elite Special Forces unit, explained when he was most likely to encounter civilians:

> Contact with civilians was most common during the arrest itself . . . but whether they're innocent civilians or not is already a question. Most of the time they were clearly not innocent, since there's a reason that someone in their family is sought by the Shin Bet [Israel's internal security service].

In Eitan's eyes, family members of someone wanted by Israel's security services no longer qualified for civilian status. This understanding was reflected in soldier terminology, which distinguished between the "involved" and the "uninvolved," rather than between combatants and noncombatants.[27] Ilan, who too had served in an elite unit, explained,

> We didn't do checkpoints, so we didn't have entire periods of friction with the population. The thing is that really, in our operations, there's no difference between "involved" and "uninvolved." For each mission everyone is "involved" . . . because they are all targets of the operation. For instance, if you're conducting searches and need to collect information then even the family, which ostensibly is "not involved," becomes "involved," because you need to get intelligence from them. That's the point.

In offensive and defensive operations, then, combatants were less likely to view civilians as civilians at all: they were perceived either as incidental to the operation or as losing their civilian protections due to their very presence in combat operations or to their relationship to suspected militants. Moreover, contact with civilians was much briefer in duration than in the seemingly endless and tedious checkpoint shifts. As a result such operations were perceived as targeting enemy insurgents and therefore as far more legitimate.

Sense of Threat

An additional difference between normalized and non-normalized violence is the sense of threat that accompanies the task. Soldiers are trained to function in threatening circumstances, and the existence of an armed threat therefore serves a central legitimating and motivating force for military violence. Moreover, violent threats and the presence of risk and danger are a primary component of the thrill and *ekshen* that soldiers eagerly look forward to. In the absence of a perceived threat, the perception of the necessity and legitimacy of violence can be diminished. In the first years of the Intifada a sense of threat was pervasive as soldiers encountered hundreds of violent incidents. As a result, even though the enforcement of movement restrictions was consistently ranked as an unattractive military task, it was nevertheless perceived as more legitimate in the first years of the Second Intifada, when checkpoints in many areas were less structured and more likely to be the targets of insurgent attacks. The improvised nature of the checkpoint, the element of added risk, and hence its more combative nature made serving at checkpoints in some areas more appealing to soldiers in this period. Over time however, attacks on checkpoints declined, making checkpoints a far more mundane and undesirable task than offensive operations, which were more likely to encounter gunfire, IEDs, or the hurling of rocks or Molotov cocktails.

Military Achievements

A final feature of normalized violence was its potential for military achievement and for the accompanying sense of accomplishment and triumph. Killing and capturing militants, finding stashes of arms, or destroying sites claimed to be weapons-manufacturing workshops were considered heroic accomplishments that generated respect from peers and praise from commanders. An informal tradition in some units involved marking an *X* on a gun that killed an enemy, with each *X* serving as a source of social prestige. One respondent described his be-

loved company commander as an impressive officer who had some twenty *X*s on his rifle. A former combatant explained in a newspaper interview,

> For a combatant, the biggest thing you can do is eliminate a terrorist. Just like for pilots the biggest achievement is to take down an [enemy] plane. It's like proof that here, we did it, marking an *X* on your weapon after taking down a terrorist. It's a type of machismo; when you do it you think about showing the guys. What can you do, we are trained all the time to kill people, that's part of the military. The moment a terrorist stands across from you, you don't see him as human anymore. When you're in the killing business, as we are, the situation comes to that and much worse.[28]

Similarly, Doron, a former officer in an elite unit, recalled,

> When you come back from an operation where you kill someone, everyone is thrilled. It doesn't matter that today I look at it in retrospect like it's crazy. It's OK when you're a 19-year-old kid. That's why they take you at that age. They sent you to battle and either you died or you didn't. . . . You kill and it's great; everyone is happy.

In addition to the killing of militants, which combatants likened to "actual battle," arrests of "heavy terrorists" (men considered armed and dangerous or who had been involved in large-scale attacks in Israel) were also a cause for pride and glory, as was the finding of weapons or equipment. As Yaniv explained, when I asked him what the high point of his service had been,

> As a platoon commander there were many high points, whether they were activities that I personally sent out and succeeded in, or whether it was capturing an armed man or capturing weapons in [Palestinian] villages, things like that—when you know you're involved and there are results, and the soldiers see it with their own eyes. They see what we're doing, essentially. In general, this success in fighting terror is really satisfying, so it pushes you forward.

For soldiers, such concrete operational successes raised morale and brought glory to the unit. Most importantly, they made soldiers feel important and significant, because they were doing exactly what they had trained to do. Ariel had served as an infantry officer in the Jenin area in the months after Operation Defensive Shield, a time when the IDF was engaged in intense offensive operations to reestablish control of the city and arrest suspected insurgents. He fondly recalled the period:

> Ah . . . that was [a good] time. At that time you felt like you were doing something. You really felt there were no terrorist attacks. You go and blow up the home of a terrorist who committed a suicide bombing, and *walla*, you feel like you're part of the height of the Intifada. You're at the center of the center of the stuff you read about. That's you. It was a period when you felt great about yourself. A good period, a time when you really felt like you were doing something. Look, most of my military service was a waste of time . . . and here it was absolutely the real thing.

In contrast, population-control operations promised few successes and were devoid of heroism. Soldiers did not boast to each other about their shifts at checkpoints, which were perceived as drudgery, not as thrilling. Roy, a former tank commander, explained,

> Another reason that it wears you down is that these are glory-less achievements. Catching an illegal, for instance; 99 percent of illegal entrants are people who want to work. They do it illegally but they want to work. You catch someone, and now you know he can't work in agriculture or in a greenhouse. You feel you did what you're supposed to do, but you don't feel much satisfaction. That's one of the problems—you don't feel satisfaction in what you do.

Though soldiers sometimes intercepted weapons at checkpoints, these events were few and far between. Hillel, a former infantry soldier, said that for most of his military service he felt insignificant:

> When you stand at a checkpoint, then maybe, maybe, maybe in seven months you'll find one knife. That one time is so negligible after all those eight-hour shifts you did that you feel like it's insignificant. And I guess you could look at it another way, I don't know if to call it a rational way, and say, it's important, the fact that there's no *ekshen* is good, routine is good, quiet is good, it means nothing bad is happening, but you don't feel significant that way. You feel significant when you see, physically and actively, that your presence there makes a difference.

To summarize, IDF organizational control processes at the military training phase led combatants to identify with and normalize violence of a certain type: offensive, combative, targeted at an enemy, risky, and leading to concrete and tangible achievements. The vast majority of combatants participated eagerly in such violence, viewing it as a desired expression of lofty values, an opportunity for excitement and thrills, and a means of enhancing masculinity, social respect, and admiration. In contrast, violence that did not meet these criteria, was relatively

safe, collectively or indiscriminately targeted at an unclear and often invisible enemy, and absent any promise of glory or heroism was perceived by many combatants as less appropriate. As a result, during population-control operations the beliefs, values, and interests of some soldiers were much more likely to diverge from those of their superiors. Soldiers found it harder to believe that such operations were necessary, leading to a decline in identification with the mission and, consequently, to less compliance and increased shirking.

Producing Strategic Violence: The Role of Small-Unit Commanders

In the face of growing divergence between the beliefs and interests of combatants and the military, one concern of small-unit commanders was how to motivate combatants to produce strategic violence at such sites where military training failed to instill identification with the mission. The scope of this challenge varied, depending on the values and interests of the individual combatants. But for some combatants, the divergence in beliefs led to shirking from strategic violence, particularly in population-control operations.[29] This section analyzes some of the strategies that small-unit commanders used to realign soldiers with military interests, ensuring that strategic violence was produced at the desired level.

Social Control: Reframing Violence as Normative

A central problem with legitimizing population-control operations was the absence of many elements that normalized violence in the eyes of combatants and the consequent reduction in soldiers' motivation to participate, whether due to discomfort at its targets or form, or simply because of boredom, fatigue, and a lack of faith in the contribution or importance of such operations. One control strategy that some commanders used was to reframe population-control measures to the extent possible as combative in an attempt to re-instill in combatants the motivation and enthusiasm that had faltered. By recasting violence as the kind that combatants had learned to anticipate, commanders could realign the beliefs of combatants with those of the military, establishing the necessity and value of population-control operations and thereby rendering any associated violence as normalized and invisible once more.

One such commander was Erez, who as a tank officer in the West Bank had been assigned to checkpoint duty for several months. Erez pointed out that at checkpoints, commanders were not only responsible for curbing excessive violence (see chapter 6) but also for pushing soldiers to **produce** violence, a task he

had found no less challenging. Some soldiers, Erez explained, allowed their discomfort with their missions to reduce their aggressiveness and their initiative. To illustrate these dilemmas, Erez told the story of a Palestinian man who had approached the checkpoint and yelled at one of his soldiers:

> Suddenly I heard yelling at the checkpoint. . . . I went in immediately and don't even remember what I did; I guess I did something, I kicked him out of the checkpoint, I loaded my weapon in his face and ordered him out of there. It sounds crazy but [you must] understand what it means for him to yell at a soldier: it means that had he had a knife, [the soldier] would be dead now! The very fact that he approached and felt comfortable enough to enter a checkpoint of IDF soldiers, tomorrow he'll come with a knife and slaughter two soldiers! . . . I told them, "You don't understand—no one enters. And if someone enters, the moment he crosses the line—boom! All guns are loaded at the checkpoint. The guy will be shocked. If he's an informant or involved in some sort of [militant] activity he'll say, 'Listen, that's one checkpoint I don't want to enter.'"

Erez's command strategy was to reestablish the checkpoint as a site of military combat, framing the man not as a civilian frustrated by the long wait but as a potential terrorist who may exploit soldiers' weakness to attack them. When his soldiers asked how they should have responded in that situation, Erez told them,

> "Listen, you're the soldier here. You have the gun. You control who enters and who does not . . . and there's no way . . . that someone yells at one of your comrades and you do nothing! . . . I loaded my gun at the guy, how come none of you loaded your guns?" It took me a lot of time, maybe two months, to train them to be somewhat aggressive. . . . I asked them, "What would happen had he attacked me? Would you start deliberating whether to do something?" And I started talking to them about it, and training them with different scenarios, like—"What happens if someone jumps on me with a knife, what do you do?" . . . At first they said stuff like, "We'd separate you," but I told them, "There's no such thing, someone who jumps at a soldier and tries to stab him is a dead man, and it's over. There's no discretion here . . . With some things you must behave like a machine."

Erez described a long process of training soldiers to view the checkpoint as a dangerous military site, where a military response was appropriate and necessary. Ultimately, he believed he was successful:

> About two months later when I was on patrol, I stopped some car and the guy approached me and started yelling. Immediately I loaded my gun and the minute I loaded—bam! All of [my soldiers], they knew already, they loaded their guns, and the guy was shocked. And I said to myself, I succeeded.

By reframing checkpoint duty as a military, rather than an administrative, task, and by training his soldiers to employ the logic of combat even at sites of population control, Erez was able to re-instill identification with the mission and, consequently, increase participation among his soldiers.

Like Erez, Eyal had served for several months as a checkpoint commander. As a soldier he had encountered opportunistic violence at checkpoints, such as harassment and beating, as well as what he saw as unprofessional soldier behavior, such as informal chatter with the local population. Eyal attributed both behaviors to a single source: the nonmilitary nature of checkpoints, which, depending on the circumstances, could cause soldiers both to falter in producing strategic violence or to engage in opportunistic violence. He explained,

> Another thing that frustrates the soldiers is their inability to do their mission. . . . We don't have a police dog, or mirrors, or time to totally take apart the entire car for drugs or weapons, so as a soldier you feel frustrated because you're not really doing your job. You let cars pass and pray there's no terrorist or explosives or drugs or weapons. . . . It's a performance, it just looks like you're a checkpoint, you just look like you're checking, it just looks like you know what you're doing. . . . And that terribly frustrates soldiers, to do nothing hours upon hours upon hours for months on end, and to just look like you're doing something. It creates a lot of anger towards the system and towards the checkpoint. And when you're at an internal checkpoint then you really don't understand what the significance of what you're doing is. There's a village here and a village there, and a checkpoint in the middle, you just have to check people, but there are no clear guidelines for how to check. How much should you check? Should I strip him? Should I not strip him? Should I take the car apart? Or not?

To deal with the growing gap between the military's directives and soldiers' attitudes, and consequently with increased shirking, Eyal, like Erez, adopted a strict stance:

> I was very tough with my soldiers regarding human rights and contact with the population. There was to be no chatter, no conversations, no

> jokes, and no yelling, beating, or pushing. Nothing. I prevented contact. I told them that from my perspective they either let the person pass or shoot him in the head. There was no middle ground. . . . There's no reason for deep conversations or pleadings or whatever. He's either allowed to pass according to the permit, or forbidden, and that's it, he's out of there.

Eyal's strategy, in other words, was to attempt to reestablish the soldier's black-and-white perspective, which separated friend from foe, removed civilian considerations from the picture, and left no room for negotiation. It was an effort to impose a military logic on a primarily civilian site so as to ensure soldiers behaved as they had been trained, thereby facilitating the production of strategic violence. As he put it, "You're not a cop, you don't try to find out the story and you don't care what happened. You're a combatant. You identify an enemy—you shoot. You don't identify an enemy—you shut up."

Formal Control: Hierarchy and Obedience

Not all commanders could successfully employ social control mechanisms to inculcate among combatants a newfound sense of identification with their mission. Some commanders were critical of some missions themselves and could not credibly normalize them. When approached with questions and complaints from their subordinates, they found themselves at a loss to defend the military necessity of enforcing an ever-shifting regime of movement restrictions and population control. In these circumstances some commanders resorted to formal mechanisms, reminding soldiers that they must carry out orders regardless of whether they identified or agreed with them.

Aviv, for example, had served as an officer in a paratroopers unit. As a commander he had eagerly taken part in the operations preceding Operation Defensive Shield, where his unit had participated in ambushes and killed and arrested several insurgents, wreaking heavy damage in civilian areas. While he described those operations as memorable and exciting, he was much more critical about his service at checkpoints:

> There are cases when they tell you to let only these people pass, and you let them pass, and then suddenly they tell you, "No, now stop, because it might be a [terrorist]." And you say, "But wait a minute, all those who I just allowed to pass—the terrorist could be one of them? So how did they pass until now? Couldn't you have told me sooner?" . . . You don't understand the idea behind it. Or they tell you to check every vehicle

> thoroughly, and then suddenly tell you everyone can pass with an ID card. So you feel a bit like, what have I done until now, what has it contributed. . . . It's an annoying situation, and totally lacking in logic . . . As a commander you hear soldiers complain and you say . . . "There's nothing you can do, this is the army." Maybe if it's a stubborn soldier I'll make up something so he'll leave me alone . . . but basically, that's the army.

Similarly, Nir explained that he would tell his soldiers that important people with more experience than him had made the decision, so there must be a good reason for such tasks, even if they seemed illogical. Lior, who served as a platoon commander in the West Bank, resorted to a similar response when soldiers complained of the arbitrariness of checkpoints: "I would tell them, 'Guys, we're juniors in these matters. There are people above us and we do what they decide.'" In these cases, the resort to formal mechanisms that relied on the power of authority and the chain of command indicated a failure on the part of small-unit commanders to induce identification among combatants with forms and targets of violence with which they themselves did not identify.

Failure of Control and the Decline of Compliance

Finally, there were cases in which small-unit commanders failed to resolve the discrepancies between military training and counterinsurgency practices that primarily involved population control. It was in these units that soldier participation in strategic violence was most likely to decline. Sometimes, such failure resulted from the example given by senior commanders who themselves did not seem to take directives at checkpoints very seriously. Amir's case, introduced at the outset of this chapter, illustrates the consequences of such behavior. He had initially attempted to follow orders at the checkpoint despite his growing uneasiness. However, on occasion his battalion commander would come to the checkpoint and let everyone pass without checking their status. Amir recalled his frustration:

> And then you say to yourself, wait a minute, why is he doing it and not me? . . . What does he know that I don't know? He would look at their papers and wouldn't contact headquarters; he'd just decide whether people could pass or not. And then you feel like, OK, why did I detain him here for five hours? For what? You don't really understand it. . . . You see the top commander letting anyone he wants to pass. . . . And I doubted that he knew more than me about these people since he didn't

> check their ID with headquarters. . . . And it starts to gnaw at you, because every day you encounter [civilians] . . . people in the rain . . . students, kids who want to go in or out but can't because of the closure. . . . . These are feelings that, as a 21- to 22-year-old kid, it's pretty crazy when you think about it today, why should you have to deal with it? It feels like the army is shaking you off, because you tell yourself that the day after [you stood there,] the battalion commander let 75% of the people pass. You feel like an idiot.

After observing his battalion commander exercise discretion and allow civilian movement despite existing regulations, Amir began to exercise discretion himself, eventually allowing people to cross in contravention of his orders.

Control also failed when different commanders in the same unit imposed varying standards as to required behavior, leaving soldiers without a clear picture of what was expected of them. This was the case in David's unit, where different NCOs imposed different policies at checkpoints so that combatant behavior would change daily, depending on the responsible commander on shift. David explained,

> I think that compared to the other commanders in the company I was pretty average in terms of attitudes towards Palestinians or attitudes towards regulations. I heard of other commanders who were much more lenient in terms of who they let through. I don't know if it's because they were gentle souls or because they were just tired of it. On the other hand there were definitely commanders who were much stricter in terms of punishment or detentions or enforcement of restrictions to the letter.

As a result of differences among commanders, levels of strategic violence could vary among the same combatants at the same checkpoint. A similar dynamic could be found at other sites of encounter between soldiers and civilians, such as patrols in rural areas, where NCOs were the only authority and often operated with very little supervision. Omer, a former infantry officer, recalled that during patrol assignments "lazy squad commanders could take the soldiers and sit around for eight hours, whereas another squad commander might go beyond the limits of the task and patrol inside a village or something, and another squad commander would just do [the job] rationally."

A final pattern, evident in the least disciplined units, was a near-complete lack of control by commanders, which led to uncontrolled behavior and shirking from strategic violence. Gilad had served in such a unit, a battalion in a unit later called the Kfir Brigade.[30] He and his comrades were often deployed on patrols or checkpoint shifts with little to no briefing. "It was like, you have eight hours, don't do

anything stupid that could hurt you or others. And that's it." In contrast with military regulations, soldiers in Gilad's unit were rarely debriefed after shifts nor monitored during missions. As a result, he recalled,

> Let's just say all of us did stuff we weren't supposed to do, whether it was our attitudes towards Arabs or our attitudes towards the mission. For instance, sitting around for eight hours [instead of patrolling]. . . . Sometimes an officer would ask what we had done . . . but most of the time you finished your task and that was it. If the battalion commander had investigated what we had done, he would have found that there were a lot of problems, ethical and operational. Silly stuff we'd do . . . because they put you there and you work eight-hour shifts, the same tasks, for an entire week, so at some point you start going crazy. So yes, there was a period when one of the soldiers would set off bonfires, and we almost burnt down an olive tree. . . . We were sick of doing the same things over and over so we tried to make it interesting, which usually meant doing stuff we weren't supposed to do. . . . For example, we'd go hang out in an abandoned trailer park instead of patrolling.

On a final note, Omer and Gilad's stories also demonstrate the relationship, described in chapter 1, between reduced participation in strategic violence and increased participation in opportunistic violence. Weak organizational control not only leads to increased shirking, as evidenced by the squad commanders who abandoned their patrol, but also to an increase in the production of opportunistic violence, as evidenced by the behavior of squad commanders who damaged property for entertainment. These dynamics are discussed further in chapter 6.

This chapter has drawn attention to the considerable organizational effort involved in producing military violence, showing that, although IDF combatants in the Second Intifada sometimes eagerly participated in strategic violence, in other cases they shirked from it. I argued that this variation in participation can be attributed primarily to social organizational control. When the violence demanded of combatants conforms to the levels, forms, and targets of violence normalized through military training, participation is likely to rise. However, when combatants are expected to perform violence that was not normalized through training, control weakens and shirking emerges.

Instrumentalist theories that attribute variation in violence to the shifting strategic calculations of elites would not predict these patterns. In the Second Intifada, Israeli security elites deemed population-control operations necessary, both as a means of pressuring civilians to reject the insurgency and as a way to disrupt

insurgent activity. However, elites often failed to adequately instill these preferences among ordinary combatants, leading in some cases to a decline in the production of strategic violence.[31] Theories that attribute violence to polarized identities and passionate emotions are similarly limited in explaining variation in combatant participation in strategic violence. Such theories can account for the unleashing of violence, but not for shirking or restraint. If rage or revenge is behind soldiers' eagerness to commit violence, it is unclear why in some cases rage and revenge would be absent. Social-psychological theories that focus on the role of social influence in promoting violence are also limited in explaining variation in participation in strategic violence, because they cannot account for the disobedience and nonconformity associated with shirking violence ordered from above. Finally, variation in participation in strategic violence cannot be explained by organizational theories that argue that weak control and discipline lead to the overproduction of violence discipline.[32] As this chapter shows, weak control also leads in some cases to underproduction or shirking from strategic violence.

Instead, this chapter argued that IDF organizational control processes, applied most forcefully during military training, were successful in normalizing some forms of violence but not others. Specifically, violence that was perceived as aggressive, risky, targeted at a concrete enemy, and promising significant results was normalized as desirable soldier behavior, not just as legitimate but also as the expression of esteemed values, rendering the human consequences largely invisible. Such violence typically elicited high levels of compliance and enthusiasm, because it was consistent with the portrait of meaningful service, glory, and thrill painted by the IDF.

In practice, however, much of the IDF's counterinsurgency strategy in the Second Intifada did not fit this description, instead relying heavily on population-control operations such as the enforcement of strict restrictions on movement. This was particularly true for ordinary (non-elite) units, which bore most of the responsibility for such operations. The noncombative nature of these missions, the collective and indiscriminate targeting they required, and the lack of associated glory or military achievement led to a divergence between combatant and military preferences, whether because of principled resistance to the targeting of civilians or simply due to boredom or lack of belief in the necessity or importance of the task. For some combatants, this divergence led to a decline in the production of strategic violence, for example, through relaxing the enforcement of movement restrictions at and around checkpoints or through dodging such missions altogether by choosing to take a break somewhere far from sight.

It fell to small-unit commanders to intervene where centralized control mechanism had become insufficient, to enforce the military's normative framework, and to realign shirking combatants with the organizational goals. This task was

often accomplished through social control mechanisms, which sought to raise combatant motivation by imposing a military logic on population-control missions, re-instilling among combatants a sense of significance and purpose. Less effective were formal control mechanisms, demanding obedience regardless of combatant beliefs by invoking the formal authority of the chain of command. When commanders failed to impose either of these mechanisms, participation in strategic violence was most likely to decline.

Toward the latter part of the Second Intifada, the IDF itself increasingly recognized the control problems associated with military checkpoints. In 2004, Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin, then commander of the IDF's military colleges, dressed as a reserve soldier and performed checkpoint duty for one day. He was later quoted as saying, "It's shitty work. I wouldn't want to continue it for even one moment. You never know who the terrorist is and you have to treat everyone with suspicion. . . . Not all soldiers are doctors. If they had good skills they would be somewhere else. It's a tough and unrewarding job."[33] That same year an internal IDF review identified several problems at checkpoints, including behavioral and ethical problems, lack of training and instruction for checkpoint duty, and the absence of sufficient physical and technological infrastructure to enable its smooth functioning.[34]

Senior IDF officers, realizing that the checkpoints posed severe problems to military control, gradually found ways to outsource the enforcement of Israel's harsh movement regime in the Occupied Territories. In 2004 a special "Crossings" unit was established in the military police for the sole purpose of administering Green Line checkpoints. In 2005 a Crossings Administration was established in the Israeli Ministry of Defense with the aim of constructing and administering up to forty crossings from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel. In 2006, under the auspices of the Crossings Administration, Israel embarked on a multimillion dollar "demilitarization of border crossings" project, transferring many checkpoints into the hands of the police or the Ministry of Defense, which now operates the checkpoints through private security companies.[35] The demilitarization project provides evidence for the IDF's difficulties in controlling the violence associated with its enforcement of the restricted movement regime.

5

THE DYNAMICS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL VIOLENCE

In officer's school they teach us: I define the what for you—you execute the how.

Interview with former officer, May 2009.

These things, these so-called educational acts, are something for which authority is not defined. You do it, and you don't violate any law . . . as a checkpoint commander I'm authorized to do anything as long as I don't violate the law. And then it's endorsed in retrospect by my company commander.

Interview with former tank commander, November 2009.

The small courtroom at the old Military Court Building in Jaffa was unusually crowded. Impatient journalists paced in and out of the room, anxious for the hearing to begin. The narrow wooden benches were filled with people: family and friends of the defendant, journalists, representatives from Israeli human rights organizations, and soldiers of various ages and ranks. All awaited that day's witness, Major General Gadi Shamni, head of the IDF's Central Command. In an unusual move, the senior-ranking officer had been summoned to testify in the case of an officer charged with physical violence against Palestinian civilians during a military operation in the West Bank village of Qadum.

The officer, second in command in his company, was deployed to Qadum late one night following a report that gunfire was heard in the nearby Israeli settlement of Q'dumim. His mission was to try and obtain information about the incident and, if possible, about the whereabouts of the shooter or the gun. During the course of that night he and his soldiers would encounter two groups of men, the first on the road leading to the village and the second in its central square. Accounts of the ensuing events diverge, but according to the facts as later determined by the court, the officer interrogated some of the men using physical force, including slaps and aggressive shaking. In addition, one of the sergeants under his command was charged with butting a civilian with his helmet, kicking him in the stomach, and roughing up several others. After the incident was discovered, the officer and his sergeant were arrested and charged with aggravated assault.

The trial would have become yet another unexceptional military trial of violence against Palestinian civilians were it not for an unexpected turn. The defendant's main argument throughout the case was that his behavior reflected common practice in his unit and conformed to what he had learned from his commanders. While there was nothing atypical about this line of defense, his battalion and brigade commanders, who might have been expected to denounce his behavior and label it an aberration, surprisingly confirmed his account in court. The two officers testified that the defendant, a leading commander in his unit, had in fact acted in accordance with his mission and his responsibilities. Although they acknowledged that his use of force may have exceeded accepted practice, they argued that his actions in no way constituted criminal assault, but were instead an appropriate and legitimate military reaction under the circumstances. In a statement later quoted widely in the Israeli press, the brigade commander testified,

> A slap, sometimes a blow to the back of the neck or the chest, sometimes a knee [to the stomach] or chokehold to calm the person down, is reasonable. Is there a chart that determines what's permissible and what's forbidden? No, and it is impossible for there to be. . . . To say that questioning is done without using force at all is to feign innocence.[1]

The next day the battalion commander stepped up to testify. Like the brigade commander before him, he explained that, while aggression for aggression's sake was unacceptable, and aggression had to be proportional, it was certainly acceptable and often necessary to use some physical force to carry out the military mission of protecting Israeli civilians.[2]

The testimonies by two high-ranking officers permitting physical violence against civilians under some military circumstances caused an uproar in the Israeli press. A few NGOs called for the dismissal of the officers, arguing that they should not be training soldiers.[3] The IDF Chief Military Advocate General (MAG) wrote the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Central Command stating that the testimonies provided explicit legitimacy to engage in unlawful violence during interrogations of Palestinians—a severe breach of behavioral norms expected of soldiers and commanders; was at odds with IDF values; and conveyed an unacceptable message to commanders and soldiers.[4] Less than two weeks after the testimonies, Central Command Chief Shamni issued a letter to the officers under his command emphasizing and clarifying the rules regarding physical violence against detainees, and especially "the express prohibition on the use of force and violence without justification or in excess of necessary towards Palestinian residents, and the prohibition against harming their dignity without justification."[5] The brigade commander was officially reprimanded for his testimony, and his promotion was temporarily stalled.[6]

The reprimand had swift effects. When the brigade commander's request to testify a second time was denied, he filed an affidavit that contradicted his earlier testimony, stating that mild, non-wounding physical violence was permissible only in very limited circumstances—when necessary to prevent an explosion (in the event of "a ticking bomb") or injury to soldiers or civilians.[7] A few months later, when the brigade and battalion commanders were summoned once more, this time to testify in the trial of the sergeant charged along with the officer, their accounts had changed so thoroughly that the court declared the battalion commander a hostile witness.[8]

It was against this volatile background that Major General Shamni was summoned to testify before the military court and clarify the contradictions between the testimonies of two senior ranking officers and the letter he had circulated among all the officers under his command. Shamni took the witness stand for approximately two hours. In response to repeated questions from the defense attorney regarding the accepted norms in the brigade, as evidenced by the testimonies of its senior leadership, Shamni emphasized that there was no such thing as "proportional violence" against civilians that commanders could exercise at their discretion. He explained that his letter to his subordinates was intended to ensure that no soldier misunderstood the testimonies as allowing unlawful violence against civilians. Moreover, he had spoken with the brigade and battalion commanders and found that they regretted their statements on the witness stand, explaining that in their desire to support an officer under their command their words had been misunderstood and taken out of context. Shamni maintained that all agreed that the testimonies, while using unfortunate choices of words, did not reflect what actually happened in the field. In the field, he insisted, rules regarding the use of force were unambiguous and were generally obeyed.

Between Strategy and Opportunism: The Emergence of Violence from Below

The trial and its aftermath revealed a form of violence against civilians that is initially difficult to classify. Much of the literature on patterns of violence in conflict explicitly or implicitly distinguishes between strategic and opportunistic violence (Manekin 2013; Wood 2012). The former involves activity that implements the preferences of armed group leaders, while the latter refers to self-serving violence that exceeds or contravenes armed group strategy. The beatings in Qadum were strategic in that they were intended to serve military objectives—in this case, to obtain information regarding a reported shooting—and were endorsed by the

unit's senior leadership. However, once discovered, the appropriateness and even the existence of such violence were forcefully denied by senior military leaders, who emphatically claimed that the beatings constituted misconduct that was in no way related to military strategy.

This chapter identifies and analyzes this category of violence, which is neither strictly strategic nor opportunistic. It builds on the assumption that in large, complex organizations, organizational strategy is a more complex phenomenon than implied by the conventional top-down/bottom-up dichotomy between strategy and opportunism. As Burgelman (1983a, 61) argues in the corporate context, in large organizations "most strategic activities are *induced* by the firm's current concept of corporate strategy, but also emerging are some *autonomous* strategic activities, that is, activities that fall outside the scope of the current concept of strategy." In other words, while most strategic activity in the organization emanates from managers at the top, some strategic behavior results from autonomous initiatives at the firm's lower and middle levels. I term such behavior, intended to serve the organization's mission but originating autonomously from the organization's lower levels, *entrepreneurial violence* (EV).

The notion of a middle category between strategic and opportunistic violence was recently explored by Wood, who identifies a category of "practice" defined as "violence that is not ordered (even implicitly) but is tolerated by commanders" (2014, 471; also see Wood 2018). As in EV, violent practice typically emerges from below. However, the concept of practice is broader, including forms of violence that do not serve organizational interests but are nevertheless tolerated by commanders because the costs of curtailing such practices outweigh the benefits.[9] In other words, the existence of a violent practice reflects a failure of enforcement, rather than any particular stance regarding the organization's strategy. EV, in contrast, is intended to advance the military's objectives as they are perceived from below. It therefore reflects not failure but ambiguity of control.

EV is more similar to the "clandestine operating codes" that Ron (2000) describes in his analysis of Israeli state violence in the First Intifada. Ron argues that state security forces face conflicting pressures: they must find a balance between effective repression and the maintenance of an image of legality through rules limiting the use of force. This balance is achieved in practice through "organizational decoupling," which promotes "auras of rule conformity for public consumption, but practically engages in rule deviation to get the work done" (453). It points to the disjuncture between formal rules and informal practices embedded in the organizational culture.

Like the operating codes identified by Ron, entrepreneurial violence serves strategic, not opportunistic purposes, and it is typically covert, reflecting its deviation from the authorized strategic practices of the military. Ron's analysis,

however, takes such codes as given and does not account for their emergence nor for the conditions under which they are sometimes institutionalized. Moreover, it pertains primarily to organizations engaged in policing, for which rules governing the use of force are clearer and security forces more constrained by domestic and international institutions. In a context where rules restrict behavior, "senior officers, political leaders, and rank-and-file soldiers . . . negotiate these contradictions by decoupling their situational activities from general rules" (Ron 2000, 453).

My argument concerns armed conflict, which is characterized by a greater degree of norm ambiguity.[10] Though there are certainly laws that regulate armed conflict, and these laws are undoubtedly sometimes side-stepped in the manner that Ron describes, the practices I focus on in this chapter are not the work of security forces creatively circumventing (and subverting) existing rules of criminal justice. Rather, at least from the perspective of soldiers, they are attempts to create violent strategy on the ground in an environment of persistent ambiguity.[11] Specifically, I argue that, under conditions of uncertainty regarding the limits of permissible behavior, junior and mid-level officers have incentives to develop violent practices, sustained by the ambiguity maintained by the higher ranks. If these practices prove successful, they may eventually be institutionalized in the military's strategic repertoire.

This chapter seeks to further identify and theorize this middle category of military violence. I first define the key conceptual elements underlying the notion of EV and outline an analytical framework for understanding its emergence and persistence, developed inductively from observed patterns of violence in the Second Intifada.[12] I then analyze ordinary soldier attitudes toward entrepreneurial violence, arguing, as in previous chapters, that organizational control mechanisms shape the degree to which combatants participate in EV. However, in the case of EV the control of combatants is naturally more difficult because it is ambiguous by definition.

Before proceeding with the analysis, a comment on data is necessary. As described here, the entrepreneurial process requires input from all levels of the organization. Ideally, then, evidence for such a process would need to be collected directly from all levels of the military chain of command. However, entrepreneurial behavior is inherently risky, and failed entrepreneurs are liable to pay a price for banking on uncertain outcomes. This is especially true in the case of EV, which, by nature of the industry, is dangerous and often occurs at the shadowy margins of legal norms. It therefore tends to remain concealed for as long as it is unknown whether the entrepreneurial opportunity has paid off, perhaps developing into the "clandestine operating codes" described by Ron as it becomes clearer, over time, that they represent a deviation from permissible behavior.

As a result, much of what I initially learned about entrepreneurial violence came from interviews with ordinary combatants and junior officers who provided local observations of the decisions of their superiors. Data from my interviews, together with extensive data from secondary sources, provided an initial basis for detecting patterns in violence that could not be explained by reference to either strategic or opportunistic mechanisms. Some clues that alerted me to the presence of entrepreneurial violence during interviews were the use of vague or evasive language and shifting terminology to describe similar practices, and the treatment of such behavior by respondents as somehow different from ordinary strategic violence. In addition, observations from the Qadum beatings trial provided an important source of data. Although the events that led to the trial reflected a practice that, based on the testimony of mid-level officers, had evolved into an operating code rather than an entrepreneurial innovation, the trial provided an opportunity to examine the role played by various links in the chain of command, offering a glimpse into the dynamics of risk and reward stripped of their characteristic ambiguity. Nevertheless, the inability to directly access data on EV from all levels of the chain of command necessarily places some limits on its study. I return to this limitation in the chapter's conclusion.

Definitions and Concepts

The analytical framework laid out in this chapter builds on three concepts: entrepreneurship, organizational strategy, and strategic ambiguity. This section discusses each in turn, drawing first on organizational and management theory to elaborate the organizational dynamics at play in enabling and sustaining entrepreneurial behavior and then applying each to the military context.

Entrepreneurship and Corporate Entrepreneurship

In the past two decades research on entrepreneurship has grown exponentially.[13] While several definitions of entrepreneurship exist, the most prominent defines entrepreneurship as the process by which people identify and exploit opportunities for innovation in goods, services, and ways of organizing (Davidsson, Low, and Wright 2001; Shane 2003; Shane and Venkataraman 2000). Much research on entrepreneurship has focused on the creation of new organizations and ventures; however, a separate area of research has explored the discovery and exploitation of new opportunities **within** existing firms, often termed "corporate entrepreneurship" (CE).[14] The concept of CE has been used to refer to two related but distinct phenomena: (1) a firm's orientation toward entrepreneurship in its

ranks as expressed by the attitudes of top management toward such behavior and (2) the informal entrepreneurial behavior that emerges at the firm's lower levels (Kuratko 2010).

A key element of entrepreneurial behavior is the presence of uncertainty and risk.[15] Jones and Butler (1992, 734) observe that "entrepreneurs create value by acting in the context of uncertainty." If everyone had access to perfect information, opportunities for gain would be immediately exploited, leaving no space for the entrepreneur (Gifford 2010, 303). Moreover, the possible outcomes of opportunity exploitation and the ultimate value of the venture are unknown and can be costly (Alvarez and Barney 2005; Shane 2003). Indeed, a number of studies have found entrepreneurs to be significantly higher in risk propensity than managers (Stewart and Roth 2001, 2004; Zhao, Seibert, and Lumpkin 2010).

In the military context the concept of entrepreneurship may at first seem misplaced. Militaries are often perceived as bureaucratic, highly centralized organizations that privilege obedience over innovation. At the same time, however, military innovation is essential for adaptation to changing circumstances and as such is a central feature of military history (Grissom 2006). Grissom identifies two approaches to the sources of military innovation that most closely conform to the entrepreneurship model described here. First is "the intra-service model of military innovation," which contends that innovation results from "intra-service politics" and, specifically, from struggles among mid-level and senior-level officers within the military organization. Second are explanations that emphasize the strategic culture of a military and the manner in which such culture approaches innovation.[16]

Organizational Strategy

As reviewed in chapter 1, many studies of state violence in conflict view military strategy in purposeful, top-down terms. Military leaders are assumed to formulate policies in an intentional process of strategic choice, and implementation is facilitated by the hierarchical military structure, which enables the flow of information from higher to lower levels. This perspective is also reflected in studies of military innovation, nearly all of which operate from the top down (Grissom 2006). However, such stylized descriptions are removed from the empirical reality of organizational processes, including those in the military. Empirical studies of large, complex organizations have found the actual formulation of organizational strategy to be a more dynamic and emergent process than implied by the top-down model, involving managers at various organizational levels.[17]

One prominent example, the Bower-Burgelman process model, traces strategy making in a complex firm through the lower, middle, and top levels of the

organizational hierarchy (Burgelman 1983b; Noda and Bower 1996). According to this model, strategic initiatives emanate primarily from the organization's lower and middle levels, but top managers shape the process by establishing the context in which such initiatives emerge. Indeed, research has identified lower and middle levels of management as vital in driving the process of strategy formation in existing firms (Floyd and Lane 2000; Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd 2008). Because of their proximity to day-to-day operations and outside information, lower-level managers can "conceive new business opportunities, engage in project championing efforts to mobilize corporate resources for these new opportunities, and perform strategic forcing efforts to create momentum for their further development" (Burgelman 1983a, 65). Finding new, innovative solutions to existing problems and improving the performance of the organization present an unparalleled opportunity for lower-level managers to stand out in the eyes of their superiors and gain recognition and promotion.

In turn, middle managers who recognize the contribution of these initiatives can seek support for and embed them within a broader strategic framework (Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd 2008). Middle managers "perform the crucial role of linking successful autonomous strategic behavior at the operational level with the corporate concept of strategy" (Burgelman 1983b, 241), refining such ventures so that they fit with the organization's mission, purpose, and constraints (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, and Hornsby 2005). In this more complex view of strategy formation within organizations, top managers are not simply the initiators of strategy but are also managers of the entrepreneurial process (Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd 2008). Top managers empower lower levels to act entrepreneurially and then ratify initiatives that they deem beneficial for the organization. This ratification process takes time, however, as top managers delay decision making until some of the uncertainty surrounding entrepreneurial initiative has been resolved (Floyd and Lane 2000).

In the military context, autonomous strategic initiative can be found in the concept of mission command, a philosophy of decentralized command that encourages initiative by commanders at the field level (Ben-Shalom and Shamir 2011; Shamir 2011; Storr 2003). Mission command was first developed by the Prussian army in the nineteenth century in response to the challenges of modernizing warfare, which rendered ineffective the earlier command model of total control that viewed subordinates simply as obedient automatons. In light of its advantages, mission command has been gradually adopted as a philosophy of command among Western armies since the 1980s, with varying degrees of success (Shamir 2011). Under mission command, lower level commanders are encouraged to exercise independent judgment, since their access to the ever-changing and uncertain conditions of combat gives them an information advantage that

can be exploited to devise effective military solutions quickly and flexibly. It thus envisions more complex and decentralized strategy-making processes than the traditional command philosophy of total top-down control. Put differently, mission command involves the delegation of authority to lower levels by providing minimal parameters of commander intent within which subordinates are empowered and expected to exercise initiative, take risks, and act independently.

Delegation and Strategic Ambiguity

The previous sections have shown that managerial delegation of authority and encouragement of entrepreneurship empower the lower ranks and at the same time exploit their information advantages for the overall benefit of the organization. However, delegation of authority also promises other, more sinister benefits that have received far less attention. When managerial decisions can potentially generate negative consequences for top managers, they can avoid such consequences by delegating the decision down the ranks.[18] In this way, delegation of authority provides plausible deniability for decision makers, who can thereby shift the blame for negative outcomes.

This feature of delegation complicates the principal-agent relationship between organizational leadership and its ordinary members. In agency theory, principals are assumed to employ agents to increase efficiency. The principal's primary dilemma becomes how to align the interests of agents with her own through monitoring and incentive schemes. Put in organizational terms, the manager's primary task is to design and implement organizational control mechanisms that ensure that members' interests, values, or beliefs are aligned with those of the organization. However, the blame-shifting aspect of delegation reflects a deliberate desire of management to place some distance between itself and the lower ranks, so that plausible deniability can be achieved. In other words, such delegation indicates neither successful nor failed control but intentional dissociation.[19]

This intentional abandonment of control is often achieved through the use of what I term, following Eisenberg (1984), "strategic ambiguity," or the intentional use of ambiguous language to achieve particular objectives. Strategic ambiguity is a method of communication that leaves some important matters unsaid, and therefore open to multiple interpretations. It provides many advantages, allowing for flexibility in implementation and minimizing the potential for disagreement. As a strategy of command, strategic ambiguity offers the important benefit of delegation of responsibility to lower ranks. The senior commander need only mention the goal, and his subordinates are responsible for making sure that it is achieved. In the case of misconduct and its subsequent detection, subordinates are invariably held liable, because it is extremely difficult to produce evidence link-

ing the senior commander to the crime. Strategic ambiguity thus allows commanders to exploit uncertainty as to who is actually responsible for violent behavior by delegating responsibility down the chain of command.[20]

Analytical Framework

Having laid out the key elements of the framework I can now trace the relationships among them to specify the process through which entrepreneurial violence emerges and the conditions under which it persists. The framework is summarized in figure 5.1 and detailed in the following sections.

The Emergence of Entrepreneurial Violence

Entrepreneurial violence emerges, in Burgelman's (1983a) terms, as an autonomous strategic activity. Three conditions are necessary for such violence to arise: ambiguity, entrepreneurial individuals, and opportunities.

AMBIGUITY

First, the strategic context must be one of uncertainty and ambiguity. In other words, entrepreneurial violence does not encompass forms of violence that are prohibited by military orders or have already been explicitly identified and incorporated as part of the organization's strategic repertoire. Ambiguity stems from several sources. Some ambiguity is inevitable, because it is impossible to foresee and mandate every form of individual behavior, especially in the unpredictable circumstances of fighting. The level of ambiguity will vary between military



FIGURE 5.1. The emergence and persistence of entrepreneurial violence.

organizations, depending both on their organizational cultures and on the degree to which their structures are decentralized. The IDF, for instance, possesses a strong tradition of decentralization and a culture emphasizing leadership, independence, aggression, and initiative throughout the ranks (Ben-Shalom and Shamir 2011; Vardi 2008). Finally, some ambiguity is strategic, reflecting a deliberate intent on the part of the senior ranks to delegate responsibility and ensure deniability in the case of negative consequences.

An example of strategic ambiguity, noted with frustration by many former combatants, was the absence of clear rules determining how to enforce military authority at checkpoints in the event that Palestinians evaded movement restrictions. Barak, a former infantry officer, explained,

> I remember situations when we would detain someone at the checkpoint for several hours, I can't remember why; there were things like that. And there was a dilemma what [to do]. You can't arrest him; you're not a cop. You don't have the authority of a cop—handcuffs and onto the police car. On the other hand, if, as a commander, you see someone disrupting the operation of the checkpoint you want to solve it. Sometimes, most of the time, the Palestinian who is disrupting the checkpoint harms the population more than he harms the checkpoint itself. It creates mayhem and delays, so you ask yourself, What do I do? One of the solutions was to detain the person at the checkpoint and not let him pass or something. Is that ethical? Unethical? To this day I don't know how to answer that.

When I asked Barak whether the rules permitted such detention, he responded,

> The rules . . . there are rules, I'm trying to remember. I think that from the beginning we would encounter these problems with patrols and such, similar situations, of someone who essentially disrupts order and you want to do something to solve it, to maintain order. I think at first it was allowed, maybe; I really can't remember the details, maybe it was allowed within a certain time limit, just not to go crazy with it, but I think that after some time they decided that you don't do it anymore.

I pressed him further, asking what his battalion commander or other senior officer would say if the question of how to enforce authority was posed to him. What was the "correct" answer in this case?

> That's the whole complexity of it. I don't know. Maybe the battalion commander knew how to give the right answer, but if I don't know it, it means that from my perspective there's no clear answer. . . . If I don't

> know, then it doesn't exist from my perspective. It could be that I've forgotten, but other things are very clear to me, and I still remember what's permitted and what's not. So if I don't remember, or if I remember that it was unclear, then that means that it wasn't clear enough.

Barak's stumbling response reveals a fundamental ambiguity in which senior officers delegated authority down the chain of command, leaving commanders to devise their own solutions to problems encountered during population-control missions.

Strategic ambiguity was also evident surrounding offensive practices generally termed "disruption," though they went by many different local names.[21] The logic of disruption was elaborated succinctly in the brigade commander's testimony in the Qadum violence trial. He explained that disruption was used when no concrete intelligence about the identity of militants or their whereabouts was available, in order to generate information about militant networks or impending attacks. Practically, it could entail patrolling noisily in a village, throwing stun grenades, conducting showy searches or arrests, and using other means of demonstrating military presence.[22] In contrast to the commander's fairly detailed testimony, the IDF's Chief of Central Command's responses in court were more vague. He stated that he was familiar with "disruption," but as an "operational concept," rather than a mission. Consequently, he acknowledged there were no written orders regulating such tasks. From the perspective of ordinary combatants often deployed to perform this very task, this ambiguity created space for the invention of practices that were not formally authorized.

ENTREPRENEURS

As already noted, the IDF has a tradition of encouraging aggressive initiative at the lower levels. Moreover, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, which are typically carried out by small, geographically dispersed teams of soldiers led by relatively independent junior commanders, are particularly conducive to entrepreneurial behavior. It is therefore not surprising that enterprising commanders were fairly common in the Second Intifada. Such entrepreneurial officers showed initiative and were proactive in initiating missions. One such officer, a commander of an elite unit, was described by Ethan, one of his former soldiers, as "bloodthirsty," after announcing to soldiers that he was "not afraid of peace":

> He said it to a room full of soldiers. It was like the guy was living in an action movie. . . . Like, "if we have nothing to do we [still] won't sit here with our hands folded." . . . And it was scary because he was bloodthirsty—we're here to kill terrorists. He wanted to take terrorists apart. You could see he was totally goal oriented. . . . Some [commanders]

> are bloodthirsty, they go beyond their mission, I don't know, maybe it's a stupid *ekshen* thing.

Daniel, a former platoon officer in an infantry unit, described with irritation the private initiatives his company commander used to take when stationed in the Nablus area, leaving him to deal with most of the administrative tasks:

> He would disappear. Every night he'd disappear. He'd go into the [built] territory with a few soldiers to create a commotion, shoot in the air, throw stun grenades. He would create a commotion and disappear all the time . . . and he was pleased! Every night he'd go into the village and shoot.

To emphasize, these were not rogue commanders carrying out private opportunistic missions. They were highly valued officers, who were not content with simply doing their jobs, but continually searched for opportunities in which they could take initiative to advance what they saw as the organizational goals of preventing terrorism and repressing the insurgency.[23]

Entrepreneurial officers often supported and encouraged their own subordinate commanders to take initiative. Doron recalled how an admired company commander empowered his subordinates:

> There was a company commander who, in terms of his drive towards contact, his professionalism, and especially the determination that he communicated in everything he did—just totally propelled us forward. But at the same time we were like kings. . . . We felt like we were in the top commando unit. We'd sit at the base and get ready for special operations. I'd go on [special] operations whenever I felt like it, take vehicles and go wherever I wanted, to whatever Palestinian city I wanted and whatever village I wanted. . . . We'd do any training exercise we wanted . . . complete and total endorsement: "Have a good trip."

Similarly, Gilad described how mundane nighttime tasks of patrolling around settlements in the Nablus area could be turned with some initiative into more aggressive (and, for him, exciting) missions in Palestinian villages:

> We used to set up checkpoints, patrol the area, and every once in a while we'd go into the village, especially at night, if our [superiors] agreed, if our company commander allowed us to do something a bit enjoyable. One night I asked if I could go around inside the village instead [of the usual patrol]. We just went around the village for an entire night; we initiated our own activity. I don't know if the battalion commander would have been happy about four soldiers walking around the village at night;

> the village was just on the outskirts of Nablus, but for us it was a bit of a head rush, a bit of adrenaline, and it was fun.

OPPORTUNITY

Finally, entrepreneurial violence requires opportunity. Such opportunities are created when current strategy does not seem to be fully meeting its goals and is unable to sufficiently address all the problems or challenges it was designed to resolve. Such external circumstances create the demand for new solutions that go beyond the practices mandated and authorized by military leaders. "Disruption" practices, for instance, were developed as a result of a fundamental problem of counterinsurgency warfare: the fact that insurgents hold the initiative regarding how and when to strike. They can time attacks to their advantage, lying low for much of the time, blending into the population, and reducing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. In the Intifada's early stages, the IDF encountered this challenge frequently. It responded to insurgent initiatives with defensive operations designed to catch militants who had already embarked on attacks. Some militants were able to slip through the IDF's defensive nets and carry out violent attacks within Israel, and the IDF was initially unable to effectively target them before they set out to strike.

This operational problem created many opportunities for violence entrepreneurs in the military to take the initiative and devise solutions. Various "disruption" activities were designed to identify militants in situations when they chose to lie low and no information existed as to their identity and whereabouts. Through random military activity in villages, IDF officers hoped to create upheaval that might generate intelligence and lead to the identification of militants.

"Stimulus and response" operations, described in chapter 3, were born out of a similar need. Proactive field officers in the paratrooper unit developed the idea of clandestine urban ambushes in private homes, luring militants into the streets of Palestinian cities and refugee camps by creating a noisy diversion and then targeting them by concealed sniper fire.[24] In this way they were able to overcome the problem of wielding heavily mechanized forces in counterinsurgency zones (Lyall and Wilson 2009), employing what they saw as "guerilla against guerilla" by using small bands of trained soldiers hidden deep in civilian areas. Doron, a former officer who had participated in many such operations, explained,

> At the time at least it seemed true, the claim that if we engaged them in their own territory they wouldn't hurt Israeli civilians. That was the claim, and it seemed very reasonable to me at the time, justified even. . . . It's an operation with one objective: to kill terrorists. You go out into the field in all kinds of ways that are very suspenseful and very scary in

> my opinion. . . . We **wanted** to be there, because we went there without anyone telling us to, as an initiative of the unit commander . . . but the result is that you kill, injure, or capture terrorists.

Other entrepreneurial practices also reflected the identification and exploitation of opportunities to solve existing problems. For instance, IDF officers devised a practice of tearing through residential walls, rather than moving outside in the narrow alleyways, to protect soldiers from sniper fire and IEDs. The practice, attributed to then-Colonel Aviv Kochavi, at the time the commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, made use of the spatial organization of Palestinian towns and refugee camps to address a basic problem in urban warfare: the vertical dimension that exposed soldiers to hidden sniper fire in the open streets.[25]

In addition, various punishment and deterrence practices were developed to "educate" Palestinian civilians to comply with the regime of movement restrictions that the IDF imposed, addressing the IDF's inability to control Palestinian space in its entirety. Oded, a former infantry commander, described how violent practices emerged from situations in which commanders did not feel they were given the tools to solve everyday problems:

> There was a road in our area that [Palestinians] couldn't use. And when people were caught there then I think they'd be detained for days sometimes. . . . It's a decision that even a squad commander can make, but it comes from above. It's basically that "we don't have a solution so improvise in the field. . . . We can't deal with it, so improvise." They didn't know how to deal with that road because no matter how much they tried to block it, it would be broken open. So the response in the field was to leave people [who tried to pass] there, take their ID card and they can stay there.

When I asked Oded what it meant to detain people on a road for several days, he was evasive:

> I don't remember that exactly, but say his car would stay there for example. People didn't stay for days; let's say he would stay for a day, but the cars would stay there. . . . It's not confiscation, it's "Your ID is at the checkpoint; come in an hour and get it." If you cared, it would be there [when he came to pick it up.] If not, people would lose it.

Assaf, who served as an officer in the Hebron area, also explained how the difficulty in enforcing restrictions on movement led to the improvisation of violent practices:

> They want to pass and they pass. So you bring a bulldozer and block [the road], and they break through it. So you catch them and leave them there and meet them the next day. . . . You take the keys and tell him to stay; you stay with him. There are lots of ways; you take his keys and bring them to the DCO; they would change the procedure of how to do it every day. Once I brought a bulldozer and lifted the fork over his car; he was sure I was going to crush it. You scare them, stuff like that. . . . Ultimately the system doesn't give you a solution; you need to come up with your own solutions. There's no magic solution since their desire to eat is greater than your desire for them not to use the road.

Detention of civilians was a widespread practice, but the discretion given to checkpoint commanders meant there was individual variation in its implementation. As Roee, a tank commander who served at a checkpoint in the Jenin area, explained,

> As a checkpoint commander . . . your authority is everything that happens at the checkpoint. For instance, there was one illegal entrant we would catch every day. He said, "I'm trying to enter [Israel], and I'll try five times a day, because that's where I can find work and if I can get into Israel for a few hours I'll have more work." So for three consecutive days, every single day, he sat at our checkpoint under a tree with the bottle of water that we made sure to bring him. Why? So that he'd sit under a tree for three days and understand that these infiltrations are not worthwhile because we catch him, and it's better for him to look for work inside [the West Bank] or to get a permit.

Another practice that soldiers widely employed in efforts to curtail the flow of people who resisted or evaded checkpoints was to confiscate vehicles, car keys, and identification papers.[26] David, a checkpoint commander in the Nablus area, described this practice:

> There was a large open area . . . where we would have random foot patrols or an APC try and catch people bypassing the checkpoint. There were often vehicles that would pass through, and what we often used to do there—again, we didn't really know in terms of regulations what we're supposed to do with them—are you supposed to detain them? Confiscate their vehicles? By what authority are we confiscating vehicles? So sometimes yes, it was the platoon commander's decision. You'd see four taxis parked next to our outpost of four Arabs whose taxis and keys were confiscated, and they were told to come back in a week and take

> the car. . . . It grew gradually, out of attrition, out of being given a task to prevent the movement of people and vehicles that we simply couldn't do. We didn't have [the tools.] So you have to make deterrence steps more severe. It won't help to ask them nicely not to come tomorrow.

A similar practice was reported by Josh, a former tank commander:

> There's a procedure that if someone does something to you, you take his keys. . . . [For example] there was a person there who didn't understand us and we didn't understand him. He thought he could go, he started to drive, and one of the guys who was there, it had to do with inexperience, started yelling at him, "Stop, stop, stop!" . . . I remember standing there and not knowing what to do. I saw the guy approaching the checkpoint and didn't know what to do until he stopped because he heard the yelling. Had I operated according to procedure I should have fired in the air. Anyway, we stopped him, took his keys, took his ID, and then at the end of the day you get a ton of keys back at headquarters. . . . The tank commanders collect keys . . . . so you have a pile of keys and ID papers. . . . No one ever said anything [against] it, absolutely not. . . . Afterwards you'd play with the keys and the cars would be scattered all over the place. . . . With time I think we'd park them somewhere, or maybe at some point a tank would accidentally run them over.

As these excerpts show, the emergence of entrepreneurial violence is a bottom-up phenomenon, generated by enterprising individuals identifying and exploiting opportunities and enabled by ambiguity at the senior level. Having identified an opportunity to increase the military's effectiveness or solve a persistent problem, aggressive, entrepreneurial commanders can formulate solutions, devising new violent practices.

Endorsement and Proliferation

Once a violent practice has emerged, its military costs and benefits can be better assessed. The military utility of a practice can be measured by its operational effectiveness and the degree to which it achieves its stated objectives. For instance, a violent practice designed to prevent repeated bypassing of checkpoints will be judged by its effectiveness in stopping the circumvention. It will also be judged by its costs, which can include a disproportionate threat to soldiers, or a likelihood of attracting domestic or international scrutiny and condemnation. Some innovative practices are likely to be egregious failures, especially if it is patently clear that their costs far outweigh their benefits. When a violent initiative is clearly

harmful to organizational interests, the incident may be covered up at the lower levels or, if discovered, can lead to punishment for the instigators.

A prominent case of failed entrepreneurial violence that occurred after the Second Intifada was what came to be known as the "Dahariya Incident," in which a platoon officer on a patrol mission in the Palestinian town of Dahariya initiated an unauthorized undercover raid with the objective of finding and killing a Palestinian insurgent. The soldiers, in civilian clothing, stopped a Palestinian cab, ordered the passengers out, blindfolded and tied up the driver, and began to drive through the town's streets. During their ride they encountered a civilian who aroused their suspicion, and one of the soldiers shot the man, critically wounding him. Fearing the consequences, the soldiers left him bleeding, abandoned the cab and driver, and returned to their base where they attempted to cover up the incident.[27] When it was discovered, the commanding officer was indicted and charged with multiple offenses.[28] He was ultimately demoted and sentenced to fifteen months in prison, and his brigade and battalion commanders were reprimanded.

The Dahariya Incident was a case of entrepreneurial violence in which, from the military's perspective, the costs clearly outweighed the benefits. A group of soldiers from an ordinary unit, with no training in special operations and no suitable preparation, attempted to carry out a raid that they were unequipped to perform and whose only result was the wounding of a civilian. It was therefore apparent that such an operation would not be endorsed, and indeed, quickly realizing this, the soldiers unsuccessfully attempted to conceal it.

In contrast, in cases where entrepreneurial violence appears effective and its costs to the military are not prohibitive, it is likely to spread locally across units (through informal horizontal ties and networks), because it provides effective or at least not overly risky responses to problems that soldiers face.[29] It can thus evolve from a local initiative to a more widespread practice.

It is during this process that commanding officers are called on to endorse a particular practice. Roee, the former tank commander, explained that when the rules were ambiguous, checkpoint commanders could develop their own initiatives to solve operational problems, some of which were later endorsed by higher ranks:

> One time I remember that . . . one of the [Palestinian] agricultural workers got angry because it took a long time to get merchandise through [the checkpoint]. So he thought, there are open areas [in the separation barrier]. I'll just drive my tractor with the vegetables there. When we saw him we sent two vehicles to catch him and bring him back to the checkpoint, and as punishment we not only checked each fruit as if it had a

> grenade inside, but we took apart his tractor, physically: "Take the tractor apart, take the wheel off, take apart the engine, let's see it." The goal was that he'd have to be stuck there all day. By definition, the punishment was to be stuck there all day so that by evening his vegetables would spoil. Now why would we do such a thing? So that next time he'd come to the checkpoint. And indeed after that beginning, it didn't happen to us [again], because people understood that *walla*, if something like this happens I lose a workday; I'm now in their computer systems, and on top of it all my merchandise is spoiled, which is tremendous economic damage.

When I asked Roee whether such a step was permitted, he responded that as a checkpoint commander he was authorized to do anything as long as he did not violate the law, and his company commander would endorse him after the fact. Mid-level commanders at the battalion and brigade levels are thus key figures in this process, because they are the ones who determine whether to endorse the practice and if so, how to link it to existing policies.

The Outcomes of Entrepreneurial Violence

Once a violent initiative has been endorsed by the intermediate ranks of command and has spread across units, mid-level commanders are responsible for advocating for such practices with the military's strategic leadership, so that they can be integrated into its strategic repertoire. At this phase, too, senior commanders are likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, assessing the utility of a violent practice and its potential risks. Several elements may influence this decision. First, individual differences between generals matter, with some likely to be naturally more risk averse than others. Moreover, the present circumstances of the military are likely to play a role in shaping a general's assessment of the expected utility of violence. Whether the military is perceived to be winning or losing, whether threat levels are high or low, and whether public opinion is pushing for a tough campaign or is relatively indifferent are all factors likely to be taken into account. Finally, the level of domestic or international scrutiny will affect a general's perceived risk of authorizing entrepreneurial violence.

Ultimately, this calculation can yield three potential outcomes. When the costs of an endorsed practice are perceived to clearly outweigh its benefits, it is likely to be explicitly rejected by the senior ranks, leading to the withdrawal of endorsement and the prohibition of such violence. In the Israeli context, previously uncertain costs often materialized after unexpected media exposure or the initiation of legal proceedings. For example, the use of Palestinian civilians to protect

soldiers during operations was a widespread practice in the first years of the Second Intifada. Soldiers would order civilians, for example, to enter buildings first to verify their safety, conduct searches under soldiers' orders, check and move objects suspected of being booby-trapped, and stand or move in front of soldiers so as to shield them from militant gunfire (for more on this practice, see B'tselem 2002a and Human Rights Watch 2002a). Of these, the most common practice was what was informally known as the "neighbor procedure," used during arrest operations. To avoid the risk of a violent confrontation, soldiers would send a neighboring civilian into the home to order the suspect and family out of the house.

Yet despite the prevalence of this practice, when seven Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations petitioned Israel's High Court to rule on its legality, the IDF immediately announced the following:

> In light of various complaints that reached the respondents, including, *inter alia*, the information detailed in the petition, and without expressing a position on the question of whether these complaints are true or not, and for the removal of any doubt, the IDF has decided to immediately issue an unequivocal order to its forces, pursuant to which there is a complete prohibition on all forces operating in the field to use civilians as such as a "human shield" from fire or attack by the Palestinian side, or as "hostages." The order also clarifies that this prohibition applies in homes, streets, and any area and place where IDF troops operate.[30]

The IDF subsequently issued a detailed new directive titled "Early Warning Procedure," which authorized soldiers to "get assistance from" local Palestinian residents, subject to their consent, in order to "minimize the risk of harm against innocent civilians and the wanted persons" by giving an early warning to residents to leave the building and turn themselves in. Several years later, in 2005, the High Court ruled that the new procedure was illegal, forcing the military to curtail the practice.[31]

Conversely, in cases where the strategic benefits of entrepreneurial practices clearly outweighed their costs, these practices were likely to be adopted and institutionalized by the senior ranks, thereby becoming part of the organization's strategic repertoire. For instance, "stimulus and response" operations, initially developed as innovative practices by low-level officers, proved to be effective in targeting Palestinian militants in the streets of Palestinian towns. Because the operations were highly targeted they did not come under public criticism. At the same time, although it was risky, this practice did not turn out to be costly in terms of soldier casualties. The innovation was therefore institutionalized and became a central feature of Israeli counterinsurgency strategy.[32] Similarly, the costs of

moving through holes blasted in residential walls during large-scale operations—severe damage to Palestinian property—were deemed far less costly from the military's perspective than the advantages promised by such activity: the minimization of IDF casualties from IEDs and sniper fire. As a result the practice was institutionalized and incorporated into the IDF's strategic repertoire.

In many cases, however, the expected benefits and costs of a particular practice remain uncertain for some time, and it is difficult to determine which outweighs the other. Under such conditions senior commanders are likely to choose to maintain strategic ambiguity, thereby delegating the responsibility for uncertain outcomes to the lower ranks. Strategic ambiguity sustains entrepreneurial violence, allowing it to continue as an endorsed but non-institutionalized practice for as long as outcomes remain uncertain. Examples of such sustained ambiguity in the Second Intifada included various "disruption," "punishment," and "educational" practices used at checkpoints. These practices involved (nonlethal) violence against civilians and were therefore legally murky, but the scope of the violence was relatively limited, and therefore, for the most part, the operational and reputational costs of such activities for the military were not particularly high. At the same time, the effectiveness of these activities was uncertain. In some cases civilians may have been deterred or intelligence may have been generated, whereas in other cases neither measure achieved its stated goal. Given these uncertain costs and benefits, senior commanders were likely to be unwilling to end ambiguity by either institutionalizing or prohibiting the practice. Consequently, strategic ambiguity continued for as long as uncertainty remained, with such practices sometimes developing into the "clandestine operating codes" identified by Ron (2000).

Compliance with Entrepreneurial Violence

I have argued in this chapter that entrepreneurial violence is a separate category of violence that follows a distinct logic. As such, patterns of soldier participation in such violence differ to some extent from patterns of participation in strategic or opportunistic violence. The core argument of this book is that the degree of soldier participation in violence is largely shaped by organizational control. To the extent that violence was normalized by organizational control processes, it elicited high levels of compliance and enthusiasm. In contrast, when organizational control mechanisms failed to normalize violence, levels of compliance declined. In the case of entrepreneurial violence, organizational control processes were by definition ambiguous. As a result, such violence was greeted by some combatants with greater suspicion than ordinary strategic violence, leading in some cases to reduced participation.

Small-unit commanders were particularly important in the implementation of entrepreneurial violence, because it was they who typically initiated such violence and needed to ensure that their troops were behind them. Sometimes this task was relatively simple: some soldiers needed little persuasion to engage in aggression of any sort. Other combatants, however, were uncomfortable with ambiguous missions whose strategic benefits seemed unclear and that stood in contrast to the clear authorization of strategic violence. Still others viewed entrepreneurial officers as overly hungry for thrills, taking undue risks for unjustified reasons. As with strategic violence, in the absence of effective organizational control at the small-unit level, soldier participation was likely to decline.

David, for example, a former infantry commander, was able to avoid "disruption" tasks that made him uncomfortable:

> Another thing we did besides checkpoints, occasionally, was that someone, usually an officer, would go on a mission, an initiated mission, we called it "entering houses," and that was something that really, really upset me. It really bothered me. I don't think I said anything or expressed it to my commanders, but I did talk about it with my friends. An officer would take a few soldiers, decide to patrol in some village, and enter a house to conduct a search. It was different from anything I had experienced earlier in the army, because there was no intelligence information or anything of the sort, just code words, "demonstration of presence" . . . so that they know that the IDF is there. I remember one officer coming back from a mission like that all excited like, "Wow, I surprised him when I came in through the window and he almost died in bed." He said it like it was funny; I felt it was wrong, and it bothered me. . . . There were a few cases like that. I didn't participate in those missions, I don't remember if they asked if I wanted to and I said no, or if it just didn't work out.

Avner, a former combatant in an infantry unit of religious soldiers, also described his aversion to "disruption" activities they conducted in the Bethlehem area:

> A lot of the arrests we did were for no reason; that is, we'd get information about a house and cordon it, and we'd take everyone out, check ID papers, and not arrest anyone . . . because we were trying to "create a sense of being hunted." . . . That's what [those missions] were called. . . . People [in the unit] didn't identify with "creating a sense of being hunted," with knocking on people's doors and going around inside and then exiting. There were some people who identified more and others less . . . . We understood the rationale of [guarding] static posts; we

> understood that there were Israelis we needed to protect. OK. But the rationale of knocking on Palestinian doors at 2:00 a.m., not so much. . . . We kept asking why, and when they weren't successful in explaining it to us we didn't like to do it.

Enterprising small-unit commanders used various means to reassert control over skeptical soldiers. Sometimes, as evidenced by several passages in this chapter, they took just a few soldiers on such missions, whom they could trust would be as excited to participate as they were. When that was impossible, they relied on a mix of formal and social means to bring soldiers critical of entrepreneurial violence back in line. Doron, a platoon commander in an elite unit, described the challenges that he had in generating compliance for such operations and how he used social control mechanisms (primarily persuasion) to restore his soldiers' belief in their necessity and utility:

> During such operations there are a lot of [control] problems, like how do you keep hold of your soldiers. Because they tell you, "OK, listen, what's up with this, enough." There were weeks when we'd have three encounters [with armed militants], some of them with casualties, and they'd say "OK, what do you want from us, let's do [only] what we have to do." . . . Soldiers suddenly start asking you questions; they ask themselves also. "I'm ready to die for my country—[but only] when it's necessary." At some point . . . questions are raised. So you have to sell clichés, but you better believe them or else it won't work. And other times the results prove [that the operations are effective] . . . I knew back then that I had to use clichés, but clichés don't mean that it isn't true. I'd use a cliché to raise their morale a bit. But sometimes I didn't need to say anything because when you come back with a result, then they understand.

Whereas "stimulus and response" operations often had concrete results, as indicated by killed or captured militants, vague "disruption" activities were more difficult to justify to soldiers. Nir, a former company commander, explained,

> Tasks such as mapping,[33] they have no purpose. It doesn't give you anything. The likelihood of finding a terrorist in these kinds of missions is zero; it's totally meant to harass, to create an unpleasant feeling among the residents. And the results are more damaging than good. The likelihood of creating another terrorist in such missions is higher than the likelihood of finding one. . . . Why do mappings? You see that the battalion commander stammers and comes up with some stupid answer, so you don't identify with it. What can you do, you're human after all.

> But you do it anyway, and you represent the system, and you educate your soldiers to do it.

Other times, when persuasion efforts failed, formal mechanisms were used to control soldiers, as evidenced by the story told by Ethan, a former combatant in an elite unit:

> There were some missions that made people raise an eyebrow, even in my team. There was an activity . . . called "making noise," where the army purposely goes in to make noise so as to stir up the area because you know there is gunfire there. So you wake up the whole village, create a whole festival for them. And in my unit our entire team raised its head and said that the mission made no sense. So they told us to shut up and that's it. There was some anger, they tried to explain to us that that's how it went, and we tried to reach an understanding. We said there's no way we're doing something like that again. By chance it happened that we didn't do things like that again.

A small minority of junior commanders simply refused to accept ambiguity, compelling officers to clarify the objective of the mission. As in the Qadum violence trial, dispelling ambiguity led to a rejection of the practice. Ori, a former platoon officer in an infantry unit, related such an experience:

> There's no such thing as "demonstrating presence." I checked it once. As a squad commander I was once sent on a "demonstrating presence" mission, and I said there was no such thing and refused to do it. I said there's no such military mission. My company commander and I went to the battalion commander. . . . It's true that company commanders order soldiers to do it; they tell them to go demonstrate presence. But there's no such military mission. There's a handbook of military orders . . . and there's no order that says to demonstrate presence. There's attacking, there's defending, there are lots of other missions . . . and I said I have no problem doing it, but they can't call it "demonstrating presence," they need to give me a concrete task. So we went to the battalion commander and talked about it. Eventually we changed the name of the mission. It wasn't demonstration of presence. The battalion commander took my side; he said it really didn't exist.

In this case, when forced to confront the ambiguity of the widespread "disruption" practice of "demonstrating presence," the battalion commander acknowledged that it was not in the strategic repertoire and was forced to reorient the mission so that it fit the criteria of strategic violence. In contrast, the battalion

and brigade commanders in the Qadum violence case made a much less common choice on the witness stand, explicitly endorsing a covert practice and stripping it of its ambiguity. Consequently, their testimonies were renounced by their superiors, and they paid a professional price for their choice.

Despite the support he had received from his superiors, the lieutenant charged in the Qadum beatings was eventually found guilty as charged. Unlike the officers who had defended him on the witness stand, the court could not dismiss acts of violence against civilians as routine and appropriate. However, in its sentence the court decided that the sixty-four days the defendant had already spent under arrest, in addition to the thirty-two days he had spent in house arrest, were sufficient punishment under the circumstances. His sergeant was demoted to the rank of private, but he too was not required to serve any additional time beyond what he had already served during the trial.[34] A criminal investigation against the brigade commander was launched after the trials, but was later closed.[35] His promotion was delayed for two years, after which he was promoted to Brigadier General and appointed as chief infantry and paratrooper officer.[36]

In its analysis of entrepreneurial violence, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that military strategy is a more complex phenomenon than implied by conventional, top-down models focusing on the calculations of military elites, and that the relationship between armed group leaders and ordinary soldiers and commanders is not limited to conventional agency problems alone. Armed conflict is characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity, both unintended and strategic. Under such conditions, entrepreneurial junior officers have incentives to develop violent practices, exploiting new opportunities and taking risks, which, in the event of success, could bring them credit and advancement. At the same time, senior commanders can delegate the risks of uncertain outcomes to their most enterprising officers, thereby avoiding responsibility should such ventures fail.

Entrepreneurial violence can be difficult to identify in practice. Because of the inherently risky and often shadowy nature of violence beyond the margins of the clearly authorized, it can remain concealed for prolonged periods. When discovered, its instigators are often labeled as deviants, with senior officers distancing themselves from the practice and denying any knowledge of or responsibility for it. As such it can be difficult to discern whether the practice is a case of opportunistic misconduct or an emergent practice sustained by strategic ambiguity. Moreover, individuals may sometimes present their violent behavior as designed to serve the organization in order to avoid consequences for what was, in reality, gratuitous or self-serving. In some instances, opportunistic violence and entrepreneurial violence may be difficult to tell apart based on available evidence. This

chapter has suggested four ways to distinguish the two. First, EV practices are carried out for organizational rather than individual ends; second, they typically spread across units and are endorsed at least by field-level commanders; third, they are known by a variety of codes that demonstrate the ambiguous context in which they operate; and finally, they are designed to solve particular operational problems regarding which the military refuses to concretely issue explicit orders or prohibitions. It should thus be evident that the data required to clearly distinguish between the two categories can be difficult to obtain.

The theoretical framework proposed in this chapter was built inductively on the Israeli-Palestinian case, further developing the notion of a middle category between strategic and opportunistic violence analyzed by such scholars as Ron (2000) and Wood (2018). By specifying the conditions for the emergence and persistence of entrepreneurial violence, the model developed here can be tested in other conflict contexts. Primarily, it suggests that the institutionalization, rejection, or continued ambiguity surrounding a particular practice of entrepreneurial violence will depend on its relative costs and benefits as assessed by senior generals examining the practice after it has been endorsed by mid-level officers. In cases where costs and benefits remain uncertain, strategic ambiguity can be expected to continue, enabling the persistence of such violent practices.

6

THE PRODUCTION AND CONTROL OF OPPORTUNISTIC VIOLENCE

At the end of the day, how to treat the population is also a type of order. You're carrying out orders. It's a mission just like any other, like preparing for military drills. . . . If you treat your mission seriously and in a measured way, and you don't get tempted by what's around you or act excessively, then it will manifest at the checkpoint also.

Interview with Aviv, June 2009

The previous two chapters were concerned with violence that soldiers commit to advance military objectives, whether because they have been directed to do so or because they are pursuing initiatives that emerged from below. This chapter shifts the focus of analysis from violence committed professionally to violence that soldiers commit opportunistically, or "opportunistic violence." I define opportunistic violence as intentional harm inflicted by combatants that is (1) not planned, ordered, or authorized by military superiors and is (2) carried out by combatants for their own benefit rather than for the benefit of the military organization. The functions of opportunistic violence are diverse and include violence for instrumental purposes such as personal enrichment, violence committed for social posturing or due to peer pressure, and violence with no apparent purpose, stemming from emotional impulses or arbitrary drives. In counterinsurgency, the targets of such violence are often civilians.

From a contractual perspective, opportunistic violence can be viewed as a specific instance of the classic agency problem, in which conflicts of interest and information asymmetries lead ordinary soldiers, or agents, to diverge from the interests of their superiors, the principals.[1] From an organizational perspective, opportunistic military violence is a form of organizational misconduct that is at odds with the interests of the organization. Unlike the dynamics of participation in strategic and entrepreneurial violence, which have largely been unexplored, theories of participation in self-serving aggression, violence, and misconduct are more developed, enabling a deductive approach aimed at testing, rather than building, theory.

Opportunistic military violence, like aggression more generally, is a product of many factors, both individual and situational. Combatants are overwhelmingly likely to be male and young, two factors that are consistently associated with aggression and violence (Barling, Dupré, and Kelloway 2009). Violence can also be triggered by elements of the environment or social situation, such as aggressive cues (objects that prime aggressive thoughts), interpersonal provocation, frustration, and pain and discomfort (Anderson and Bushman 2002). Many of these elements are plentiful in violent conflict, thereby creating a high risk that combatants will lash out opportunistically. Nevertheless, participation in such violence is variable. To explore the reasons for this variation, I rely on two sources of data: an original online survey of Israeli ex-combatants and combatants' own interpretations of violence as expressed in interviews. The soldiers sampled were not selected at random, so the data presented in this chapter cannot be used to make inferences regarding patterns of violence in the Second Intifada. It can, however, suggest tendencies grounded in evidence regarding the determinants of opportunistic violence and, specifically, the central role of organizational control in reducing it.

Patterns of Opportunistic Military Violence in the Second Intifada

Forms of opportunistic violence vary from armed group to armed group and from conflict to conflict. In a study of soldier misconduct during the Second Intifada, Minka (2003) identified ten behaviors that constituted the primary forms of opportunistic violence in this period: stealing money; taking items, whether for personal enrichment or as so-called "souvenirs" (looting); gratuitously threatening to use firearms; harming symbols; confiscating property; committing physical violence; vandalizing and destroying property; taking property in exchange for granting benefits (forced bribes); engaging in verbal abuse; and arbitrary detentions of Palestinians at checkpoints. This list is consistent with evidence from my own interviews and with data collected by local NGOs. For the sake of analysis, I grouped these forms of violence into four categories: physical violence; nonphysical violence (e.g., humiliation, harassment); violence against property (e.g., vandalism, property destruction); and the taking of private property (e.g., looting and forced bribes).

Levels of opportunistic violence across time, space, and military units are much more difficult to estimate than its most prevalent types. Despite the relatively high scrutiny of IDF conduct by media outlets and NGOs, there are no systematic data on the prevalence of opportunistic violence, particularly nonlethal violence, the

most common form of OV.[2] In most cases Palestinians do not file complaints against such violence, and due to its typically covert nature, it is difficult to systematically monitor through external observation. Although some Israeli organizations, most notably Breaking the Silence, collect testimonies from soldiers, testifying soldiers form a self-selecting group that is widely perceived as unrepresentative of the soldier population. Other NGOs have attempted to study violent misconduct based on internal military investigations and court records, but even when these are accessible, they form only the tip of a much larger iceberg. Systematic data on variation in opportunistic violence among combat units are nearly nonexistent.[3] This paucity of data is, of course, not unique to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Systematic data on opportunistic violence in conflict are severely lacking, because, like organizational misconduct in general, it tends to be concealed by its perpetrators.

Consequently, as noted at the outset, the data collected for this study cannot be used to draw inferences about general prevalence rates because of the inability to randomly sample combatants or violent events. However, the data do suggest two general observations with respect to prevalence. First, rates of opportunistic violence fluctuated considerably among units, over time, and through space. Whereas some respondents described opportunistic violence as a routine occurrence in their units, others rarely encountered it. Second, opportunistic violence was nonetheless common enough to be witnessed by a majority of combatants during their deployment.

These trends are demonstrated in the survey I conducted of 118 veterans of the Second Intifada. My sampling method, described in more detail in chapter 1, included snowball sampling and sampling via Facebook, a modern-day adaptation of the location-based sampling methods traditionally used to sample hidden populations. Nearly all IDF regular ground units—including all of its infantry brigades; its armor, artillery, and engineering corps; and its independent/special forces—are represented in the survey (see Appendix).

The dependent variable in the dataset is an index summing four items representing the primary categories of violence against civilians in the Second Intifada: physical violence, verbal abuse/humiliation, destruction of civilian property, and the taking of private property. Although they are subject to well-known limitations, multiple-item self-report measures are an important means of measurement in other domains of opportunistic behavior, such as workplace deviance in organizational studies (Bennett and Robinson 2000; Berry, Carpenter, and Barratt 2012), and crime and delinquency in criminology (Krohn et al. 2010; Thornberry and Krohn 2000). In both of these fields self-reports are used based on the recognition that reliance on statistics of perpetrators who have been caught is likely to vastly underestimate the problem, even compared to self-reports.

To ensure that only opportunistic violence was measured and not violence ordered by military superiors, survey items were referred to as "infractions" and were included in a list of various infractions that sometimes occur in military units, the majority of which were not related to violence against civilians, such as refusing orders, destroying army property, and violating guard duty. To minimize the perceived threat of self-incrimination and reduce social desirability bias, respondents were asked to report the frequency of each form of violence in their unit, rather than their own engagement in violence. Responses were arranged on a Likert-type scale ranging from "none" (0) to "very high" (5). Inter-item reliability analysis of the four items produced a relatively high Cronbach alpha of 0.85.[4]

The reported levels of opportunistic violence among survey respondents are presented in figure 6.1. It is of note that more than 85 percent of respondents reported having witnessed opportunistic violence in their unit, and approximately 18 percent reported witnessing high levels of at least one form of opportunistic violence. While it is possible that these figures are underestimates because of the sensitive nature of the topic and social desirability bias, they are nevertheless remarkably high compared to estimates of opportunistic violence based on other data sources. For instance, an internal IDF study leaked to the press found that approximately 25 percent of soldiers had engaged in or witnessed abusive behavior at checkpoints.[5] Reliance on official statistics such as court or conviction records would have led to estimates that were much lower still (Yesh Din 2008).



FIGURE 6.1. Reported levels of opportunistic violence in unit.

Source: Manekin 2013.

Determinants of Opportunistic Violence: Findings from Survey Data

Though reasons for opportunistic violence are diverse, here I consider first the role of two key situational variables in driving violence: (1) the duration of deployment and (2) revenge. I then examine the role of organizational factors—unit morale and organizational control—in curbing violence.

Duration of Deployment among Civilians

One factor that I propose is associated with opportunistic violence in counterinsurgency is the psychological effect of prolonged deployments among civilians from another group, in many cases a group identified with the enemy. Compounding the ordinary preference that people give their own group over outgroups is the conflict situation that creates sizable asymmetries of power between soldiers and civilians. Civilians are low-status opponents and as such tend to elicit contempt and disgust (Fiske, Harris, and Cuddy 2004). Individual norms against violence erode over time with repeated exposure to moral dilemmas, through well-documented processes of moral disengagement, dehumanization, desensitization, and routinization.[6] In the Israeli-Palestinian context, opportunistic violence is often attributed to prolonged deployment among civilians and to the resulting numbing and erosion of norms (see, for example, Elizur and Yishay-Krien 2009). Long-term deployments among civilians are also frequently cited as explanations when cases of opportunistic violence surface in the Israeli media.[7]

Importantly, the process that leads to the removal of ordinary inhibitions against violence is a gradual one. Bandura (2002, 110) observes,

> Disengagement practices will not instantly transform considerate persons into cruel ones. Rather, the change is achieved by progressive disengagement of self-censure. Initially, individuals perform mildly harmful acts they can tolerate with some discomfort. After their self-reproof has been diminished through repeated enactments, the level of ruthlessness increases, until eventually acts originally regarded as abhorrent can be performed with little anguish or self-censure.

A second, perhaps related mechanism is the tedium of repetitive, mundane tasks and the desire of soldiers for action and thrills. Acts of violence, especially in the aggressive context of the military, can create excitement and entertainment where otherwise absent. Discussing aggression more generally, Baumeister and Campbell (1999, 215) argue,

> In many cases, the perpetrator may not even be seeking or intending to cause harm. The goal is to find something arousing and enjoyable, and this could be reached by a broad variety of excitement such as pranks or diversions. Exuberant, risky, physically stimulating activities are sought. The outcome may seem evil to the person who unfortunately ends up being harmed by the acts, but it is very possible that evil was the farthest thing from the perpetrator's mind prior to the event.

There are therefore many reasons to hypothesize that long deployments in civilian areas will raise the frequency of opportunistic violence in the unit.

To measure deployment duration, I asked respondents to indicate the areas in which their unit had served, corresponding with the four major zones of activity for IDF combat units at the time: Israel's northern border, southern Lebanon (before May 2000), the West Bank, and Gaza. I also asked how long they were deployed in each area. Responses were measured on a six-point scale indicating the following increments: "no time" (0), "less than 4 months" (1), "4–8 months" (2), "8–12 months" (3), "12–18 months" (4), and "over 18 months" (5).[8] The duration of service in the West Bank was used to measure deployment among civilians, because this was the zone in which most direct soldier–civilian interaction took place.[9]

Revenge

An alternative theory attributes opportunistic violence not to the numbing effects of prolonged deployments but to heated emotions and passions, most notably the drive for revenge. Kalyvas (2006, 59), for example, argues that the motives of soldiers for violence are often expressive, noting that "revenge is probably the most recurrent feature in the description of violence in civil war." The approach linking violence to heated emotion is especially dominant in the literature on ethnic conflict, much of which focuses on the role of intergroup animosities and passions in fostering violence (see, for example, Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 2001, 2006; and Peterson 2002). This theory generates a hypothesis that opportunistic violence should increase as the desire for revenge increases.

Two indicators were used to measure the drive for revenge. First, I assembled data regarding the number of conflict-related combatant deaths per each IDF unit represented in the sample by matching casualty lists from the Israeli NGO B'tselem with unit information based on publicly available sources. Several studies have linked battle deaths to strategic violence, both by states (Downes 2006, 2008) and rebel groups (Hultman 2007). By a similar logic, battle deaths might also drive opportunistic violence by creating rage and vengefulness among combatants. In

the context of irregular war where distinctions between militants and civilians are blurred, the more deaths a particular unit sustains, the more likely it may be to lash out in retaliation against civilians on the opposite side. Accounts of the My Lai massacre, for instance, emphasize the role of mounting casualties suffered by the Charlie Company in the weeks before the massacre and the resulting demand for revenge among soldiers (Bilton and Sim 1993; Olson and Roberts 1998).

A second indicator of revenge is the number of Israeli civilians killed during a combatant's period of service, averaged per month so as to enable comparison among combatants. The majority of Israeli casualties in the Second Intifada were civilians, many of whom were casualties of deadly suicide bombings. Such attacks were also likely to increase vengefulness among combatants, thereby contributing to opportunistic violence.

Unit Morale

Morale, defined as "the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group" (Manning 1991, 455), has long been studied as a predictor of military performance (Britt and Dickinson 2006; Gal and Manning 1987). High unit morale, indicating a large number of individuals with high enthusiasm, has been linked to a number of positive outcomes such as psychological well-being and resistance to stress (Britt et al. 2007), as well as military effectiveness (Motowidlo and Borman 1978). In light of the positive consequences of morale, it is plausible to hypothesize that units with high morale will be less likely to engage in self-serving, opportunistic behavior.

To measure morale, respondents were asked to rate the level of morale in their unit on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). This item is commonly used to measure morale both in military surveys and in scholarly studies of military morale (e.g., Bliese and Britt 2001; Maguen and Litz 2006).

Organizational Control

To enforce armed group leader notions of strategic violence and prevent opportunistic violence, the command hierarchy must function properly, allowing for communication along the chain of command (see also Wood 2009). Prohibitions against opportunistic violence must be inculcated in combatants through training and rules of engagement and enforced through formal and social control mechanisms. As argued throughout this book, small-unit commanders are central figures in this process, because they are the ones who exercise authority over soldiers in the deployment phase. To effectively enforce the preferences of armed group leaders, small-unit commanders must be strong and authoritative in the

face of negative influences from below. To assess the effects of organizational control, I examine three indicators: commander authority, compliance with operational rules, and sanction systems.

COMMANDER AUTHORITY

A strong command structure is necessary for commanders to exercise authority and for soldiers and commanders to communicate with one another. When commanders are weak and lack authority, competing sources of authority can emerge, undermining the hierarchical group structure. In such an environment it is hypothesized that opportunistic violence will be more prevalent, as commanders will be less able to enforce rules and norms prohibiting misconduct.

To measure commander authority I exploit the fact that, in some IDF units, veteran cohorts (those who had served in the unit for longer than a year) are traditionally granted seniority privileges. Such privileges range from the relatively benign (no more kitchen duties) to the disruptive (exemptions from disciplinary rules and requirements), to more extreme privileges that utterly undermine hierarchy, allowing soldiers from senior cohorts to punish or impose tasks on their more junior counterparts. The number of privileges granted to the senior cohorts is thus an important indicator of how well the unit's hierarchy functions. In units where senior cohorts are strong, commanders are by definition weak, since they are unable (or unwilling) to impose discipline on all but the most vulnerable members of the unit. An informal hierarchy is created in the unit in which the primary mark of authority is not rank but seniority, severely undermining and challenging the authority of the formal chain of command.

Amos, a former platoon commander in the Golani infantry brigade, described the detrimental effects of the informal hierarchy to organizational control:

> Being a platoon commander is really complicated. . . . As an officer the [senior soldiers] tell you they expect you to be the professional figure. They say, "Let us manage [daily] affairs . . . let us be in charge of junior-senior relations, we'll do what we want, we'll organize the shifts, we'll do the maintenance, let us worry about everything. You can lead us in ambushes." And then immediately afterwards they tell you, "You're not professional at all; we're much more professional than you. You know nothing, you've done nothing. Were you deployed with us? Did anyone fire at you?" . . . It's a problem. For instance, an officer is not allowed to inspect his soldiers, their weapons, their equipment. . . . And it's something pretty basic for a commander to inspect his soldiers' equipment. . . . The junior soldiers will let you do it, but you can't touch the senior ones. You're really not allowed. . . . It's an order that a senior soldier will

> disobey without thinking twice. It's grounds for mutiny. . . . Who's a popular officer? An officer who lets them do what they want.

I thus measured commander authority by the number of privileges exercised by the senior cohorts in the unit on a scale ranging from 0–11. Units where senior cohorts received no extra privileges received a score of 11 (indicating complete commander authority), and each privilege reduced the score by one point.

COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL RULES

In addition, soldiers in units with well-functioning command structures should exhibit compliance with rules governing behavior during operations that are unrelated to the treatment of civilians. Commanders who are able to induce compliance with rules such as preparation of equipment, briefing and debriefing before and after military tasks, maintenance of alert conditions, and the like are likely to be stronger than those who do not or cannot enforce such rules. Moreover, soldiers who are disciplined in following operational rules are also likely to be disciplined in following rules regarding violence.

To measure compliance, respondents ranked on a 10-point scale to what extent seven operational rules were enforced in their unit. The Cronbach alpha for the seven-item index was 0.85.

SANCTIONS AND PUNISHMENT

Formal control mechanisms are hypothesized to play a role in reducing levels of opportunistic violence. In units where punishments for opportunistic violence are severe, potential violators will be deterred from violent behavior. The logic of deterrence is not uncontested, however. Empirical studies of the effects of organizational punishment have had mixed results, with some showing positive outcomes for punishment; others stressing the costs of punishment, which are said to outweigh benefits; and still others finding a more complex, nonlinear relationship between the severity of punishment and misbehavior (Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999; Treviño 1992; Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds 2006). The hypothesis I test here—positing that more severe punishment is associated with a reduced frequency of opportunistic violence—is consistent with the more conventional deterrence model.

As a measure of formal control, soldiers were asked to identify the typical punishment a member in their unit would receive for each of the four items included in the dependent variable. Punishments were then ranked by severity as follows: "none" (0), "verbal reprimand" (1), "a fine" or "grounding to base" (2), and "incarceration" (3). The punishment measure is an index of the average punishment for violence against civilians in the respondent's unit. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was 0.73.

Moderation Effects

Beyond their direct effect on opportunistic violence, I propose that organizational control structures should moderate the detrimental effects of prolonged deployments on opportunistic violence. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that soldiers act in line with prescribed rules, regulations, and norms, even as the passage of time makes the preservation of such discipline increasingly difficult. Thus, prolonged deployments among civilians should have less effect on opportunistic violence in units in which control is strong than in units in which control is weak. Put differently, commander authority and severity of punishment should act as moderating variables, reducing the association between the duration of deployment among civilians and opportunistic violence.

Control Variables

I controlled for two additional variables that may have had effects on opportunistic violence as well as the independent variables: whether respondents were soldiers, NCOs, or officers and whether the respondent was in an elite unit.

Survey Results

Table 6.1 presents summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. The dependent variable exhibits substantial variation, but its mean is relatively low. This might reflect some underreporting due to social desirability concerns, but it is also likely attributable, at least in part, to the fact that opportunistic violence in an organized state military, like organizational misconduct generally, is relatively kept in check. Table 6.2 reports bivariate correlations between the dependent and independent variables.

The results in table 6.2 indicate that duration of deployment among civilians is a significant predictor of opportunistic violence, in support of the first hypothesis. The desire for revenge, as measured both by unit losses and civilian deaths, is not associated with opportunistic violence and neither is morale, providing no support for the second and third hypotheses. All three organizational control measures are negatively and significantly associated with opportunistic violence. In addition, table 6.2 shows that a number of the variables are correlated with one another, in particular various measures used to measure organizational control. Of the control variables, membership in an elite unit was negatively associated with opportunistic violence.

TABLE 6.1. Summary statistics

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	MIN	MAX
Opportunistic violence (square root)	118	1.75	1.13	0	4.47
Duration of contact with civilians	118	2.13	1.74	0	5
Unit losses	118	4.16	3.33	0	14
Civilian deaths (per month of service)	118	9.00	5.86	0.44	23.37
Morale	118	3.79	0.86	1	5
Commander Authority	118	7.87	2.22	2	11
Compliance	118	8.42	1.13	5	10
Punishment of opportunistic violence	84	2.15	0.69	0.25	3
Role	118	0.79	0.97	0	3
Elite unit	118	0.23	0.42	0	1

Standard OLS regression was used to test the hypotheses and identify the independent effects of the measures used. Because data on deviance and misconduct have the characteristic of being positively skewed, I transformed the dependent variable using a square root transformation before conducting the analysis.[10] Table 6.3 presents these results. In each of the multivariate models, I tested specifications with and without moderation effects. Because one of the measures—severity of punishment of opportunistic violence—contains many missing observations, I report in columns 1 and 2 the results excluding the variable and in columns 3 and 4 the results including it. In models 2 and 4, the predictor variables were centered before creating the interaction term.

The effect of duration of deployment among civilians retains its size and significance in all models. In contrast, both measures of revenge have no significant relationship with opportunistic violence, and only the civilian deaths measure takes a positive sign. This provides strong support for the argument that disengagement and routinization, not rage and revenge, are associated with opportunistic violence in the Israeli-Palestinian context. As hypothesized, measures of organizational control are negatively and significantly associated with opportunistic violence. Unit morale does not seem to be related to opportunistic violence, nor does soldier or commander status. Furthermore, once organizational control variables are controlled for, the elite unit measure no longer exhibits independent effects.

TABLE 6.2. Intercorrelations among study variables

VARIABLE	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Opportunistic violence (square root)	0.31***	–0.17	0.15	0.09	–0.30***	–0.27**	–0.57***	–0.003	–.24**
2. Duration of deployment among civilians		–0.22**	–0.10	0.19*	–0.04	0.05	–0.08	–0.12	0.05
3. Unit losses			–0.19*	0.03	–0.03	0.13	0.06	–0.05	–0.04
4. Civilian deaths per month				0.02	–0.15	0.001	0.07	–0.16	–0.05
5. Morale					0.13	0.21*	–0.11	0.03	0.15
6. Strength of hierarchy						0.01	0.22*	0.33***	0.33***
7. Compliance with operational rules							0.28*	–0.04	0.17
8. Punishment of opportunistic violence								0.02	0.16
9. Role									0.08
10. Elite unit									

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

TABLE 6.3. Predictors of opportunistic violence: multivariate results

MODEL	1	2	3	4
Duration of contact with civilians	0.22***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
Unit losses	–0.02	–0.02	0.01	0.004
Civilian deaths	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Morale	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.07
Strength of hierarchy	– 0.14**	–0.16***	–0.13*	–0.12*
Compliance	–0.27**	–0.25**	–0.11	–0.12
Punishment of opportunistic violence			–0.76***	–0.75***
Role	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16
Elite unit	–0.37	–0.22	–0.02	–0.03
Moderator variable:		–0.07**		
Duration of contact with civilians x strength of hierarchy				
Moderator variable:				–0.09
Duration of contact with civilians x punishment of opportunistic violence				
Constant	3.83	1.76	4.24	1.78
Observations	118	118	84	84
R^2	0.33	0.39	0.48	0.49
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.33	0.42	0.42

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Moderation Effects

As hypothesized, commander authority significantly moderated the relationship between deployment duration and opportunistic violence. However, though the interaction with severity of punishment carried the expected sign, it was not statistically significant ($p = 0.31$).

Figure 6.2 shows the duration of contact with civilians–opportunistic violence relationship for units with command structures that are one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., strong commanders) and units that are one standard deviation below the mean (i.e., weak commanders). For soldiers in units with weak commanders, the simple slope for the relationship between duration of contact with civilians and opportunistic violence was positive and differed significantly from zero ($b = 0.37$, SE = 0.07, t = 5.1, $p < 0.001$). For soldiers who were in units with strong, authoritative commanders, the simple slope remained positive but did not differ significantly from zero ($b = 0.05$, SE = 0.08, t = 0.63, p = 0.53). This provides support for the hypothesis that strong, authoritative hierarchical structures reduce the association between duration of deployment and opportunistic violence.



FIGURE 6.2. Moderating effects of hierarchy strength. The *y*-axis is calculated as the square root of the sum of the four opportunistic violence indicators.

Source: Manekin 2013.

The finding that extended deployment among civilians is a key determinant of opportunistic violence is consistent with social-psychological theories regarding the gradual erosion of social and individual norms against violence against a low-status outgroup. Although rage and revenge may play an important role in other contexts, the prolonged and routinized nature of Israeli counterinsurgency and military occupation in the Occupied Territories appears more likely, on average, to foster feelings of disengagement and desensitization than heated passions.

The findings, however, also tell a more complex story about the deleterious effects of extended deployments, suggesting that these effects can be limited by well-functioning command structures: commander authority, though not punishment, was found to have a moderating effect, mitigating to a large extent the effects of long deployments on opportunistic violence. Although the nonsignificant moderating role of punishment may simply be a result of the small sample size, it could also point to a substantive finding, reiterated throughout this book: commanders can be more successful in shaping soldier behavior through social means such as personal example and strong leadership than through formal means such as severe punishment.

Contrary to expectation, unit morale was not found to be significantly associated with opportunistic violence. A possible explanation is that opportunistic violence can in some cases actually increase morale, creating bonds between

participants through their witnessing of or participation in illicit behavior (D. Cohen 2013; Wood 2009). The data also suggest an interesting finding regarding elite units. In the bivariate analysis, elite units were found to be negatively and significantly associated with opportunistic violence, suggesting that members of elite units were less likely to engage in such behavior. This observed relationship is reflected in popular perceptions in Israel that members of elite units are "higher-quality" soldiers. However, once factors related to organizational control are controlled for, the association loses its significance, suggesting that the difference between elite and regular units is explained by the much stronger control and discipline structures in elite units, rather than the individual characteristics of their members.

Alternative Explanations

The survey results, then, provide support for my argument regarding the important role of organizational control in reducing violence, especially given the detrimental effects of long deployments. However, other explanations may be consistent with the observed relationships. One such explanation is that both weak command and control structures and opportunistic violence may be typical of particular units that attract lower-quality manpower, echoing claims that attribute violence against civilians to the thuggish nature of combatants. Indeed, some units in the IDF are less selective in the quality of manpower they recruit, a factor that may be associated with both opportunistic violence and disciplinary breakdowns.

To assess the plausibility of this alternative explanation, I investigated the role of unit membership in the survey by creating dummy variables for each of the brigades included in the sample. A bivariate analysis of opportunistic violence and brigade membership produced a significant relationship in the case of only one unit, known today as the Kfir Brigade.[11] This finding is consistent with journalistic accounts, in which Kfir has been particularly notorious for opportunistic violence against civilians.[12] However, once brigade identity was entered into a multivariate regression controlling both for duration of employment and command and control factors, the effects of membership in Kfir were no longer significant. This suggests that long deployments and disciplinary problems in Kfir account for its relatively high share of opportunistic violence, rather than any particular individual characteristics of its members. Indeed, Kfir is the only IDF brigade to serve solely in the West Bank, and its soldiers are deployed in one area for particularly long periods.

A second explanation suggests that an alternative mechanism underlies the association between strength of hierarchy and opportunistic violence. It might be

argued that the senior privilege measure employed in the survey is actually a measure of bad modeling rather than of commander authority. Social learning theory (Bandura 1978) suggests that violence is learned through exposure to role models who engage in violent behavior as a method of conflict resolution or in response to stress. In units where senior soldiers mistreat junior soldiers, taking advantage of their power to haze, humiliate, punish, and impose ridiculous tasks, new recruits may learn to abuse their own power when faced with vulnerable civilians. However, the similar results found when compliance with operational rules and severity of punishment were used as measures lend additional support to the argument regarding the effects of command and control.

Findings from Interview Data

In my interviews, former combatants provided diverse explanations for incidents of opportunistic violence. They often pointed to individual-level factors, explaining that perpetrators were problematic individuals, prone to aggression in general. Other times they blamed violence on laziness or fatigue or, in a small number of cases, on social posturing. Interviewees mentioned revenge only in a handful of cases. For example, one recounted a story he had heard from a friend, who described a soldier hitting a Palestinian with a helmet, after the Palestinian had started to argue with the soldiers at a checkpoint. He explained that the soldiers at the checkpoint were on edge, because a soldier in their company had recently been killed. Another former soldier described inflicting damage on parked Palestinian vehicles and said that revenge for suicide bombings in Israel was part of the explanation:

> A lot of it is out of desire for some kind of revenge. Yes. You say to yourself, "Damn that guy who did the terrorist attack at the Park Hotel.[13] He destroyed an entire hotel. And I'm here, so I'll destroy some cars." So it's a combination of things, a combination of anger, boredom, of "here, I can do it."

However, consistent with the survey data, the most common interpretations that soldiers gave for opportunistic violence were long, tedious deployments, as well as the central role of organizational control mechanisms. These narratives shed light on the empirical associations uncovered in the survey by discussing the processes that link these factors to violence.

Deployment Duration

Eran, a former infantry combatant, described the effects of long deployments this way:

> When you meet combat soldiers you see they're the best people, the highest-quality people there are. You'd never dream if you met one of them that they could behave badly towards someone. They help old ladies cross the street. . . . But when you take anyone and put him in a situation like this which is impossible, day after day after day after day, you lose, I'm not sure that it's your humanity, you lose your concern for others. And that's the main problem.

Tomer, a former engineering officer who had overseen dozens of house demolitions in the course of his military service, gave a chilling example of this gradual numbing:

> The truth is that I must admit it didn't do anything to me. I'd like to tell you now that it was sad, but I didn't care. . . . Sometimes there was a moment of discomfort. When [the victim] was someone completely [innocent], the army wouldn't rush to demolish his house . . . but even boarding up his windows, which essentially meant he couldn't live there anymore, it didn't make me feel bad. . . . It didn't break my heart. . . . I didn't care. I could, for all intents and purposes, eat a snack while I was doing it. No emotion really.

The interviews also shed light on the mechanisms linking deployment duration to opportunistic violence. Two processes associated with moral disengagement were particularly dominant in my interviews: minimization of the consequences of violence and denying or blaming its victims.

MINIMIZATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE

In many interviews, the consequences of opportunistic violence were portrayed as trivial, minor, and not particularly harmful, or in Hebrew, as *shtuyot* (see chapter 2). Such trivialization allows perpetrators to perform acts of violence without the self-restraint that would inhibit their behavior in other settings. Gal, a former infantry soldier, was told by a friend (though he had not witnessed it himself) that the platoon officer in a nearby company used to make Palestinians line up and then would throw food into their mouths, later forcing them clean up the mess. When Gal criticized the behavior, his friend responded that the abuse was silly and minor and that Palestinians were not really hurt since it was just a

joke. Similarly Ethan, a former Special Forces soldier, recalled an officer who was prone to doing *shtuyot*, such as blowing up half of a building instead of just its door and "all sorts of other things that were a little out of place."

Respondents often noted that they had encountered "trivial" acts of opportunistic violence, but nothing serious, seeking to minimize violence that they had witnessed. Yair, for example, said that during Operation Defensive Shield some members of his unit took "souvenirs," but he never saw anyone break into a safe and take money or loot a home. Guy noted that at checkpoints, some of his "retarded friends would do silly things, nothing extreme like beating." Matan recalled that some of his soldiers had done "little things, like take prayer beads from a car, nothing horrible, not a total humiliation of the person." Oded, when asked about harassment of civilians at checkpoints, responded that "these are things that happen that you hear about, maybe not beatings, but games and stuff—that happens." And David, when discussing how civilian belongings were treated when soldiers were deployed inside private homes, said, "I think using [private] property is attrition that's psychologically natural or something, because how long can you avoid using the bathroom or taking a shower? It's not like you're destroying anything."

DEHUMANIZATION

A second mechanism through which moral inhibitions can be disengaged over time is dehumanization of the victims so that their suffering engenders no empathy and hence no discomfort or distress (Bandura 2002). Prolonged deployments among civilian populations facilitated a gradual process of dehumanization in which civilians came to be seen by many combatants as one nameless, faceless mass. Erez explained,

> The power you are given as a soldier at the checkpoint is immense. You control other people, control them forcefully with weapons. And suddenly the need and purpose of your control begin to fade. Because if you're only doing it for the security of the state, there's no reason to humiliate people. But time goes by and your contempt for these people grows, and you become more and more inconsiderate of them, and suddenly you no longer see them as individuals but as a society. . . . Your values and your common sense are no longer as clear as they were initially. Your patience begins to wane, your annoyance grows, and your violence rises.

Ido, a former infantry soldier, also described a process in which civilians were dehumanized over time as combatants grew increasingly tired and dejected. The same people he had been tolerant of initially eventually seemed disgusting to him:

> In the beginning when everything is new to you, then the attitude is more or less as it should be, but after a while as time goes on you understand that you're tired of it; with all the gloominess and resentment you simply take it out on them. Now, it's not exactly like there's no reason to take it out on them, right? Because ultimately they're the reason why you're there. But there's a difference. The more you have contact with them and the more you work with them, the more you hate them. Or at least that's how I felt.

Organizational Control

Although respondents acknowledged that the likelihood of opportunistic violence grows over time, nearly all agreed that commanders played a key role in contributing to or curbing levels of violence in their units. The military is after all an organization in which soldiers must obey commanders on matters ranging from the dress code to charging forward under enemy fire. Commanders therefore possess the authority and power to shape and restrain soldier behavior toward civilians. Yoav, a former infantry combatant, explained,

> The way you behave towards the population . . . depends on two factors. First of all, on the person himself, that is, who he is, what kind of person he is, what home he came from, what world he came from. And the second thing is who his direct commander is. And when I say direct commander I mean even his squad commander, because that's who's typically with you in most of these places: the squad commanders and maybe the platoon commanders. . . . These are the people that can influence this issue.

Many respondents, both former soldiers and commanders, gave examples of cases in which commanders were able to prevent incidents of opportunistic violence. Oren was a junior tank commander whose subordinates were all older and more experienced than he was. On one occasion his tank's driver asked him whether he could drive over Palestinian cars for entertainment:

> I told him he couldn't. I don't remember if I threatened him, but I forbade it. Those soldiers didn't particularly care about what I said, but if you say no—you have real authority over them. I had the [formal] authority and they didn't, what can you do. . . . In this case the soldier had no choice because if I tell him "No" then it's clearly forbidden, and if I decided to make an issue out of it, and I would have made an issue out of it, it was clear [that he would get in trouble].

In a few cases respondents compared the levels of opportunistic violence in their units to other units they had encountered, identifying the approach of commanders as the most central factor in determining violence levels. Aviv, a former infantry commander, argued that opportunistic violence was "all a matter of education. [Some] is the education a person came with from home, and much of it is education from commanders, who set the course for how to treat [civilians.] That's the most influential factor."

Opportunistic behavior, generally, and opportunistic violence, specifically, reflect deviance from military strategy, orders, and interests. Units that were more professional and controlled were therefore less likely to engage in opportunistic violence. At the same time, as discussed in chapter 4, they were less likely to shirk from strategic violence. Yossi, an officer in an infantry brigade notorious for its levels of opportunistic violence, explained that discipline, professionalism, and ethical behavior were impossible to separate:

> Professionalism is automatically connected with ethics. . . . I can't imagine a soldier who is unethical and is professional. It's impossible. Because . . . a soldier that understands his mission is a professional soldier. But if you start pushing and hitting people, then you didn't understand your mission and you're unprofessional. You're not using your energies properly.

As always, small-unit commanders could use both social and formal control mechanisms to shape soldier behavior and restrain opportunistic violence. The remainder of this section discusses these mechanisms and their effectiveness.

Social Control: Commander Authority and Leadership

Though my survey found that severity of punishment was negatively associated with opportunistic violence, punishment was not found to have a significant moderating effect, in contrast with commander authority. Although this lack of effect could be a result of the small sample, as suggested earlier in this chapter, my interviews point to a different explanation. In the daily operations of combat units, junior commanders used punishment much less frequently, preferring to employ social control mechanisms that relied on positive example, leadership, and education to shape combatant behavior. Nir, a former platoon and company officer, explained why punishment was perceived as less effective than education and persuasion:

> I think what happens after [the violent incident] is less important, less influential, than what happens before . . . . When [commanders] talk

> to you beforehand, before something happens, and discuss the issue, then you understand that it's important. It's no longer related to something you did or didn't do; it's an important topic on the agenda, a topic we need to talk about. . . . That's how I see it. Punishment is always perceived as related to a particular incident—[e.g.] he took a box of cigarettes so was put in jail for a week, or something. I'm being extreme of course. So the punishment is just because he took those cigarettes. But if you talk about it beforehand it sinks in deeper, I think.

Given the drawbacks of punishment, effective commanders typically relied on their own leadership skills to shape combatant behavior, communicating to their subordinates the boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate, acceptable and unacceptable. Yossi described such a tactic:

> When you send [them] out on a mission, you add a few words at the end . . . and try to influence them a little ethically. "Guys, these are human beings, you're talking to a grandfather; imagine that it could have been your grandfather. Think [how you would feel] if a soldier would come and talk to your grandfather like you're talking. Imagine a bit what it feels like on the other side." I'd explain to them that ultimately, a very small percent is problematic, and they can't let the stress and fatigue affect their discretion. "Be professional; check [only] what's really important. If you need to come and take apart a vehicle because it seems right to you, then do it, but don't do it to every vehicle because you'll create a traffic jam, and that jam endangers us and isn't professional, and it isn't ethical. Use discretion so that you can really use your power properly." I would give them the feeling that I want them to be professional and ethical at the same time.

Barak, a former infantry officer, explained that he was very concerned with ethical problems at the checkpoint:

> Statistically, these checkpoints create many more ethical problems than operational successes, like catching a weapon or something. Statistics. And it's really important to be strict about that and emphasize it. There was no checkpoint shift that I briefed where I didn't emphasize it. Mandatory. Mandatory, mandatory, mandatory. Totally. It was really important to me, and important to the company in general. . . . And of course we as officers behave accordingly.

Even more important than these formal messages were the informal messages that commanders communicated to their subordinates through their own behavior. As Assaf put it:

> A commander doesn't need to say anything. It's enough that on a mission a soldier gave some civilian, an Arab, a little slap, and the squad commander or sergeant didn't say anything—that's it. The soldier interprets it as permission. And the next time when he's alone he'll do more. Soldiers in the beginning don't know what to do, so they look at the commander, for instance—how he checks someone, how he talks to someone—and they learn. . . . A soldier always watches you, how you do things, what you do, and it really matters a lot.

Yoav emphasized the importance of small-unit commanders in shaping soldier behavior at checkpoints:

> You're standing at a checkpoint. How do you behave? You have power in your hands at a checkpoint and a civilian arrives. . . . There's the potential of doing anything you wish, because he comes to you, you're there with a weapon, and whatever you say will happen. So what will you do? What won't you do? If there's a squad commander with you, then he can tell you; he can monitor events and tell you yes or no. . . . If the squad commander is not like that, if he's the type of person who would himself slap a Palestinian, the checkpoint will mirror that. And if he doesn't do it . . . if he's a sufficiently responsible and dominant leader, such things won't happen if he decides that they won't happen.

In squads and platoons where commanders were careful in their treatment of civilians, opportunistic violence was less common, even if not completely absent. Lior described the influence his squad commanders had on him and his peers:

> I learned a lot from my squad commanders. . . . My commanders had a lot of respect and appreciation for the civilian population, and they tried to convey that to us soldiers. It's not something we talked about, but things we saw and pretty much everyone imitated them. I say pretty much because there were a few that didn't.

At the same time, commanders who modeled abusive or careless attitudes toward civilians were likely to be imitated as well, raising levels of opportunistic violence in that particular unit. Josh, for instance, was attached for a few months to a tank unit stationed in the Nablus area. He described the unit as trigger-happy, often shooting for no apparent reason. One commander had even killed a child as a result of negligent firing. He gave several examples that indicated that levels of opportunistic violence in the unit were relatively high. It was therefore not surprising when Josh described the behavior of unit commanders, which provided a model for excessive violence.

> I remember there was an incident when a Mercedes tried to escape an officer. . . . He chased him until he reached an alleyway or someplace he couldn't escape, brought a bulldozer, and erected dirt barriers around the car so that it couldn't move anywhere. The driver was inside.

When I asked how soldiers reacted to the incident, he responded,

> It was really funny, it was considered really cool, like what a cool commander we have. It spread like wildfire; it was the coolest thing there was.

Formal Controls: Punishment and Monitoring

Although social control was a more powerful means of shaping behavior, formal control also played a role in reining in opportunistic violence. Interview findings shed more light on the conditions under which punishment was more likely to be effective, given difficulties in monitoring soldiers and the sometimes counterproductive effects of punishment. I found that punishment was more likely to be effective in cases when the entire command structure in a particular unit made a concentrated effort to eradicate a particular form of behavior. A case in point is a directive that was apparently issued regarding the soldiers' use of property in private Palestinian homes during large-scale offensive operations.[14] Initially, the use of property in private homes was fairly rampant, as described by Doron, who was a combatant in an elite unit at the outset of Operation Defensive Shield:

> What we did then that was wrong, but it wasn't clear back then [that it was wrong], was to use their furniture, sleep on their beds. I think that the IDF didn't know at the time; it wasn't aware that it was wrong, as an army. It was the beginning; we didn't do the Occupied Territories before that. So those were the parts that were really wrong, though as a soldier I didn't see it that way. We slept on their beds, we sat on their chairs, ate at their tables. We did use our own food and I don't remember taking anything, but still, if I think about a soldier sitting and opening a can of food on my own table I would . . . you know?

However, in the course of the operation the practice seemed to change: several respondents reported prohibitions issued by their commanders regarding the use of private property. Yair, who served in the paratroopers, recalled the new prohibitions, effected much to the frustration of soldiers, who did not view the use of private property as opportunistic at all:

> For two weeks you're in a home, and you use it like it's your own, and rightly so. You need to sleep, so you take old mattresses. And then at

> some point there was a new directive: "You can no longer sleep on their beds." Because we used to sleep on their beds. . . . They often have a pile of mattresses in the corner, so we could take the mattresses and spread them on the floor. And then there was a period when they said we weren't allowed to use anything, not even their mattresses. So we used to argue. . . . "We sleep three hours a night and you tell us to sleep on the floor? What happened? It's a military necessity! What's the difference between using a table as a post and sleeping on a mattress? I'm willing to sleep on the floor if necessary but I want to use the mattress." I remember commanders would come in and yell at us not to sleep on the beds, and kick us off the beds.

I heard similar accounts from combatants from other infantry and armored units. And although the mere issuance of a directive did not guarantee its enforcement, it seems that the concentrated effort to eradicate a practice increased the likelihood of success; several respondents noted that the directive was strictly enforced by commanders, with violators receiving reprimands or being temporarily grounded to their bases.

In other cases, sanctions were initiated and enforced locally, typically by mid-level officers such as brigade or battalion commanders. When the elimination of particular practices was important to them, these relatively high-ranking commanders had sufficient power to ensure their directives were enforced, if they so chose. For example, Lior's unit was charged with opening gates in the separation barrier to allow Palestinians access to what Israeli security officials called the "seam zone" (see chapter 3). When deployed in the Tulkarem area, the soldiers regularly arrived late at the gate, requiring civilians to wait in all weather conditions to gain access to land, educational, or health facilities. However, after the soldiers deployed to the nearby area of Qalqilya, the practice changed:

> The Qalqilya area commander was not the Tulkarem area commander. It was a totally different person. We changed commanders, and he was very strict. If the gate had to be opened at 1:00, it would be opened at 1:00, not 1:01 and not thirty seconds after 1:00. We had just arrived from Tulkarem and were used to getting there at 1:30 because the patrol had other things to do, not out of malice . . . and by the time we got there it took a half an hour. So one platoon commander was fined, another one was grounded for a weekend, the company commander was reprimanded, and then the company commander issued a directive that 1:00 is 1:00 no matter what happens. . . . Even in Tul Karem when we opened late we felt a little bad about it; when we arrived and saw 150 Palestinians waiting in the sun, elderly people and children, it's disturbing. But

> we thought, "OK, what can we do?" But it turns out there is something you can do, because if you get slapped for it you'll find a solution.

Punishment, then, was more likely to be effective when it originated from relatively senior officers and when it was enforced on the entire unit. Junior commanders, the authority figures charged with shaping combatant behavior on a regular basis, were less likely to impose punishment, because it could stir up resentment, anger, and resistance among soldiers, making the commander increasingly unpopular. By imposing punishment, such junior commanders would risk paying a heavy personal price—from becoming a target of anger, to being ostracized, and eventually even subject to mutiny or removal from command. Naturally, deteriorating relations with soldiers would have a negative effect on commanders' ability to lead. Many commanders found it hard to resist such social pressures. Oded explained,

> [Discipline] really depends on how much you're willing to take a risk, how much you believe in it. If you believe something has to be a certain way, then you do it and that's it, and you pay a personal price. Here and there you have explosions with soldiers. It's much easier to play it safe and avoid conflict.

A related problem was the difficulty in shaping combatant behavior through punishment when commanders in a particular unit differed on the extent to which punishment should be used. In addition to making the strict commander unpopular, imposing punishment was simply ineffective when done inconsistently. Soldiers were keenly aware of differences among commanders and would simply ensure that violence took place under the watch of those considered more lenient. Nadav recalled how members of his unit had used their APCs to flatten cars for entertainment:

> In the West Bank they did it sometimes. . . . I have to admit that we had that in our company. . . . It's not supposed to happen. Some officers knew about it, and some officers didn't. It's part of knowing who you're with, or more precisely, who you're up against—who your platoon officer is and who your company officer is.

Given the limited effectiveness of punishment under such circumstances, some junior commanders who were determined to restrain opportunistic violence struggled instead to increase monitoring, in an attempt to prevent violence by their very presence. Daniel, a former infantry officer, was particularly concerned about opportunistic violence by his soldiers, but knew that other commanders in his unit were far less strict. His solution was to attempt to directly monitor soldiers so as to prevent such violence:

> I would constantly move from guard post to checkpoint, constantly. There was just one post that I never visited, an isolated watchtower, because I didn't care if my soldiers didn't guard properly. I only cared if things happened under my [responsibility] that I opposed. For instance, you go to the checkpoint and see a Palestinian standing in a puddle, and you ask the soldiers, who are under the supervision of a sergeant, "What's up?" and one responds, "He was wearing a Hamas T-shirt so we're making him wait in this puddle." Or once they beat up a photographer because she came to take pictures at the checkpoint. Stuff like that. . . . I come to the checkpoint, so they tell me.

Punishment did not seem to be an option for Daniel, who fought an uphill battle against other commanders who were less concerned about checkpoint abuse. Instead he hoped that by increasing his presence at sites of contact with civilians, he would be able to stop violence before it happened. Similarly Ari, a former infantry officer, used increased monitoring to curtail another common practice of opportunistic violence: beating detainees after they were arrested.[15] After he realized that detainees were sometimes severely beaten when taken in military vehicles to investigation, he made sure to sit in the back with his soldiers, rather than in his place at the front:

> During my first arrest [as an officer] . . . I opened the door of the jeep and asked, "Where is the Palestinian? Where is the prisoner? Where is the prisoner?" A jeep can hold barely eight people, say, and we had sixteen people, and a dog, and a prisoner. But where was the prisoner? I couldn't see him. It turned out that someone was sitting on his head. . . . They sat on him the entire ride. . . . When they brought in the prisoner I saw red marks on him; he was beaten up badly, it looked like [he had been burned with] a cigarette . . . and it became obvious that in the few minutes when I wasn't with him somebody totally beat him up . . . . So [after that] I always tried to sit in the back with the prisoner, almost always. . . . They knew it was important to me. But even if they didn't [beat him] just because I was there—that was already something.

As these officers well knew, although punishment and monitoring might have prevented some incidents of opportunistic violence, they were difficult to implement consistently and had limited effectiveness in circumstances when violators had the opportunity to commit violence without the commander's knowledge. As a result, many former combatants and commanders I interviewed stressed the importance of positive leadership based on social control, rather than formal control mechanisms such as strict orders and punishment. Itay explained,

> If the platoon loves the commander, they'll do things because they love him, not because they'll get punished or because that's what they have to do. They'll do things for him, that's how I felt, that you do things in order to please him.

In sum, small-unit commanders had a variety of means at their disposal to bring soldiers back into line and reduce opportunistic behavior generally, and opportunistic violence in particular. Social control mechanisms were more effective in shaping soldiers' beliefs, norms, and values, thereby reducing the temptation to resort to violence and moderating the effects of long deployments. Formal control mechanisms were generally less effective, except when they were initiated from mid-level commanders and enforced broadly and consistently as part of a comprehensive effort to eradicate a particular practice.

The Persistence of Opportunistic Violence: Obstacles to Organizational Control

The previous sections treated the exercise of organizational control as relatively unproblematic, because of the authority given to commanders by virtue of their positions in a hierarchical organization. In practice, however, the exercise of effective control during the deployment stage is much more complex than suggested by the mere presence of an authoritative hierarchy and formal power to issue and enforce orders. This section discusses two obstacles to effective organizational control: unit structure and the decentralized nature of counterinsurgency warfare. When commanders did not successfully overcome these obstacles, opportunistic violence increased.

Unit Structure

As noted earlier in this chapter, a central factor limiting the exercise of effective control in IDF combat units was a well-entrenched informal command structure, which privileged seniority over rank. In some units, the informal command structure with its regulation of status was so strong that it dominated nearly every aspect of daily life. When asked how much of their time was preoccupied with seniority-related issues, many interview participants replied between 70 and 90 percent. Fighting such established social codes was difficult and socially isolating, and many officers simply gave in, concentrating on their many duties and allowing senior soldiers to manage the daily affairs of the company. In such units, disciplinary problems in general and opportunistic violence in particular were especially common.

Some forceful commanders tried to break the informal structure, abolishing senior privileges and attempting to reestablish authority. Yet by doing so, they risked losing the trust and cooperation of their subordinates. As Nadav, a former NCO, explained,

> When a new platoon officer arrives from officer training, there's nothing you can do; officer training makes them proud, and he walks around all smug like "I'll do what I want; this is my platoon." Often they don't understand that they're entering a system that's already running. It works. And one of the roles of the sergeant is to explain how things work, who the soldiers are, and to bring him down to earth a little bit, to reality.

Many officers quickly understand that to avoid conflict and retain cooperation they will need to relinquish some of their authority. Those who tried to fight the informal structure could fail miserably, as recalled by Avishai:

> The platoon commander was very strict with his soldiers, and over time the problems started. Real problems. [He would tell people], "Come, we're going on patrol" and they'd say—"We're not coming." . . . People went to jail for it. . . . Two or three went to jail—the leaders were already indifferent to everything, their senior privileges were taken away, they had nothing to lose, they were with their backs to the wall. Other guys had something to lose—they're junior, they didn't want to go to jail or be removed from combat, so they shut up and waited for him to leave on his own. And he did leave on his own because he didn't get along socially. Eventually he couldn't be there anymore; he couldn't be with soldiers who did what he said but had no relationship with him. He couldn't talk to them and ask them what's up, [they'd respond] "OK, I don't want to talk to you. I hate you and I don't want to talk to you." It's impossible to function socially in a place like that. You need to be with these people 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and it's impossible!

Avishai's narrative demonstrates that weakened control leads not only to increased opportunistic violence but also to reduced participation in strategic violence, as argued throughout this book. His commander's attempts to impose strict discipline undermined his attempts to establish control, ultimately leading to combatant shirking from missions.

Not many commanders had the leadership skills necessary to challenge the well-established informal structures and restore the formal chain of command. As Amos explained,

> There are unique individuals who are able to win over the platoon. I don't know how they do it. They have special charisma, and they're somehow good-enough politicians. They manage to get along with the sergeant somehow, and generally make things go the way they want them to.

I interviewed a few such unique commanders, who approached the process of winning over their soldiers as an art form: a mix of discipline and forging supportive relationships with soldiers. One such commander was Ariel, who served in one of the IDF's most notoriously unruly units as a soldier and later as a platoon officer, and was successful in establishing control over the most undisciplined soldiers in the unit. Ariel was familiar with the power of the informal command structure from his time as a soldier. When he first entered the platoon and was summoned to an introductory talk with his platoon officer, he recalled that his sergeant took him aside and said, "Now you're going in to talk with the platoon commander. Whatever he says to you, you listen and say yes, and then forget about everything. Everything you need should go through me."

Understanding these dynamics, Ariel emphasized the importance of building a command staff that supported the formal command structure. One of his first steps was to have the popular company sergeant removed from the unit after he found out that he had ordered one of the junior soldiers to disobey the formal dress code and then punished him for refusing to do so. Ariel forbade senior members of the company to disturb the sleep of junior members by imposing menial tasks on them, and he slept in the soldiers' tent, rather than in the officers' quarters, to ensure his orders were obeyed. He made sure that only one junior soldier at a time was sent to kitchen duty, breaking the tradition that junior soldiers slaved away for hours as a hazing ritual.[16] When senior soldiers balked at his orders and threatened him, he had them removed from the company. Ariel attributed some of his success to luck, because his own commanders were very supportive and his soldiers ultimately complied even when they could have been more resistant. Indeed, other respondents who successfully fought the informal command structure emphasized the importance of institutional support, as well as of sheer luck. Uri, an officer in the engineering corps, described his experience in what he called "regaining the power":

> The only way to do it is by force, by giving them painful blows, and doing it constantly. Not physical blows but punishment. Dealing with every infraction. Not ignoring anything. If a junior soldier guarded two hours and fifteen minutes instead of two hours, I'd take care of it. . . . It's not just to my credit; it was my platoon, but the other platoon commander also did a really good job, and we had support from our company

> officer. . . . The company first sergeant was also with us; he came from another unit and not from inside . . . which was really significant. So to establish himself he also had to exercise a lot of power and he did. We all did. . . . . Also, we were able to do it [in our company] because our senior soldiers were relatively weak. It was easier to break them. . . . But if you ask me today whether I'd be willing to do what I did again, I'm not sure. I had a really big ego then. It's smaller now.

As indicated by the survey findings, weak commanders and a strong informal hierarchy fostered opportunistic violence. In many cases, it was easier for commanders to avoid conflict simply by not monitoring their soldiers or by looking away from violent incidents. Nir, a former combatant and officer who served in various combat roles for more than six years, reflected,

> When you hear about ethical problems in the Occupied Territories, in my opinion, I didn't do a survey, but I think that in 90 percent of the cases of ethical misconduct the commanders were junior. I'm almost sure. Whether it's a platoon commander who recently arrived, a squad commander whose soldiers are more senior than he is, a new company commander who hasn't established control yet . . . The senior cohorts in the senior companies place a great deal of emphasis on experience and professionalism, and who are you, fresh out of commander training, to tell me what to do when I've been standing at this checkpoint for a year. And it's natural and it's the biggest problem, because the minute you arrive as an inexperienced junior, it doesn't matter what you say, you're considered inexperienced and that's it. I'd see it when new platoon commanders would arrive at the company. . . . You have to be a very, very, very emotionally strong person to issue directives and give orders.

Several accounts shared in my interviews suggested that Nir's intuition was correct. Matan, who served as a squad commander in a senior infantry company, emphasized that commanders have the power and authority to stop opportunistic violence, but nevertheless sometimes choose not to exercise that power:

> One of the memories I carry from that period, is that one time at a checkpoint I was reluctant to confront soldiers who took prayer beads [from civilians.] It's something I'm ashamed of, but I've come to terms with. It was one of my first shifts as a commander, and I didn't feel confident yet, so I allowed soldiers to do things I could have easily stopped. . . . . Had I stopped it, it would have stopped, no question. You know, it was a little thing, taking one string of beads from a vehicle, not something

> terrible, not totally humiliating for the person. There were lots of justifications at the time, but it was really not wanting to deal with the senior soldiers there, and maybe to appear cooler to the guys, because even as a commander you're still one of the guys.

Counterinsurgency and the "Strategic Corporal"

In an influential article in *Marines Magazine* published in 1999, the former commander of the U.S. Marine Corps, Charles Krulak, coined the term "strategic corporal" to describe the importance of small-unit commanders in modern military operations. Unlike conventional warfare in which combatants operate in large units, asymmetric and counterinsurgency warfare is based on operations in small teams, often far from the sight of supervising officers. In the Second Intifada, many of the IDF's operations were performed in teams consisting of just a handful of soldiers. Moreover, in an era of instant communication and heightened media exposure, the actions of such junior commanders are often highly visible and can therefore have strategic effects (Kilcullen 2006b). As Krulak (1999) notes, these changing conditions require small-unit leaders, many of whom are NCOs, "to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress—decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion."[17]

The use of small teams led by NCOs was a feature of IDF counterinsurgency warfare as well. Units were often deployed in large geographic areas, with platoons operating very far apart from each other. Platoons were also fragmented, with small groups of soldiers conducting routine missions such as checkpoints, patrols, and watches. As a result, many officers rarely saw their soldiers together in one group. These evolving and geographically dispersed frameworks made monitoring very difficult and often impossible, considerably weakening organizational control. Daniel, who served as a platoon officer in the Nablus area, explained that he rarely saw his own commander, the company officer, or half of his subordinates, who were under the command of his sergeant in a far-away area. During a period of several months he was unable to see the entire platoon in one sitting. Despite his best efforts, he often simply had no idea what was going on. Respondents who had served as combatants similarly reported rarely seeing their platoon officers. Gilad described the autonomy combatants and NCOs exercised while deployed:

> There was no real monitoring at the checkpoints. It was more like they'd send us for eight hours and say "Go for it." . . . Not just at checkpoints, but in general, like patrols in the [Nablus] area, there was no monitor-

> ing; no one came and checked. If an officer came by and saw a bunch of guys [detained] on the side of the road, he'd ask about it. . . . It's not that he came to check on us; he just happened to pass by and see them, so he'd ask why there were there. Usually there was a logical answer so he'd say, "OK, release them soon." But I can't say that there was monitoring.

This lack of monitoring facilitated the occurrence and then the concealment of opportunistic violence, as well as shirking from strategic violence. Avishai recounted an incident in which civilians were beaten by combatants on patrol, under the watch of a squad commander who was from the same cohort as the offenders. The soldiers agreed that no one would report the event and it was never discovered.

Officers were aware of the obstacles to control posed by geographic dispersion, fragmentation of units, and empowerment of NCOs. Barak, a former infantry officer, explained, "As a platoon officer you can't see everything, you can't hear everything. You can't. But you come to terms with it because there's really nothing you can do."

The inability of officers to monitor their soldiers on a regular basis meant that much of the burden of control was borne by inexperienced NCOs with little training and often without the leadership skills necessary to guide and control combatants. Moreover, junior commanders had to function in very difficult structural conditions: unlike officers who benefited from some separation from their soldiers, sleeping in separate quarters and wearing distinguishable marks of rank, NCOs spent every minute of the day with their soldiers. Oded, who served both as an NCO and a platoon officer, explained,

> When you're a squad commander . . . you have 24 hours a day of conflict with soldiers. . . . [You] have live with them, eat with them, and constantly maintain comportment, 24 hours a day. It's not easy. It's the hardest job there is.

Because of this social closeness, junior commanders could not afford to be overly strict. They had to be, as Yoav put it, "people who could be friendly and affable and lead at the same time . . . it's an art. . . . Not everyone can do it, they don't teach it in commanders or officers training." In addition to the intensity of their contact with soldiers, NCOs were often of the same or more junior cohort than their own soldiers. Assaf, like others, described squad commanders as "upgraded soldiers":

> That's how they saw themselves. They slept during watches, like us, they complained, like us, they participated in cleaning duties, like us, though they were exempt from kitchen duties, and they slept in our

> room. They were more like camp counselors than commanders, and socially they were our friends.

Assaf's description underscores the tight link between weak commanders and disciplinary breakdowns. In his case, commanders not only failed to prevent soldiers from sleeping during their watch but also did so themselves. Junior commanders also participated in various forms of opportunistic violence. Two respondents from two different units described NCO involvement in breaking the windows of a civilian vehicle at a checkpoint. In one of these cases, the window was broken as a result of the commander's independent decision to carry a club at the checkpoint. Avi, the platoon commander, only learned of the incident much later:

> As a platoon officer there were many things that my squad commanders did that I discovered long after. . . . One time it turned out my squad commander had shattered a car window at a checkpoint. . . . He walked around the base with a club because he felt a club was a much better deterrent than a gun, because the [Palestinians] knew he wouldn't use the gun. . . . He stood by a car and told it to stop, and it didn't, so he hit the windshield to make noise and the windshield shattered. He didn't tell me about it. Apparently the driver complained . . . so I was asked about it several weeks or months later. . . . I realized how detached I was. And it wasn't the only time.

In other cases, junior commanders were not directly involved in the violence, but allowed it to happen for fear of jeopardizing their already delicate position. Assaf gave an example of such social dynamics, which continued well into his reserve service nearly a decade later:

> There's pressure from the soldiers, I even see it in reserve service. We go out on an eight-hour mission [and the soldiers say to the commander], "Make it fun, let's go in, let's show them, let's fire at them," stuff like that. . . . And a weak squad commander can be dragged into these things.

Soldiers quickly recognized eager-to-please commanders and exploited their weakness, goading newcomer commanders to allow lapses in discipline or violence. Ori recalled his soldiers complaining that other commanders were more fun than he was:

> They'd say, "All the commanders take the patrol and have coffee for five hours," which wasn't true. Yes, there were commanders who did it, that's true, because they were just like you once. It's hard because in the army your age and cohort really matter, and also you're under a lot of

> pressure; you're with three soldiers on patrol and they drive you crazy, "Just let us [stop the patrol] and go buy food . . . let's go buy falafel from Palestinians," and some squad commanders are eventually worn out; they don't feel like representing the system so they do what the soldiers want them to. And eventually it will reverse and they'll lead soldiers into such places, or do stupid things or take big risks.

As in all contexts of social influence, some individuals are better able to resist such powerful pressures.[18] Some possessed the charisma and leadership skills to navigate the conflicting demands of their position. Others were sufficiently senior to exercise authority. However, in units where even just a few of the squad commanders were weak or ineffective, attempts to exert control were much more likely to fail. David, who served as a squad commander in the paratroopers, recalled that his soldiers used to force Palestinians who wanted to pass at makeshift checkpoints to give them cigarettes or soft drinks. When I asked him how he reacted, he responded,

> They didn't hide it. And I didn't report it. I don't remember if I had enough, not authority, but enough of a conscience that something wrong was going on to tell them it's not OK, stop. Maybe I also knew after several months there that if I said it, it wouldn't matter and they'd do it anyway. So no disciplinary action was taken, and it was something that became routine by the end.

David observed, however, that other commanders in his situation might have acted differently. Some may have exercised control to stop the violence, whereas others may have participated in it themselves.

Data from the Second Intifada show that although risk factors for opportunistic violence are abundant in violent conflict, it nevertheless varies considerably among combat units. My findings indicate that extended deployments among civilians raise the likelihood of opportunistic violence as soldiers become more disengaged and desensitized over time. Together with mounting evidence regarding the adverse effects of long deployments on the physical and mental health of soldiers (Adler et al. 2005; Rona et al. 2007), this suggests that, where shortening deployments is not an option, both soldiers and civilians in warzones may benefit from better care and support services to those deployed.

Yet, even though long deployments are likely to have harmful effects on both soldiers and civilians, the slide into violence is not inevitable and can be controlled. Units with well-functioning command structures are better able to delineate and

enforce rules, ensuring that soldiers remain in line with the interests of superiors and refrain from opportunistic behavior. This study thus provides additional support from the Israeli-Palestinian context to findings from Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006), Sri Lanka (Wood 2009), and El Salvador (Hoover Green 2016) regarding the role of armed group structures in restraining opportunistic violence.

In the IDF, as well as in other militaries engaged in counterinsurgency, organizational control is exercised at the small-unit level by field commanders who are empowered to implement formal and informal control mechanisms to bring deviant soldiers into line with organizational interests. Indeed, my data analysis suggests that junior commanders could be quite effective in shaping soldier attitudes toward violence and in preventing incidents of opportunistic violence at sites of friction with civilians. However, my analysis of opportunistic violence in the Second Intifada also suggests that military elites cannot simply assume that control will happen on its own by virtue of the mere existence of an authoritative hierarchy. The exercise of effective control is often hampered by weak NCOs with poor leadership skills and by the difficulties in monitoring dispersed combatants engaged in irregular warfare. A concentrated effort at the senior level is thus required to train, monitor, and respond to soldier behavior throughout the period of their deployment, long after basic training ends.

7

BEYOND ISRAEL

Counterinsurgent Violence and Restraint in Comparative Perspective

Does the theory developed in this book travel beyond the Israeli-Palestinian context to other modern militaries engaged in counterinsurgency? As I have sought to demonstrate, questions of violence and control in the military require in-depth research in an environment where access can be hard to secure. Analysis of participation patterns in other modern, Western militaries would thus require considerable additional data collection. However, initial evidence from other cases does suggest that insights from the Israeli case are more broadly applicable. Rather than presenting a full-scale analysis of generalizability, the goal of this chapter is more modest: to draw initial parallels between the Israeli case and other contemporaneous cases of counterinsurgency that can illustrate how insights from Israel can improve our understanding of political violence elsewhere.

Perhaps the most natural comparison to be made is between Israel and the United States, which during the Second Intifada embarked on two massive counterinsurgency campaigns—in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In both cases, a modern, highly capable, and well-resourced military sought to impose order and repress insurgency through military occupation and the use of force. Moreover, formal and informal links existed between the two militaries, that transferred knowledge, equipment, and personnel. U.S. officers preparing for the war in Iraq reportedly watched Israeli raids into West Bank towns, conducted joint maneuvers, and adopted several Israeli counterinsurgency techniques including moving through residential homes by blowing holes in the walls and using armored bulldozers.[1] Finally, the size and significance of the U.S. military makes it highly influential on military practices globally. Given the ties between the two militaries and the

similarities of their missions, it seems plausible that the dynamics of participation in violence by U.S. soldiers resemble those of Israelis. There are also, of course, important differences between Israeli soldiers and their U.S. counterparts that shape patterns of violence and restraint in both cases.

To explore potential parallels between the cases, I draw on memoirs of U.S. Army soldiers and Marines who fought in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, as well as on the accounts of journalists covering their stories. Memoirs are, of course, limited in that they present narratives crafted for public consumption and are typically retrospective.[2] Still, they are unique in that they provide access to counterinsurgency from the perspective of the ordinary soldier, thereby shedding light on many of the issues investigated here.

The second part of the chapter briefly explores an additional case, the Yugoslav wars of succession in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991–95, to illustrate how the Israeli case can also contribute to our understanding of counterinsurgency outside Western militaries. This case diverges from the Israeli one on several dimensions, but still exhibits two elements that I have emphasized in my argument: (1) patterns of participation in violence that are shaped by mechanisms of social control and (2) shifts in these patterns, manifested in both increased shirking and opportunistic violence, when these mechanisms break down. These brief explorations suggest the plausibility of the relationship between control and violence in organized militaries beyond Israel.

U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq

The IDF in the Second Intifada and the U.S. military in Iraq share a number of similarities. First, despite obvious differences in size, strength, and budget, both are highly organized, capable, and technologically adept militaries, with vast power advantages over the insurgents that they fought. From an organizational perspective, Israeli and U.S. soldiers are highly trained and answer to clear chains of command. Some similarities also exist in the nature of their counterinsurgency efforts in the OPT and Iraq. Soldiers from both militaries confronted a diverse group of insurgent organizations that attacked soldiers and civilians through a wide range of means, including IEDs, gunfire, mortars, rockets, vehicle bombs, and suicide attacks. Much of the violence was waged in built areas, among a civilian population that bore much of the brunt of the violence.[3] Many of the military tactics used were similar as well, and in both settings, policies in the field changed over time and space, and rules of engagement were classified with their details shifting often.[4]

There were also important differences between Israeli soldiers and their U.S. counterparts in this period. To name just a few, Israelis are part of a conscript army, and the U.S. military is an all-volunteer force. Israeli soldiers are young (most enlist at 18), and their NCOs and officers up to the company level are just a few years older than they are. Many U.S. soldiers and certainly many commanders are considerably older. Perhaps relatedly, the training and discipline of American soldiers are generally harsher and more formal than that of their Israeli peers.[5] Though discipline in both militaries relaxes considerably in deployment, there remains a greater formality and centralization within U.S. military culture.[6]

In addition to these differences between the forces, there are important differences between their two missions: whereas Israelis were fighting on their home front in areas with which the IDF was intimately familiar, and in the face of mounting civilian casualties at home from terror attacks in Israel, U.S. soldiers fought in far-off countries, against unknown enemies, and often with little clarity about the necessity of their mission and how it related to their own security. The nature of the fighting also differed. Given Iraq's large size, porous borders, and collapse of order in the wake of the U.S. invasion, U.S. troops encountered far more formidable enemies, many of whom had substantial military training. According to official figures, more than 4,400 U.S. service members died between March 19, 2003, and August 31, 2010, of which nearly 3,500 were killed in action.[7] Approximately 300 Israeli soldiers were killed by Palestinians in the Second Intifada's five years.[8]

Finally, as is discussed further below, the counterinsurgency approach to civilians differed between the two countries. Even before the publication of *U.S. Army Field Manual 3:24: Counterinsurgency* in December 2006, with its explicit focus on population-centric warfare, evidence from soldier memoirs suggests that, in theory at least, Iraqi civilians were to be engaged through positive means, as part of the goal of transitioning into a new, self-governing Iraqi state. The Israeli approach to counterinsurgency was very different, as discussed in chapter 3. These differences should be kept in mind when attempting even a preliminary comparison between the forces. Still, the nature of fighting among a generally hostile civilian population generates a number of similar pressures and limits on participation, which I explore in the next few sections.

Control, Violence, and Participation

I have argued that baseline participation patterns in violence are shaped during military training, which must socialize soldiers to produce violence and at the

same time ensure that such violence is organized and serves organizational goals. In Israel, which recruits through conscription, this process of alignment with military goals begins long before military service, as outlined in chapter 4. In the United States, the challenge of socializing soldiers is likely to be greater given its all-volunteer force, which must rely on material inducements to attract recruits and may consequently attract a pool of recruits that may be, on average, less likely to identify with military objectives. Military training is thus all the more crucial in inculcating norms regarding the use of force among recruits.

Formal control is, of course, an important part of this process. Soldiers are issued identical uniforms, their heads are shaved (for males), and they are extensively drilled, shouted at, and harassed, to degrees that appear far greater than in the Israeli context. They undergo arduous physical training and must follow seemingly trivial rules to the letter. In his memoir, army veteran Colby Buzzell (2005, 33) recalls one such rule, which mandated wearing a black backpack using one strap only.

> Till the day I left the main gate of Fort Lewis for good, I always saw new guys walking to the PX wearing their black backpacks using only one shoulder strap, and I always wondered why. Looking back on this now, I can only speculate that this policy is just there to indoctrinate the new soldiers right away to Army life, and to get them all numb and used to the fact that the Army has a bunch of stupid rules, and your job is to not think or question these stupid rules, but to just follow them blindly instead.

Formal control, even in training, is supplemented by informal control mechanisms, such as teaching cadets the illustrious histories and traditions of their units, fostering not just obedience but also cohesion and identification. And as in the IDF, a key element of military training is the neutralization of violence, recasting it as thrilling, exciting, and admirable and defusing it of its dangerous or harmful meanings. Indeed, the recollections of U.S. veterans suggest even more extreme neutralization techniques, with explicit conditioning of soldiers to kill (the likes of which I did not find in my study of the IDF). As an example, consider the following military cadence shouted in Bayonet Assault Course at West Point, which former U.S. Army Captain Craig Mullaney (2009, 28), recalls as "designed for the sole purpose of instilling an aggressive warrior spirit":

> What is the spirit of the bayonet?
> To kill, kill, kill, with cold, blue steel!
> What makes the green grass grow?
> Blood, blood, bright red blood!

> There are two kinds of people in this world. What are you?
> The quick!
> What are they?
> The dead!

Chants and cadences valorizing killing can be found across diverse units and time periods, indicating perhaps the ultimate neutralization of violence (see, for example, Fick 2006, 18 and Young, 2018, 96). Such neutralization practices foster a fierce desire for combat, "ekshen," in Israeli terms (or "Hooah," as American soldiers might put it). As put by former Marine officer, Nathan Fick:

> I saw in the platoon a glimmer of something I was starting to feel in myself: excitement. The adrenaline rush of combat and the heady thrill of being the law were addicting us. This was becoming a game. I was starting to look forward to missions and firefights in the way I might savor pickup football or playing baseball. There was excitement, teamwork, common purpose, and the chance to demonstrate skill. I didn't have the luxury of much time for reflection, but I was aware enough to be concerned that I was starting to enjoy it. (Fick 2006, 261)

As suggested by the Israeli case, the intense socialization of combatants in the training phase in modern Western militaries is generally highly effective, thus producing soldiers who are eager to participate in violence on behalf of the military. One difference should be noted, however. As the war in Iraq dragged on, the United States found it increasingly difficult to meet manpower needs. Consequently it relaxed some of its requirements, admitting soldiers who previously would not have been allowed in the army. Some of these waivers were granted to soldiers who had committed criminal offenses (Finkel 2009). This created challenges to commanders in exercising control, which likely affected patterns of participation in violence. Although some commanders sought to weed out some of those recruits before deployment, undoubtedly there were others who could or did not.

This development suggests a caveat to the claim that Western militaries are generally highly effective in socializing soldiers toward their preferences: in times of strain on human resources, even an advanced military may be more limited in its ability to use one of its key tools in training: rejecting those soldiers who are unwilling or unable to align their preferences and inclinations toward violence with those of the organization. This reduced level of control is likely to lead to increase participation in opportunistic violence and shirking from strategic violence. In the next several sections, I specifically examine each category of violence analyzed in this book, exploring parallels and possible differences.

Strategic Violence

As outlined in chapters 3 and 4, even though Israeli military elites perceived repressive population-control measures to be an important means of defeating the Second Intifada, soldier training focused primarily on conventional warfare. This disjuncture had important implications for patterns of participation in strategic violence: participation in counterinsurgent violence that conformed to the violence normalized in training—aggressive, dangerous, and targeted at a clear enemy—was generally high. When missions diverged from this kind of violence, however, participation could decline, unless small-unit commanders effectively reestablished control over their soldiers.

The U.S. case presents an interesting comparison because of its different strategic approach to counterinsurgency. The United States had not anticipated fighting an ongoing insurgency in Iraq and thus did not have a clear or coherent plan as to how to combat it.[9] In the first few years of the war, U.S. strategy primarily sought to reduce its military's involvement in Iraq and transition authority to the Iraqi Security Force (see Gordon and Trainer 2012 for a detailed account). As the insurgency developed, military units on the ground found themselves without specific guidance. As a result, tension emerged among commanders who favored an offensive (or, in U.S. terms, "kinetic") approach focused on hunting down insurgents, and others who advocated for a "population-centric" approach, emphasizing the provision of security and services to the population (Kaplan 2013).

In the summer of 2005, General George Casey, commander of the multinational force in Iraq, commissioned Colonel William Hix and Kalev Sepp to conduct a survey assessing counterinsurgency practices among American commanders across Iraq (Kaplan 2013). The two found that U.S. units entering (or returning to) Iraq in 2005 were still being trained for conventional war, including high-intensity urban combat that envisioned few civilians present and massive clearing operations. A majority of commanders at the brigade and battalion level sensed a need to adapt their practices to a counterinsurgency environment but struggled to implement this growing awareness: 20 percent were squarely focused on a conventional approach, and 20 percent were adopting a more population-centric approach (which, in the United States had come to be synonymous with the term "counterinsurgency" or "COIN"; see Hix and Sepp 2015). The "population-centric" approach eventually won out, culminating in the formal adoption of a revised counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006 and subsequently the troop surge of 2007.[10] Setting aside debates on the effectiveness or efficiency of the new approach,[11] what was clear was that positive engagement with civilians became a cornerstone of military policy.

Thus, whereas Israeli soldiers navigated the tension between the conventional warfare for which they had been trained and population-control tactics that involved nonlethal repression, U.S. soldiers initially navigated between the conventional training that dominated the first years of the war and counterinsurgency practices that called for more restraint, as well as for missions designed to provide support for the population, a combined strategy often referred to as "clear, hold, and build."[12] Over time, it appears that training for new recruits changed, with troops deployed after the 2007 surge training not only for conventional warfare and "kinetic" operations but also for engagement with civilians.

Matt Young (2018, 138–39), a former Marine officer, described such training at a mock village constructed in a San Diego training base:

> Guide wires strung from rooftops to the sandy ground carry mock-RPG explosives as they rocket toward our patrols. A loudspeaker atop a minaret at the fake village center plays the adhan—"Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar." . . . We are told to treat everyone with courtesy and respect but always have a plan to kill them. We are told the rules of engagement and reminded about escalation of force. We are told we are professionals and should conduct ourselves as such. We are told we are here to win hearts and minds. We are told we cannot search women.

Thus, although offensive missions remained at the heart of the combat soldier's training, the attempt to gain the support of the population through nonviolent engagement as part of the fight against insurgency was at least somewhat addressed in the training of some soldiers and Marines.[13] This diverged sharply from the Israeli approach outlined in chapter 3, in which the provision of financial or infrastructural assistance was not a part of the combat soldier's mission.

The argument developed in this book anticipates that tensions in preferences among the more senior ranks toward violent tactics should manifest in increased resistance to participation, because such tensions weaken the power of organizational control. If the organizational mission is not clear, it cannot be coherently communicated to soldiers. This expectation is borne out by initial evidence from the U.S. case. As put by Matt Gallagher (2010, 18), who led an army platoon in northern Baghdad:

> While being an American soldier in Iraq in early 2008 often meant playing the role of beat cop and counterguerilla in a land of roving gangs, our mission hinged on fostering working relationships with men who may have shot at us during the invasion in 2003 or emplaced IEDs during the throes of the insurgency in 2005 and 2006. Some of my NCOs

> struggled with this reality, and I probably would have too, had this not been my first deployment.

Gallagher's description of his more resistant NCOs is consistent with the argument that organizational control mechanisms are important in driving participation patterns. The NCOs, who had been trained and deployed in an earlier period, felt more alienated from the constabulary tactics more prevalent after the surge. Gallagher (2010, 40) explained,

> Field grades and senior NCOs had grown up not in this environment but in a far more rigid, structured army whose mission was simply to act on and destroy the enemy. Some thrived on this change and embraced the fluidity of a counterinsurgency, others had spent their careers on the strategic level planning for just this sort of war, but still others on the operational level seemed to have a very difficult time adapting and struggled to find purpose in our current operating environment. In these situations, friction tended to arise between the respective layers of leadership.

This friction in the chain of command could result in noncompliance, even among higher ranks. For example, the staff of Colonel Michael Steele, a brigade commander known for his aggressive approach to military operations, refused a directive from the commanding general of the multinational forces in Iraq, Peter Chiarelli, to compensate the family of a pregnant woman whom Steele's troops had killed in an air assault against insurgents (Khatchadourian 2009). Though, of course, this was not a case of noncompliance with violence but rather with positive engagement with civilians, it nevertheless demonstrates the importance of ongoing control in realigning soldiers (and commanders!) with the organizational mission and the decline in participation that can occur as a result.

In contrast to such accounts of resistance from soldiers who trained for conventional warfare, my initial evidence suggests that soldiers who were trained for "population-centric" methods showed greater understanding and acceptance of "non-kinetic" tactics than Israeli combatants did toward population control mechanisms.[14] Whereas in the Israeli case, as outlined in chapter 4, IDF soldiers were more averse to population-control tactics, some U.S. troops, at least initially, seemed keen to engage with civilians. Journalist David Finkel (2009, 27), who spent eight months with a U.S. army battalion in the east of Baghdad during the surge, described the initial attitudes of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Kauzlarich:

> For now, Kauzlarich thought that giving soccer balls to Iraqi children who would run up to his Humvee screaming, "Mister, mister," was hav-

> ing an effect. A child would take home a soccer ball; his parents would ask where it came from; he would say, "The Americans"; the parents would be delighted; their confidence would increase; they would be more willing to make the difficult decisions of reconciliation; Baghdad would become secure; democracy in Iraq would thrive; the war would be won. Eventually, Kauzlarich would give up on soccer balls.

Matt Gallagher (2010, 40), who deployed to northern Baghdad late in 2007, similarly recalled episodes of handing out toys to children and drinking tea with local leaders:

> Iraq, like most nonconventional counterinsurgencies that aimed for success, was fought on the ground level by small units, like squads and sections and platoons. Company and troop commanders became local gods who controlled civil works contracts and the electricity for entire townships; platoon leaders and squad leaders became their apostles, wandering the desert, spreading the good word, fighting battles for public perception one person at a time.

Although training can shape baseline patterns of participation, these patterns are liable to shift during deployment. In the U.S. case, initial enthusiasm for the war wore off fairly quickly, once soldiers began to experience the strains of deployment, escalated violence, suffering, and loss. Under such intense pressure, the beliefs and preferences of soldiers and their identification with their missions could increasingly diverge from those of the military. For example, the escalation of violence and the consequent injuries and deaths could lead to a desire for revenge. In other circumstances, repeated patrols in which civilians demanded resources and services that soldiers could not provide could lead to numbness and indifference. As in the Israeli case, ex-combatant accounts suggest that small-unit commanders who effectively controlled their soldiers through leadership and moral authority, rather than through the mere presence of rank, were better able to realign soldiers with military interests. When commanders were weak, resistance to strategic violence (and strategic behavior more broadly) was greater, and participation in opportunistic violence increased, as discussed in the next section.

Opportunistic Violence

Empirical evidence from diverse contexts suggests that there is a clear relationship between weak organizational control and participation in opportunistic violence, far beyond the Israeli case, and that robust armed group institutions can moderate to some extent the many risk factors leading to opportunistic violence

against civilians in general and in counterinsurgency in particular (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Wood 2009; Hoover Green 2016). In chapter 6, I find that small-unit leaders are key in controlling combatants subject to the strains of long deployments, particularly by using social control mechanisms such as leadership, modeling, and persuasion.

Initial evidence from the U.S. case is consistent with these findings. Recollections of combat veterans and journalists include accounts of everyday forms of opportunistic violence familiar from the IDF in the West Bank, such as beating detainees or suspected insurgents, harassment of civilians, confiscation of property at checkpoints, and looting. Such violence tended to occur more frequently as deployment lengthened and the strain of combat took its toll. As anticipated by the theory, such violence was reported to occur alongside other reported forms of misconduct and rule breaking, such as substance abuse.[15]

Though my data preclude definitive conclusions, it may be that heated emotions such as revenge or anger were more common among U.S. soldiers in Iraq than among their Israeli counterparts, due to the greater number of troop casualties in Iraq. In the Israeli case, I found boredom and burnout to be a more prevalent theme, perhaps because in many areas and time periods, the levels of threat were not very high. Similarly, boredom and numbness seemed to be a more prevalent theme among U.S. veterans who served in less volatile times, in the early stages or final years of the Iraq War. As Matt Gallagher (2010, 127) put it,

> There are many horrors found in Iraq, but I doubt any are as deliberate as monotony, sucking away at inner Hooah-beats like a parasitical terrorist bug. Long stretches of boredom interrupted by brief moments of sheer terror.

Yet regardless of its particular motives, opportunistic violence flourishes when command structures are weak. John Crawford, who was deployed to Iraq with the Florida National Guard, chronicled his experiences in an ill-equipped unit led by incompetent commanders. He had little respect for his officers, whom he repeatedly describes as unwilling to leave the safety of their bases, being unfamiliar with the operating environment, inept in directing their forces, and issuing directives that bore little relationship to reality. "It is the downfall of the National Guard system . . . incompetent officers with neither the experience nor the drive to lead men in combat" (Crawford 2006, 60). In a particularly pointed passage, Crawford recounted how, after two men in his unit were shot, the battalion commander and chaplain tried to support the soldiers, but neither could even remember the names of the men who had been hit (95–96).

In this climate of poor, sometimes nonexistent command, Crawford and his men were essentially on their own. Junior squad leaders, seemingly the only level

of command that would venture outside the unit's headquarters, exercised little control over their men, leaving them more or less on their own to conduct operations. Unsurprisingly, opportunistic violence was common in this weak command environment. Crawford's unpopular first squad leader, who refused to share guard duty with his men, was eventually removed from his position after orchestrating the looting of an Iraqi household. His replacement, a soldier promoted to the role, was better liked but was still ill equipped to adequately control his men as their tour was repeatedly extended; he joined them in confiscating cases of alcohol from locals and looked away when he learned that two of his men took an Iraqi civilian's motorcycle and rode it through the streets of Baghdad.

In chapter 6, I also discuss the many obstacles to control by small-unit commanders. In the IDF context, junior commanders are not much older than their soldiers, and squad leaders, who are often the only formal authority present, spend all of their time with their soldiers. As a result it can be a struggle to assert authority over them. In the U.S. military, NCOs are typically older, and thus have an easier time exercising authority. This is not always the case, however. Khatchadourian (2009) described the case of a squad leader in an infantry company in 2006. He was only a few years older than many of his men, and "at times he appeared to trade discipline for affection," a pattern familiar from my research with the IDF. One soldier reported that squad members sometimes confiscated alcohol, and others recalled that the squad leader became increasingly worn out, sometimes abusing Valium on patrols. Later, during a raid on a suspected insurgent camp near Samarra, two men from the squad shot and killed three detainees. Together, they attempted to cover up the executions, but eventually were tried and convicted.[16] Setting aside the precise details of the case, which were contested in court, what seems clear is that at the squad level, a lax climate caused both by the strain of deployment and an insufficiently authoritative junior command was associated with various incidents of opportunistic violence, beginning with relatively minor infractions and culminating in unauthorized killing.[17]

A final, particularly harrowing example of the link between weak command and opportunistic violence was the 2006 gang rape and murder of 14-year-old Abeer Qassim al-Janabi and the murder of her family in a town south of Baghdad, one of the worst atrocities committed by U.S. forces in Iraq. The crime and the events that led to it are chronicled in detail by Jim Frederick, a former editor for *Time Magazine* (Frederick 2010). The perpetrators belonged to a light infantry battalion of around 700 men, which deployed for a year to one of Iraq's most violent areas and was charged with putting down the rapidly escalating insurgency. Housed in a decrepit former potato-processing plant under grueling physical conditions, the battalion's soldiers were targeted throughout their tour by nearly 900

IEDs and shelled and shot at daily. Within the first three months, the perpetrators' company lost all of its platoon leaders and three NCOs to death or injury. Throughout their tour, the battalion would lose twenty-one men to insurgent violence, and dozens more were wounded and evacuated. More than 40 percent of the battalion's soldiers were treated for mental health issues while still in deployment.[18] Just a couple of weeks before the crime, three soldiers from the platoon were killed at a remote checkpoint, with two of the bodies found only days later, mutilated and burned.

In this brutal environment, Frederick reveals a structure of extremely poor leadership that abandoned soldiers to their fate, berated and humiliated them (even blaming beloved junior leaders for their own deaths), publicly undermined junior commanders, and pushed the troops far beyond any reasonable limit. Particularly glaring was the senior leadership's near-exclusive focus on formal control, such as haranguing worn-down soldiers for not keeping their base sufficiently clean, alongside the abandonment of social control through the exercise of leadership. In one chilling example, one of the squads was sent from mission to mission without sleep or adequate food for more than fifty-six hours, and when they finally returned to base they were greeted by an NCO who immediately inquired whether they had shaved that day (Frederick 2010, 152).[19] As Frederick writes (xviii), nothing can absolve the four perpetrators "from the personal responsibility that is theirs, and theirs alone." But the extreme strains of deployment, coupled with exceptionally poor leadership, created an environment that ignored multiple warning signs and ultimately allowed the crime to take place.

Entrepreneurial Violence

Chapter 5 identifies and theorizes the category of entrepreneurial violence (EV), violence that emerges from the bottom of the organization to serve military (rather than individual) needs. I argued that EV requires three elements—violence entrepreneurs, a climate of ambiguity, and opportunities to develop new practices. As discussed at the end of chapter 5, however, identifying EV is often difficult, because it is typically concealed until the stakes are revealed. Without inside information about communication down the chain of command, it can be difficult to distinguish between opportunistic violence and an entrepreneurial practice emerging in an environment of strategic ambiguity. In the Israeli case, some of these patterns were revealed in the trial described in chapter 5, through the testimonies of the battalion and brigade commanders. In the American case, similar patterns can be discerned in former *New York Times* journalist Dexter Filkin's (2008) account of Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman, whose military career

ended after two of his soldiers were tried and convicted of pushing two Iraqi men into the Tigris River.

According to Filkins (2008, 150), Lieutenant Colonel Sassaman was in the fall of 2003 "the most impressive field commander in Iraq." Loved by his men, he initially worked hard to promote the U.S. mission in Iraq, setting up local government and providing funds to rebuild schools and mosques. As the insurgency began to escalate, however, his men encountered growing resistance and violence, and Sassaman increasingly relied on heavy-handed tactics—conducting aggressive sweeps, bulldozing homes, imposing curfew and ID requirements, and enclosing a village in barbed wire. His approach, as relayed to Filkins (2008, 160), was that "with a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects . . . we can convince these people that we are here to help."

To discipline Iraqis who defied U.S. rules, Sassaman's men devised several nonlethal punishments, which they thought were "cutting-edge stuff" (Filkins 2008, 163). These practices included throwing rocks back at Iraqis who did so, bulldozing walls with graffiti, or dropping curfew violators in a far-off location so that they had to walk long distances home. Yet though insurgent attacks would temporarily decline when Sassaman was in the area, the insurgency in general continued to escalate. According to Filkins, Sassaman's then-commander, Major General Ray Odierno (who later rose to become Army Chief of Staff), met with Sassaman and gave him "a direct but curiously vague order: 'Increase lethality'" (163). Filkins explained, "Odierno didn't tell Sassaman how; he just wanted higher body counts. So Sassaman's men started experimenting—sometimes with the colonel's approval, sometimes not" (163).

All the ingredients for entrepreneurial violence were thus in place. Sassaman was no opportunistic rogue but a proactive, respected, and entrepreneurial leader. He was confronted with an opportunity to innovate: The U.S. strategy was not working. Regardless of what troops on the ground did, the insurgency only escalated. A climate of ambiguity was also present: although his superior ordered him to increase lethality, the exact means of doing so were left vague. The punishment practices that were devised in consequence were bottom-up measures that served to advance the organizational mission. For some time, troops thought they served them well. Sustained by an ambiguous climate, the measures were designed to reduce support for insurgents and establish U.S. authority.

One incident, described briefly in the book's introduction, forced the chain of command to dispel the ambiguity and take a stand. On patrol in Samarra, a group of soldiers saw two Iraqis driving in violation of the curfew. They detained the two men, drove them to the river, and, at gunpoint, forced them to jump in. This practice, which they called "getting people wet," was one of the punishments that soldiers had devised (and Sassaman claimed not to know about; Filkins 2008, 162).

Though not intended to be lethal, in this instance only one of the men managed to climb out. Family members reported the incident, and an investigation was initiated. Sassaman did not want to lay blame on his men, labeling them as deviants. Instead, he ordered them not to mention what had happened at the river. A body was found weeks later, however, and a number of soldiers were eventually charged for pushing the two men into the Tigris.[20] Sassaman was reprimanded, and his military career ended.

The violent practices that Sassman's men devised were neither strategic or opportunistic. Instead, they inhabited what one of the soldiers, who refused to participate in the act, called a gray zone (a term echoed by many of my own interviewees when discussing what I have called EV). Interviewed by Filkins (2008, 166), the soldier explained,

> There is the white, the right way, and the black, the wrong way. And there is a large, gray middle—the gray area in the middle where most of the shit gets done . . . Sassaman liked to play in the gray. You know, Charlie-Mike. Continue Mission. Finish the mission. That was his philosophy. His company commanders did not have to call him to ask permission to do things if it was a life-or-limb situation. He left it in their hands. They are trained officers, trained soldiers. He trusted their judgment. And when they did something, he backed them up on it. Or he turned a blind eye to it.

This passage suggests striking parallels with the Israeli case. Entrepreneurial violence emerges and spreads in a context of strategic ambiguity, persisting until it is either institutionalized (when benefits outweigh the costs) or investigated and punished (when costs outweigh the benefits). When the latter occurs, punishment for such violence is typically delegated down the chain of command, with ambiguity enabling deniability at the higher ranks. Mid-level officers who do not shift blame to their subordinates are thus likely to pay a price.

Counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia

The previous section explored some of the parallels between patterns of participation in violence by IDF soldiers in the Second Intifada and U.S, soldiers in Iraq. To further illustrate the potential that the Israeli case can shed light on military experiences elsewhere, even outside Western settings, I briefly consider the case of the Yugoslav wars of succession in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991–95.

Yugoslavia's federal military, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), recruited its soldiers through mandatory conscription of all 18-year-old males for a period of

one year. On release soldiers were transferred into the reserves, where they were periodically called up for military exercises and training. In 1990, before the outbreak of the wars of secession, the JNA had some 185,000 personnel on active duty and approximately 500,000 more in the reserve forces (Milicevic 2004).

On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, with Bosnia following suit a few months later. In response to these declarations armed conflict broke out between the JNA and an assortment of Serb armed groups on the one hand, and the forces of the seceding republics on the other. When the wars broke out, the JNA began to call up its reservists for service on the frontlines. In the confusion of the first months, many men responded to the call, but soon a phenomenon of desertion began, with drafted men leaving the frontlines in increasingly large numbers. Other large groups of men employed a variety of means to avoid the draft altogether, secretly leaving the country, going into hiding, or devising other creative means to avoid receipt of the call-up notices. Milicevic (2004, 103), who studied patterns of participation in and resistance to the draft in Serbia, quotes one reservist who decided to desert his unit and flee the country following his brief stint at reserve duty in the conflict's early days:

> No one was responsible for anything. Not even about the weapons—I never signed that I received it, and I never signed that I returned it. . . . People started shooting, a guy discharged an automatic weapon, while I was standing right above him, because he was listening to folk music and getting moved by it. Others started crossing the Danube [to Croatia], shooting there. There was a rumor that a group of Croats dressed in JNA uniforms crossed to our side of the river to commit sabotage. . . . And yet you don't get any tangible assignments or explanations.

The respondent's account stresses the near-total breakdown of control in his unit, evident in matters ranging from the care of equipment to the conduct of violence. He went on to describe how, before he deserted the frontlines, some eighty soldiers in his unit reacted to the general sense of confusion by conducting a three-day strike, in which they refused all superior orders.

The soldiers in his unit were not alone. The numbers of deserters and draft dodgers in the first few months of the conflict reached record numbers, with an estimated 50,000 reservists escaping their units as of August 1991 (Milicevic 2004). Estimates regarding reservists who fled the country vary widely but range between 100,000 and 300,000 (Milicevic 2004; Sikavica 2000). At the same time, large numbers of men were evading the draft altogether, with an estimated 50 percent of recruited men reportedly dodging their call-up notices in the fall of 1991.[21] As a result the JNA was unable to mobilize enough men for its war with Croatia, beginning the conflict eighteen divisions short (Milicevic 2004).

The widespread draft dodging, desertions, and mutinies provide evidence of the decline in production of strategic violence that ensues when organizational control is weak.[22] Military commanders were simply unable to shape combatant violence to serve their own interests, facing high levels of resistance and rebellion instead. Indeed, the JNA eventually dissolved and was replaced by the newly formed Army of Yugoslavia (Sikavica 2000).

While the military disintegrated in face of low participation rates, voluntary Serbian paramilitaries flourished (Ron 2003; Schlichte 2010). These disparate groups, ranging in size from several dozen to several hundred men, were ultimately responsible for much of the most egregious violence and atrocities in the early months of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia (Ron 2003). The most notorious Serbian paramilitary, the Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG, also known as the Tigers), was headed by a criminal and associate of the Serbian state security service, Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. The SDG was infamous for its ruthlessness and brutality and for the broad repertoires of violence it inflicted on civilians. A closer look, however, reveals that such violence was not the work of unrestrained criminal thugs but was rather tightly controlled and directed by armed group leaders. Arkan insisted on a formal hierarchy and strict discipline, employing corporal and capital punishment when members deviated from rules (Milicevic 2004; Schlichte 2010). A case in point was the organization's attitude toward looting, which was carried out in a centralized and organized fashion. Organized looting was a privilege, typically granted to members for twenty-four hours after "freeing" a town. Opportunistic looting for individual gain, however, was considered a punishable offense. As Milicevic (2004, 76) explains,

> Members of the SDG were not allowed to loot as they pleased; this was a centralized and well-organized operation. Arkan had a monopoly on gasoline, cigarettes, wine etc. . . . The SDG had its own storage facilities to which all the plunder had to be sent. When the spoils were sold, the profits were used partly for the purchase of equipment, partly to pay the wages for the fighters, with the rest divided among Arkan and his closest associates.

As the case of the SDG shows, effective organizational control does not necessarily lead to restraint and can be consistent with broad repertoires of violence. Moreover, the SDG's attitudes toward looting demonstrate that effective organizational control can shape soldier violence to serve group leader interests, regardless of the target or form of violence employed. As expected, strong organizational control in the SDG led to high participation in strategic violence while reducing participation in opportunistic violence. In contrast, other Serbian para-

militaries were far less disciplined, granting their members license to commit atrocities opportunistically (Ron 2003).

The case of the former Yugoslavia also provides initial evidence regarding the emergence of entrepreneurial violence. The proliferation in the conflict's first years of paramilitary groups with concealed and ambiguous connections to the Serbian state security service shows how conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity can produce violence from below that is directed toward strategic goals. Indeed, the connections between the Serbian paramilitaries' engagement in ethnic cleansing and Serbia's leadership have been difficult to prove to this day, though many have argued that Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic himself directed the violence.[23] In 1999, Milosevic was charged with joint criminal enterprise in connection with ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia, and with de facto command responsibility for crimes committed in those conflicts (Armatta 2012). Evidence from the trial indicates that Milosevic frequently employed strategic ambiguity, allowing paramilitary leaders to act as they saw fit (Armatta 2012; Glaurdic 2009).[24] Through persistent strategic ambiguity and delegation of authority, Milosevic was able to maintain plausible deniability, which he continued to exploit until his death during the trial.

This chapter has explored the relevance of the book's arguments beyond the Israeli case. As members of a modern, well-resourced, and technologically advanced military, I expected that soldiers who underwent training and deployment in irregular war in the IDF would share several experiences with members of similarly advanced militaries. However, contrary to some accounts that view effective organizational control as a means of increasing restraint, my argument anticipates that such control serves to align soldier behavior with military preferences, which may call for more or less violence. Consequently, I expected effective training and socialization in modern Western militaries to create baseline patterns of high participation in strategic violence and low participation in opportunistic violence. In addition, I expected the stresses of deployment to precipitate growing misalignment between the military and its members, resulting in both increased shirking and increased opportunistic violence. The primary mechanism that could realign soldiers with the organization while in the field, I argued, was effective control by junior commanders.

I found preliminary evidence for my argument in an exploration of the case of the U.S. war in Iraq. Though there were a number of important differences between the cases, patterns of participation in strategic, opportunistic, and entrepreneurial violence were generally as anticipated by my argument. Two distinguishing factors, however, merit consideration, both resulting from the heavy

strain on U.S. forces and its growing difficulties in adequately addressing its manpower needs. First, the U.S. military increasingly recruited men that previously it would have exempted from combat service, granting large numbers of "moral waivers," which allowed the drafting of recruits with criminal offenses. Second, soldier deployments were particularly long and often extended while in the field. Both of these factors posed substantial challenges to organizational control that were absent from the Israeli case.

I concluded the chapter with a brief, illustrative analysis of the case of the former Yugoslavia. Here, organizational control was revealed to be very weak once fighting started, and the military ultimately dissolved. Nevertheless, patterns of participation in strategic, opportunistic, and entrepreneurial violence broadly followed the contours laid out here. These initial analyses, which await more in-depth research, further illuminate the processes through which counterinsurgent violence is produced and curbed.

8

CONCLUSION

Violence and Restraint in Counterinsurgency

Why and in what ways does participation in counterinsurgent violence vary? Why do some combatants and combat units participate eagerly in violence, while others show considerable restraint or resistance to participation? And what accounts for variation among combatants in forms and in targeting of violence? This book set out to answer these questions through an examination of patterns of violence and restraint in a particular case of counterinsurgency, that of the Israeli military in the Second Intifada. A five-year insurgency that brought IDF combatants into the most intimate spaces of Palestinian life, the Second Intifada presented a unique opportunity to collect typically hard-to-access data on the details of military life at the small-unit level, as well as on the nature of conducting combat operations among a chiefly civilian population.

The Israeli case suggested a puzzle that challenged conventional wisdom regarding the behavior of combatants in conflict, which is often assumed to be homogeneous and violence prone. The data I collected demonstrated that combatants neither obediently implement the preferences of generals nor flock to opportunistically victimize populations. Instead, I found that participation in violence varied substantially during conflict, with some forms and targets of violence drawing widespread participation and even enthusiasm, and others remaining limited to relatively few. Although combatants sometimes "overproduced" violence, exceeding or contravening commander orders, at other times they "underproduced" violence, shirking from the violence demanded of them.

Furthermore, the analysis revealed previously hidden connections between the two modes of violence, indicating that participation in strategic violence and

participation in opportunistic violence are inversely related, with one rising as the other declines. These connections stand in contrast to the usual, binary treatment of violence in conflict, which separates the strategic from the opportunistic, thereby obscuring the mechanisms that connect the two. The Israeli case also illustrates the limits of a top-down approach that views armed groups as comprising strategy makers and implementers, principals and agents. Instead, it showed that violent policies can emerge at the bottom of the military organization, reflecting both the informational advantages and the higher risk propensities of violence entrepreneurs at lower organizational levels.

Theories that focus on the shifting strategies of military elites, the passionate emotions of rival ethnic groups, or the powerful effects of social influence cannot adequately explain patterns of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian case. These theories typically assume that combatants act uniformly, either by following leader strategies, acting on rage or revenge, or succumbing to social pressure. While all of these phenomena are sometimes present, they provide only a partial representation of combatant behavior. Combatants sometimes shirk or defect from elite preferences; violence can result not only from passionate emotion but also from the cognitive disengagement processes associated with long deployments; and combatants, like all individuals, sometimes resist the pressures of social influence.

My response to the puzzle takes an organizational approach, tracing patterns of violence and restraint to mechanisms of social organizational control that are put in place to ensure that combatant violence reflects the strategies and preferences of military elites. I argued that when military control of combatants is effective, participation in authorized or strategic violence rises while participation in unauthorized, or opportunistic, violence declines. When control weakens, participation in strategic violence declines while participation in opportunistic violence rises. And when control is ambiguous and military interests are uncertain, entrepreneurial violence emerges and spreads. Participation in violence is evident not only in levels of violence inflicted but also in its forms and targets, because effective control is likely to lead to a rise in forms and targets of violence that serve military goals, whereas weak control is likely to increase participation in self-serving forms of violence and in targeting that serves no military purpose.

Violence and Social Organizational Control

This book analyzes participation in counterinsurgency, focusing on the role of organizational control in producing and restraining violence by combatants. I define organizational control as encompassing any intentional process or institution designed to direct the diverse inclinations of members to serve the needs of

the organization. As such, organizational control comprises not only formal mechanisms such as rules, discipline, and enforcement but also, more importantly, social mechanisms, such as the inculcation of values, norms, and beliefs among organizational members. I argue that variation in organizational control produces three distinct types of violence against civilians—strategic, entrepreneurial, and opportunistic—each of which is associated with differing forms, targets, and levels of participation. Strategic violence refers to the violence committed under the authorization of military elites to advance military ends. Opportunistic violence refers to self-serving violence that combatants commit to advance their own goals, in excess or in contravention of organizational objectives. Between these two categories is a domain of behavior characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity regarding military objectives, creating space for entrepreneurial initiatives at the field level to advance strategic goals without explicit authorization or endorsement. I term such initiatives entrepreneurial violence.

Broadly, organizational control in the modern military is exercised in two stages. First, in the initial military training period, centralized control mechanisms determine which violence is considered legitimate and which is not, constructing boundaries between normative and deviant violent behavior. This creates baseline patterns of relatively high participation in organizationally sanctioned violence and relatively low participation in violence that is not sanctioned. Second, during the deployment period, commanders at the small-unit level must enforce these normative boundaries to ensure that violence remains within circumscribed limits. When control fails or is ambiguous, rates of participation fluctuate, such that participation in unsanctioned violence increases while participation in sanctioned violence decreases. Organizational control affects not only participation levels but also forms and targets of violence, because some actions are more easily construed as serving organizational needs than others. For instance, while soldiers are expected to use lethal violence under certain conditions, making lethal violence appear normative in the military context, looting for personal gain clearly serves individual goals at the expense of the organization. Alternatively, although targeting an enemy insurgent is constructed as normative, targeting an individual completely unconnected to the insurgency would be deemed deviant.

Turning to the specific patterns of violence and restraint in the Second Intifada, I found that participation in violence, as well as its forms and targets, varied substantially among individual combatants and combat units. Centralized organizational mechanisms employed by the IDF beginning in high school and culminating in basic training created a normative system that valorized violence that served military needs. This effort was in large part successful because of the IDF's ability to neutralize and reframe the violence inherent in combat activity

as heroic, glorious, thrilling, prestigious, and masculine, thereby obscuring the potential both for victimizing others and for experiencing pain and suffering oneself. The intense training and conditioning that combatants underwent produced a cohesive, aggressive body of trained violence professionals, prepared and eager to engage in the missions imposed on them. Although these control mechanisms were never absolutely successful, with a minority of combatants remaining resistant to their workings, by and large centralized control mechanisms in the IDF were able to harness the diverse interests, beliefs, and preferences of individual combatants in the service of the military, producing high baseline rates of participation in strategic violence and low baseline rates of participation in opportunistic violence.

Chapters 3 and 4 focused on patterns of strategic violence during the Second Intifada. I found that, even though the IDF's counterinsurgency tactics encompassed a wide range of practices, including offensive, defensive, and population-control operations, its military training for the most part continued to prepare combatants for conventional warfare. As such, it glorified violence that was aggressive, risky, targeted at a clear enemy, and promised concrete results. Violence that conformed to such expectations, such as large-scale offensive operations or targeted raids and arrests of suspected militants, therefore enjoyed high rates of compliance and even enthusiasm. However, much of the violence in the Second Intifada (and in counterinsurgency more generally) involved far more mundane and police-like population-control operations, which required collective or indiscriminate nonlethal targeting and in which achievements were lackluster. This growing divergence between organizational control and the realities of combat on the ground caused some combatants to drift away from organizational objectives, whether for principled reasons or simply due to boredom or a lack of identification with the mission. Some of these combatants consequently evaded or shirked their strategic duties or defied outright the directive to employ violence.

It was up to commander leadership at the small-unit level to realign wayward combatants with the interests of the military through social or formal mechanisms of organizational control. Whereas social control mechanisms attempted to increase combatant motivation by imposing a military logic on population-control missions, thereby re-instilling among combatants a sense of significance and purpose, formal control mechanisms required obedience regardless of combatant beliefs, relying on the formal authority of the chain of command. When commanders failed to impose either of these control mechanisms, the production of strategic violence declined.

Increased deviation from military mandates also resulted from the weakening of organizational control over time, a result of long and grinding deployments. Shifting to a deductive mode of inquiry, chapter 6 tested the increasingly estab-

lished finding that weak control leads to opportunistic violence. Using original survey data, I found that in the Second Intifada opportunistic violence was strongly associated with the duration of deployment among civilians. Long deployments erode social and moral norms, raising the likelihood that combatants will act opportunistically. However, the relationship between deployment duration and opportunistic violence was moderated by unit institutions, such that long deployments were more likely to cause opportunistic violence in units with weak command structures. These findings suggest that the deleterious effects of long deployments are not inevitable, but can be limited to a large extent through well-functioning structures of command and discipline.

Finally, I introduced a third category—entrepreneurial violence—to indicate violent practices that emerge at the lower levels of the military organization in the service of strategic goals. I argued that it initially emerges in the presence of three conditions: (1) the existence of proactive aggressive officers or violence entrepreneurs, (2) the identification of opportunities to advance strategic goals when such goals are not being adequately met, and (3) the presence of ambiguity regarding the permissibility of a particular practice. Both junior and senior officers have incentives to allow entrepreneurial violence to emerge and spread. Entrepreneurial junior officers, who enjoy an informational advantage, can exploit new opportunities to advance strategic goals. When such initiatives are successful these officers can gain credit and advancement. At the same time, by maintaining ambiguity, senior commanders can transfer the risks of uncertain outcomes to their most enterprising officers, thereby avoiding responsibility and gaining deniability should such ventures fail. In the context of prolonged uncertainty, practices that emerged from below could become tacit standardized operating procedures. The category of entrepreneurial violence demonstrates that strategy making in a complex organization consists not just of top-down instruction but also of emergent behavior, and it brings into view previously invisible patterns of violence and restraint.

Beyond the Second Intifada: The IDF in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

The framework developed in this book was applied to a central episode of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Second Intifada. This insurgency and its repression brought profound changes to the patterns of governance in the OPT, the most important of which was the split between the West Bank and Gaza. Already evident in the differing practices characterizing each during the insurgency (see chapter 3), the divide became institutionalized following Israel's withdrawal of its

forces and civilian settlers from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, and it deepened significantly after Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007.[1] Since then the Palestinian administration has been split, with Fatah forming a government headquartered in the West Bank city of Ramallah and Hamas continuing to govern Gaza. How well does the argument in this book account for subsequent developments in the West Bank and Gaza? To address this question, I examine key developments in each of these regions separately.

IDF Operations in Gaza: Gaza as a War Zone

Shortly after the departure of its ground forces on September 12, 2005, Israel announced that it was terminating its military rule of the Gaza Strip and transferring authority over governing the population to the Palestinian Authority. Yet despite withdrawing its presence on the ground, Israel continues to control Gaza's border crossings into Israel, its air space and territorial waters, population registry, taxation system, and supply chains.[2] After the Hamas victory in the 2006 elections and subsequent takeover of Gaza, and in response to the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel, Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza, closing its border crossings to all but very limited transfers of goods and restricting its fuel and energy supply. Although closures had been imposed in the past, this blockade was particularly long and severe, precipitating an economic and humanitarian crisis.

From the military perspective, these political developments meant that, for the most part, Israeli forces engaged Gaza from the outside, through elaborate surveillance upheld by air force, naval, and artillery power. Mortars and rockets launched into Israel from the Gaza Strip were usually met with artillery fire, air bombings, and on occasion, targeted killings. In the decade that followed the 2005 withdrawal, the IDF also launched three major operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in response to an increase in rocket launches: Cast Lead in 2008–9, Pillar of Defense in 2012, and Protective Edge in 2014. All three were relatively brief in duration but highly lethal, killing thousands of Palestinians and inflicting heavy damage on property and infrastructure. Protective Edge, the IDF's most recent large-scale operation, caused the deaths of 2,202 Palestinians and 73 Israelis in approximately seven weeks, a ratio of violence far larger than in the Second Intifada.[3] The combined effects of Hamas rule, the blockade, and Israeli military operations led the UN to declare that Gaza would become unlivable by 2020 if not sooner.[4]

For Israeli ground troops, circumstances in Gaza are far different than they were in the Second Intifada. Many soldiers who served in the post-Intifada period never entered the Gaza Strip. Those who entered did so as part of major, lethal operations that were intense and relatively brief. Does my argument about

violence and control apply to their experience? Without data on patterns of control across units, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions. However, available evidence suggests patterns consistent with those laid out here. First, my research suggests that participation in large-scale, intense operations should elicit high levels of participation and enthusiasm, because they conform to the portrait of violence constructed by the military as valuable—forceful, deadly, risky (sixty-seven soldiers were killed in the operation), and targeted at a clear and tangible enemy (members of the Hamas armed wing). Hamas, which was more organized and better armed than it had been before the Israeli pullout,[5] is seen by the Israeli government as a radical and implacable terrorist group, and the rockets launched from the Gaza Strip at Israeli towns were a continuing reminder of its hostility. Periodic discoveries of offensive tunnels dug under the Israeli border further intensified the sense of legitimacy of the fight against Hamas.

Official IDF reports support this expectation: motivation by reservists called up to participate was extremely high: Israel mobilized tens of thousands of reservists within hours (R. Cohen et al. 2017, 162), and more than 6,000 additional reservists who were not called up joined voluntarily.[6] IDF data tracking motivation for combat service show a slight rise in combat motivation following Operation Protective Edge and a subsequent declining trend.[7] In addition, a widely reported survey of Israeli youth conducted in the last days of the operation found that 61 percent of 17- to 18-year-olds stated that the fighting increased their motivation to serve in the military.[8] Public support for the operation was record-breaking: more than 90 percent of the Jewish-Israeli population believed that the operation was justified.[9] Under these circumstances it is likely that commanders had little difficulty motivating their soldiers to participate in exactly what they had trained to do. The Israeli NGO Breaking the Silence interviewed more than sixty soldiers who participated in the operation. Consistent with the public's response, one of the soldiers observed,

> I think there was something very frightening and also a bit paralyzing in the atmosphere. And I think that the feeling among [the soldiers] too, was that we really need to give it to them.[10]

Because of the operation's relatively short duration, it is also likely that opportunistic violence was relatively low. Although a number of incidents of vandalism and looting were reported, most analysis of the operation has focused on the impact and extent of the destruction wrought by strategic violence in Gaza rather than on soldier misconduct.[11] Levy (2017), for example, found that Israel sought to offset the risk of intensive ground operations in Gaza by shifting some of it to Palestinian civilians through three practices: the liberal use of firepower, explosives, and artillery to protect soldiers; operating under the assumption that,

because civilians had in many cases been warned before the troops entered, anyone remaining in the combat zone was a threat and could be legitimately targeted; and the use of artillery and air shelling in densely populated areas to provide cover for rescue operations for soldiers. Despite the massive level of destruction, such practices elicited widespread participation.

In sum, the available data on participation in military operations in Gaza are broadly consistent with my argument. These operations featured all of the elements that are likely to increase participation in strategic violence and in an even more intense manner than had already been present during Gaza operations a decade earlier. At the same time the relatively limited duration of these operations made it less likely that opportunistic and entrepreneurial violence would have a chance to develop and spread.

IDF Operations in the West Bank: The Azaria Trial

IDF activity in the West Bank in the years following the Second Intifada took on a very different character. With the repression of the insurgency and the construction of the separation barrier, the military occupation gradually returned to a policing mode, focusing primarily on population control through enforcement of restrictions on movement and the permit regime as the primary means of controlling the population. Given this change in circumstance, most ordinary combat units no longer spent the bulk of their deployment in the OPT and rotated to different zones across Israel and its borders. The argument developed in this book becomes relevant during spikes of violence that took place in this period.

The largest such spike began in the fall of 2015. Once again sparked by contention over Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the escalation this time was not organized by armed groups (which had largely been crushed a decade earlier), but primarily involved lone individuals attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians with knives, vehicle ramming, and, on occasion, gunfire. Between October 2015 and September 2016 some 40 Israelis and 240 Palestinians were killed, approximately 160 of the latter while carrying out attacks.[12]

These statistics reflect what became a salient feature of Israeli security activity in what Israelis called "the knife Intifada" and Palestinians "the Jerusalem Intifada": the deaths of attackers or attempted attackers. Human rights groups charged that shooting to kill was employed even when not necessary to stop attacks, encouraged by politicians and the media.[13] The public debate came to a head in the case of Elor Azaria, a 19-year-old medic in the Kfir Brigade, who was brought to trial for shooting and killing Palestinian Abd al-Fatah a-Sharif while he was lying wounded on the ground after having stabbed a soldier in Hebron. The shooting was caught on camera, leading to a long public debate on both the causes and the

legitimacy of the act. The army, for its part, treated it from the start as a case of soldier misconduct. Azaria was convicted of manslaughter by a military trial court on January 4, 2017, and later sentenced to eighteen months in prison. Both sides appealed the ruling, and on July 30, 2017, a military appellate court rejected the appeal. Can the arguments laid out in this book shed light on this case?

The killing of a-Sharif was clearly not an instance of strategic violence. Azaria had not been ordered to fire and in fact had surprised his own commanders by doing so. The circumstances thus suggest that it was either a case of opportunistic or entrepreneurial violence. Which seems more likely, given the available evidence? To answer these questions, I rely primarily on the hundreds of pages of trial court and appeals court decisions, supplemented by media reports covering the events.

As defined in this book, opportunistic and entrepreneurial violence both emerge at the bottom of the organization, but they are distinct in whom they are intended to serve. Opportunistic violence is self-serving and can stem from many motivations that may cause soldiers to lash out during conflict. Entrepreneurial violence, in contrast, is designed to promote the strategic interests of the military. When it is unclear whether the strategic benefits of such violence outweigh its costs, it can evolve into tacit "operating codes" (Ron 2000) that may be widespread but are not officially endorsed at the most senior levels.

Though we cannot know what Azaria was thinking when he fired, the available evidence suggests that the case was one of soldier misconduct. The shooting took place eleven minutes after a-Sharif had been incapacitated by six bullets, commanders on the scene were not consulted or notified before the shot was fired, and protocol was not followed. At least a minimal adherence to protocol would be expected if Azaria were seeking to advance military objectives, and certainly if he were acting according to standard operating procedures, even if they were clandestine. The shooting was in fact immediately rejected by the soldier's superiors: within hours, his battalion commander spoke to him and stated that the event was out of line and would be investigated, and Azaria was suspended from all operational activity. It can thus be analyzed as an instance of opportunistic violence.[14] I return to briefly consider the entrepreneurial explanation at the end of this section.

Opportunistic violence can emerge for many reasons. In this case, the court determined that Azaria was motivated by revenge for the stabbing of his friend moments earlier. This finding was based primarily on the testimony of another soldier at the scene, who recalled that after he fired the shot, Azaria said that the man deserved to die for the stabbing. The court rejected the defense's argument that Azaria was concerned about the possibility that a-Sharif could still reach his knife or was wired with explosives and therefore posed an immediate and

concrete risk to his surroundings. The time that had passed since the man was incapacitated; Azaria's cool, measured demeanor; and the fact that he did not follow proper protocol for dealing with an active explosives risk were inconsistent with his claims about an immediate threat.

Although revenge may have been the immediate trigger, chapter 6 shows that the likelihood of opportunistic violence increases considerably when soldiers are deployed for long periods of time. The Hebron shooting involved soldiers from the Kfir Brigade, which is primarily deployed in the West Bank and had dealt with much of the escalation in violence in 2015–16. Although Kfir's disciplinary record had improved since the Second Intifada, in the months before the Hebron shooting, the brigade's soldiers had reportedly been involved in a number of incidents of detainee abuse and violence against civilians, as well as other severe disciplinary infractions.[15] In November 2015, Israeli media reported that the entire brigade would be deployed in and around the city of Hebron, in response to the spike in violent events.[16] Considered one of the most difficult deployments even during less volatile times because of the presence of a small, far-right settler community in the midst of the Palestinian city, Hebron had emerged as a key site in the recent wave of violence. During the trial it was also discovered that Azaria, who had previously performed well as a soldier and had received an award for excellence in his brigade, had been in distress before the event, and his father had contacted his brigade commander twice in the days before the shooting to see what could be done to help him.[17]

Yet despite such individual-level factors, even when compounded by the harmful effects of long deployments, I have argued that well-functioning structures of command and control can curb opportunistic violence to a large degree. High levels of opportunistic violence are thus an indicator of problems in the unit's control mechanisms. Azaria's case supports this contention. The Kfir Brigade has a history of disciplinary issues, as discussed in chapter 6. Earlier in the month of the shooting, three commanders in Kfir were dismissed for another severe disciplinary breach of conduct.[18] The Azaria case itself raised significant questions about command and control: the seeming indifference of those on the scene to the shooting, captured on film, suggested, at best, neglect of military protocol. Three officers in the unit had already been reprimanded for not tending to the injured Palestinian and evacuating him in accordance with military regulations.

Judge Zvi Segal, who authored the dissenting opinion in the appeals court, expressed shock at the fact that none of the people present at the scene—soldiers, commanders, and civilians—provided any treatment to the wounded Palestinian or responded to the shooting in a way that reflected its severity. He said, "All continued to move at the site quietly and with a relatively stoic calm—a disturbing and worrying reaction in itself, and the officers on the scene even allowed

[the defendant] to continue his operational activity routine (which was interrupted only later when the Battalion Commander arrived at the scene and the gun was taken from him)—as if an unusual event hadn't at all happened in their presence." As suggested by the judge, this behavior, which was unwittingly caught on film, was an indicator of command and control problems in the unit. The Azaria case thus appears to provide further evidence for my argument regarding the determinants of opportunistic violence.

An objection that might be raised to the classification of this case as opportunistic is that other killings of alleged attackers occurred during this wave of violence, suggesting that such killings had developed into a practice. I do not analyze these other cases here (but see Schaeffer Omer-Man 2017). However, the Azaria case is distinct because of the time that passed between the stabbing and the fatal shot and the clear violations of protocol that took place on the scene. For other cases in which attackers were killed in the process of attack or shortly thereafter, it was less clear whether the killing was necessary to halt an attack, and they are therefore more difficult to classify as strategic or a practical operating code.

Implications for Theory and Policy

This book has explored in depth participation in violence at the level of ordinary combatants and small combat units, drawing attention to the fact that combatants are a heterogeneous group of actors with their own preferences, beliefs, and propensities toward violence. In its insistence on combatant agency, the theory advanced herein rejects two assumptions that underlie much of the recent literature on violence against civilians in conflict: first, that patterns of violence directly reflect elite considerations, an assumption that essentially denies the ability of combatants to shape facts on the ground regardless of elite preferences; and second, that combatants are by and large opportunistic thugs or frenzied ideologues, ready to inflict violence on civilian populations at the first opportunity. Because combatants are diverse and motivated by a variety of factors, armed organizations must invest significant resources in ensuring that combatants direct their own interests and beliefs toward the service of the organization, whether for the production of strategic violence or for the nonproduction of opportunistic violence. These resources, primarily social organizational control mechanisms, will determine to a large extent both levels of participation in violence and the character that such violence takes.

The theory presented here also presents a challenge to the dichotomous separation of strategic from opportunistic violence. In much of the literature these

forms are explicitly or implicitly analyzed separately, with instrumental theories being used to explain the former and organizational theories to explain the latter. A shift in the level of analysis to ordinary combatants and small combat units demonstrates that control is required not only to limit opportunistic violence but also to produce strategic violence. Without effective control, some combatants may simply not perform the violence expected of them, either because they prefer to commit violence for their own purposes or because they prefer not to commit it at all. Moreover, the analysis undermines the dichotomy between strategy as top down and opportunism as bottom up. A relational view of organizational control shows the possibilities for emergent policymaking and entrepreneurship created by ambiguity and delegation at the senior level, thereby revealing previously invisible patterns of organized violence and restraint.

Finally, by opening the black box of military unit organization, this study has provided a more nuanced account of organizational control, which goes beyond recruitment mechanisms or formal sanction systems. Effective control cannot be limited to formal mechanisms of discipline and punishment, especially in the chaotic conditions of counterinsurgency warfare where soldiers exercise a large degree of discretion, where monitoring is often impossible, and where relationships are often built on trust and esteem rather than fear and intimidation. Instead, control encompasses a variety of formal and informal means, including training, leadership, personal example, and, most importantly, the neutralization and reframing of violence so that it loses its destructive meaning and is instead infused with glory, heroism, thrills, and excitement. Only through such reframing can the negative and painful consequences of violence, both for its perpetrators and for its victims, be obscured.

From a policy perspective, this book has several important implications. First, it suggests that although organizational control is a central factor in curbing opportunistic violence against civilians, it is not a panacea for reducing violence in general. This is because effective control not only reduces participation in opportunistic violence but also increases participation in strategic violence. To the extent that strategic violence in a particular conflict victimizes civilians, effective control could even reduce restraint that would otherwise be present. Policies designed to limit strategic violence in conflict should thus target the incentives of leaders to engage in civilian victimization, rather than armed group institutions, which better enforce the preferences of those leaders.

As for curbing opportunistic and entrepreneurial violence, current prescriptions attempt to enforce organizational control primarily through the doctrine of command responsibility, which holds commanders accountable for the misdeeds of their subordinates. Rooted in criminal law and thus requiring a relatively high standard of *mens rea* (intention to commit a crime), the doctrine imposes

liability on commanders who knew or had reason to know of their subordinates' misdeeds and did not take reasonable measures to prevent or punish such acts.[19] This provides an incentive for commanders to use ambiguity strategically, thereby delegating responsibility down the chain of command.

Given growing empirical evidence of the link between breakdowns in discipline and opportunistic violence, as well as the arguments developed here about the emergence of entrepreneurial violence in climates of ambiguity, it might well be argued that commanders bear some responsibility for the violence of their subordinates when they allow command and control structures to lapse, even in the absence of concrete or imputed knowledge regarding subordinate violence. The narrow lens of criminal liability with its relatively high standard of intentionality may therefore be inadequate to capture the full extent of responsibility that commanders bear for behavior of their troops in conflict.[20]

A final implication pertains to the importance of soldier narratives as data. Society often has little tolerance for hearing soldier accounts in all their uncomfortable detail, and many veterans feel like they cannot tell their stories. Yet by leading to the concealment of political violence, this silencing can hinder our understanding of conflict processes. By placing the accounts of ordinary soldiers at its center, this book has argued that the experiences of the rank and file can help us understand how state violence is produced and curbed, beyond the control rooms in which military strategy is devised.

Appendix

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

TABLE A.1. Sample characteristics: demographics (N = 188)

VARIABLE	N	PERCENTAGE
Ethnicity		
Ashkenazi	97	52
Mizrachi	48	25
Immigrant from former USSR	13	7
Mixed ethnicity	14	7
Other/prefer not to respond	16	9
Religious observance		
Religious	43	23
Traditional	30	16
Secular	110	59
Other/prefer not to respond	5	3
Political opinions		
Right	52	28
Center-right	45	24
Center	11	6
Center-left	27	14
Left	25	13
Don't know/prefer not to respond	28	15
Level of education		
Less than high school	1	0
High school	34	18
Some college	29	15
College	98	52
Graduate studies	21	11
Prefer not to respond	5	3
Family SES		
Very low	2	1
Low	13	7
Medium	66	35
High	86	46
Very high	12	6
Prefer not to respond	9	5

TABLE A.2. Sample characteristics: military service (N = 186)

VARIABLE	N	PERCENTAGE
Role		
Soldier	80	43
Commander	106	57
NCO	62	58
Officer	44	42
Type of Unit		
Regular	148	80
Elite	38	20
Corps/Brigade		
Infantry	120	64
Givati	18	15
Golani	31	26
Paratroopers	21	18
Nachal	20	17
Regional battalions (today—"Kfir")	30	25
Armor	25	13
Artillery	21	11
Combat engineering	12	6
Special/independent units	8	4

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. See Anshel Pfeffer, "Reserve Officer Convicted for Hitting Palestinian," *Ha'aretz*, December 14, 2009, and Yaakov Katz, "IDF Commander Reprimanded for Comments during Testimony," *Jerusalem Post*, May 19, 2009. For details regarding the testimonies of the battalion and brigade commanders see "Petition to Open a Criminal Investigation against Brigade Colonel Itay Virob and Lieutenant Colonel Shimon Harush," Yesh Din, June 24, 2009, https://www.yesh-din.org/en/petition-to-open-a-criminal-investigation-against-brigade-colonel-itay-virob-and-lieutenant-colonel-shimon-harush-hcj-528209-yesh-din-volunteers-for-human-rights-v-chief-of-staff-lieutenant-general/.

2. See Thomas Ricks, "Commander Punished as Army Probes Detainee Treatment," *Washington Post*, April 5, 2004, and Dexter Filkins, "The Fall of the Warrior King," *New York Times*, October 23, 2005. The recollection of these events by the brigade commander, Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman, can be found in his 2008 memoir, *Warrior King: The Triumph and Betrayal of an American Commander in Iraq*.

3. See, for example, Kalyvas 2006; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Downes 2008; Stanton 2016; Weinstein 2007; and Wood 2006b, 2009, 2012. I discuss this literature at greater length in chapter 1.

4. This research has identified several factors that make it likely that people will hurt others regardless of whether they are predisposed to do so. For example, social psychologists have explored the power of social pressures to comply or conform through such mechanisms as obedience to authority (Milgram 1965, 1974) and group and role identification (Haney and Zimbardo 1998; Zimbardo 1973). Other work highlights the cognitive process of moral disengagement (Bandura 1990, 1999, 2002), which allows individuals to gradually suspend moral judgment as they engage in increasingly violent behavior.

5. See discussion in Sagi Or, "Intifada's 5th Year Saw Lowest Death Toll," *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2005, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4876307. See also data collected by the Israeli NGO B'tselem, on which many journalistic estimates are based, https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event.

6. The term "Occupied Palestinian Territories" (OPT) refers to the territories of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, which Israel occupied in 1967. Shortly thereafter Israel annexed East Jerusalem in a move not recognized by the international community. The majority of its Palestinian residents present at the time were given permanent resident status; the West Bank and Gaza were administered by the IDF. In 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew its forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control access to the strip by land (together with Egypt), sea, and air.

7. There is a large literature on control in organizations. See, for example, Flamholtz, Das, and Tsui 1985; Kunda 2006; Ouchi 1979; and Meyer and Scott 1992. For a recent overview, see Sitkin, Cardinal, and Bijlsma-Frankema 2010.

8. This definition draws on the one provided in Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long 2010, 56–57.

9. In the organizational literature, social organizational control (Eisenhardt 1985) has also been called "normative control" (Etzioni 1961), "clan control" (Ouchi 1979, 1980), and, most recently, "informal control" (Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long 2010).

10. Interview, January 2010.

11. Of course, strategies can fail or backfire, but this is an unintended consequence rather than a goal.

12. My use of the term "strategic" thus differs from its use in military theory, which distinguishes between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

13. Following Moghadam, Berger, and Beliakova 2014, I use the term "insurgency" to refer to a struggle between a nonstate group and a government that seeks control over territory through political and military means, using a wide range of tactics.

14. The doctrine was published first as the *Army Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5* and later released by the University of Chicago Press. I discuss U.S. counterinsurgency in more detail in chapter 7.

15. See Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Downes 2008; and Kalyvas 2006.

16. See, for example, Lyall and Wilson 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; and Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012.

17. Important book-length exceptions in political science include Ron 2003 on Israel, and Pearlman 2011 and Zeira 2019 on Palestine.

18. A partial list includes Bregman 2014; Gazit 2003; Gordon 2008; Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 2009; Azoulay and Ophir 2012; Hajjar 2005; Yiftachel 2006; Zureik, Lyon, and Abu-Laban 2010; Gorenberg 2006; Khalidi 2006; and Zertal and Eldar 2007.

19. On the Palestinian national movement in the Second Intifada, see Pearlman 2011 and Parsons 2005. On suicide bombings in the Second Intifada see, for example, Araj 2008; Bloom 2004; Brym and Araj 2006; Hafez 2006; Merari 2010; and Moghadam 2003.

1. PARTICIPATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. Interview, June 2009.

2. Debates about the consequences of primary group bonds are part of a large literature on the nature of cohesion and its determinants. For a contemporary treatment see King 2015.

3. Important exceptions include Collins's (2009) study of violence, which, though analyzing violence in general, is inspired by studies of combat, and Grossman's (2009) influential study of killing in the military. Both of these works argue that humans have a deep innate resistance to violence, making participation the exception rather than the rule. Grossman, who focuses on killing, argues that this resistance can only be overcome through extensive psychological conditioning. My research, too, points to the important role played by training in producing and restraining military violence. However, I argue that the effects of training, powerful as they are, begin to erode during deployment unless adequately reinforced by small-unit commanders. More generally, I am concerned with participation in violence more broadly, encompassing nonlethal forms of violence, as well as violence not authorized or endorsed by the military. Killing represents only a limited part of violence in counterinsurgency, and the specific conditioning techniques discussed by Grossman as a means of enabling killing (such as using realistic targets in training) cannot be readily extended to other forms of violence.

4. This is perhaps because of the field's traditional links to the military itself (Kurtz 1992; West and Matthewman 2016) and its tendency to focus on outcomes such as military effectiveness or civil-military relations.

5. Thus, while there is a wealth of research on topics such as diversity and stratification in the armed forces, civil–military relations, militarism, and the role of religion, there are only a handful of studies analyzing patterns of violence or determinants of the use of force at the micro-level. For exceptions, see Bar and Ben-Ari 2005; Ben-Ari et al. 2010; and Levy 2008.

6. This is particularly true in irregular conflict, where counterinsurgents "have incentives to catch the fish by 'draining the sea'" (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2014, 94). More generally, scholars have identified a variety of circumstances in which violence against

civilians can be strategic. For instance, violence can be used to generate compliance from a resistant population, to obtain information and collaboration (Kalyvas 2006), to change the political status quo (Balcells 2010), to signal the determination to continue fighting in the face of deteriorating prospects so as to improve bargaining leverage (Hultman 2007), to counter rising threat levels (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) and perceptions of threat (Straus 2006), or to reduce losses and bring about victory in prolonged wars of attrition (Downes 2006). In the Israeli-Palestinian context the instrumentalist approach was most explicitly laid out by Mitchell (2004, 57–95), who argues that Israel employs violence instrumentally to protect its power and security. Stanton (2016) argues that elites also strategically adopt restraint, when the international and domestic costs of civilian victimization are too high.

7. Kalyvas excludes violence aimed at exterminating a group from the analysis. Although he does not present an instrumentalist argument, Ron (2003) also focuses on elites by attributing state violence to the constraints that states face in exercising power. States are more restrained, he argues, in areas where their grip is strong, because they are subject to institutional constraints limiting repression that do not hinder their behavior in zones of weak control.

8. See Ben Kaspit, "New Year 2002—The Intifada Marks Two Years" [in Hebrew], *Maariv*, May 9, 2002. Raviv Drucker, one of Israel's most prominent investigative journalists, recalled interviewing a brigade commander in the Second Intifada who claimed he independently initiated a complete blockade of Palestinian villages under his control without notifying his superiors, despite knowing that his actions were opposed to the strategy of political leaders at the time. See Raviv Drucker, "Ardan, Talk to Segalovich" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz* August 30, 2015, and Drucker and Shelach 2005. For an example from a different context of how distinct ideologies within a military led to different levels of repression, regardless of government strategy, see Scharpf 2018.

9. See summary of the Spiegel Commission's recommendations published online by NRG- *Maariv* [in Hebrew], August 24, 2004, https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART/772/991.html (accessed October 13, 2016).

10. See especially the work of Elisabeth Wood 2006b, 2009, 2012 on sexual violence and of Jeremy Weinstein 2007 on rebellion. Many scholars working in this approach have analyzed the divergence in preferences between armed group elites and ordinary fighters using a principal-agent framework; see, for example, Gates 2002; Mitchell 2004; and Weinstein 2007.

11. For a sophisticated articulation of this argument see Hoover Green 2016.

12. An exception is Hoover Green (2018) who examines institutions in the Armed Forces of El Salvador during the civil war.

13. Even when strategic goals call for extensive violence, this is no easy task. The Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG), for example, a paramilitary unit that fought in Bosnia and Croatia during the Yugoslav Wars, ordered expansive violence and ethnic cleansing, but imposed strict, military-style discipline on its members to ensure that violence served the interests of the group and its leader Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. Looting, for instance, was regularly conducted but was tightly organized to ensure that the organization and its leaders were the primary beneficiaries. Looting for personal profit was a punishable offense (Milicevic 2004; Schlichte 2010). Here, then, tight discipline served to enable extensive organized violence, as further discussed in chapter 7.

14. Indeed, none of the cross-national datasets that code violent events in conflict distinguish between strategic and opportunistic violence, despite being used to test theories that make implicit assumptions about whether violence is in fact strategic or not.

15. For the sake of analytic clarity I posit a simple dichotomy between managers and subordinates or, in the military context, between military leaders and ordinary soldiers.

Of course, in reality, organizations harbor a much wider variety of potentially conflicting interests, such as shareholders, directors, managers, and employees, whereas military interests may diverge among senior generals, political elites, various military branches, and soldiers and commanders of varying ranks.

16. Similar contexts of organized, legitimized violence exist in other institutions of state violence, such as the police and to some extent the prison system. Other violent organizations, such as rebel groups, paramilitaries, or even criminal organizations or gangs, may also reach high levels of organization, but they lack the dimension of legitimacy that profoundly shapes individual participation in organizations of state violence. They may try to make up for this deficiency in other ways, such as by propagating a particular ideology or asserting their exclusion from the identity of the state.

17. In contrast to many arguments about participation in rebellion, I do not highlight the issue of recruitment. This is because modern Western militaries typically recruit by conscription, material benefits, or a combination of the two, and they do not face the barriers that rebel groups face in attracting participants. Substantively, regardless of the method of recruitment, militaries ultimately have to mold a diverse set of individuals into a cohesive force.

18. On formal organizational controls and its limitations see Weibel 2010; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; and Kramer 1999.

19. This has been known a long time. Stouffer and colleagues' seminal study of U.S. combat soldiers in World War II finds that although coercive authority matters, relationships on the frontlines are much less formal and more democratic. Commanders who command loyalty and respect through leadership and personal example are associated with higher combat motivation among soldiers (Stouffer et al. 1949, 2:112–30). Janowitz (1960) views the shift from authoritarian domination to "greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus" as one of the key shifts in the military profession in Western industrial nations in the course of the twentieth century.

20. For reviews of situational factors that promote aggression, many of which are present in the context of violent conflict, see Anderson and Bushman 2002 and Fiske, Harris and Cuddy 2004.

21. My typology thus differs from Wood (2018), who would classify such behavior as a "practice"; see chapter 5 for further discussion.

22. Of course, a wholesale rejection of military orders that reflects a lack of faith in the military leadership's ability to advance strategic goals is possible, as evidenced by historical cases of mutiny, but these cases are relatively rare in modern Western militaries.

23. I build here on Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood's (2017) conceptualization of armed group violence as consisting of its repertoire of forms, the nature of its targets, its frequency, and its technique.

24. On the indirect, long-term impact of armed conflict on civilians see, for example, Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, 2004; Hoddie and Smith 2009; Iqbal 2006; and Li and Wen 2005.

25. Important exceptions to this rule are the emerging literatures on wartime displacement (Braithwaite, Salehyan, and Savun 2019; Steele 2017) and on sexual violence in war; see, for example, Cohen 2016; Wood 2006b, 2009, 2012; Leiby 2009; and Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell 2007.

26. On the problems with quantitative battle deaths data see for example Gohdes and Price (2013), Weidmann (2015).

27. See Araj 2008; Brym and Araj 2006, 2012; and Haushofer, Biletzki, and Kanwisher 2010. These finding are supported in a recent study by Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2015), who found that indiscriminate Israeli house demolitions were followed by a significant increase in suicide attacks.

28. This ratio is puzzling given the vast asymmetries of power between the parties and even more puzzling in light of Israel's history of counterinsurgency operations. During the First Intifada, a largely unarmed campaign that began in December 1987 and lasted four years, the civilian casualty ratio was approximately 1:14. Yet even this ratio is relatively modest when compared with the counterinsurgency campaign Israel waged against Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, killing thousands of civilians between 1973–82 and an additional 12,000–15,000 civilians in the summer of 1982 alone (Ron 2003)—a civilian casualty ratio approximating 1:50. Israel's offensives in the Gaza Strip in 2009 and 2014 underscore the point even more clearly. In two operations lasting several weeks each, Israeli air and artillery attacks resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties, with less than ten Israeli civilians killed in the same period. The civilian casualty ratio during the Second Intifada is also particularly puzzling in view of the much heavier damage that the insurgency wreaked on Israel than any of the campaigns mentioned previously.

29. The counterinsurgency strategies that Israel and the United States employed in the Occupied Territories during the Second Initfada and in the Iraq War were also notably more restrained than the strategies employed by other militaries, such as Russia against Chechen rebels or Sri Lanka against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Each of these ruthless campaigns of civilian victimization included indiscriminate shelling and bombardment that led to the death of tens of thousands of civilians.

30. Note that this is a normative decision, not an empirical one, because there is considerable variation in the targeting of combatants across and within conflicts.

31. Naturally, the scope of all of these injunctions is vigorously debated. But contested interpretations notwithstanding, they demonstrate that the principle of distinction is subject to a number of caveats.

32. See, for example, Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, 1977. This provision is largely considered to be part of customary international law, and therefore universally binding even on nonparties to the protocol.

33. Responding to these debates, the International Committee of the Red Cross published in 2009 its "Interpretive Guidance" on the meaning of "direct participation in hostilities," expanding the notion of combatants in intrastate conflict to include not only soldiers in the state's armed forces but also members of organized armed groups "whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities." Those members who do not fulfill a "continuous combat function" are to be treated as civilians and are only legitimate targets for such time as they are taking direct part in hostilities. This definition has engendered much controversy: critics note that it is biased in favor of armed groups, because their members must perform a continuous combat function in order to be considered combatants, whereas soldiers of state militaries are legitimate targets by virtue of their membership with no combat role required. See discussion in Boothby 2009; Melzer 2009; Schmitt 2009; and Watkin 2009.

34. One exception to this rule is the Israeli organization, Breaking the Silence (BTS), founded in 2004 with the express purpose of collecting testimonies from soldiers who served in the OPT. Since then it has collected more than a thousand such testimonies, documenting the violence that results from fighting conducted in the midst of a civilian population, as well as the routine harm inflicted in the course of military occupation (Breaking the Silence 2012). But though BTS testimonies provide a unique source of data on the production of military violence, soldiers who choose to testify are a self-selecting group who largely oppose Israeli military policies, and therefore do not reflect the soldier population as a whole.

35. The most systematic attempt to assemble such data was made by the Israeli NGO Yesh Din, in an effort to monitor internal military investigations of combatant misconduct. The IDF initially stated that it did not collect data on the unit of the alleged perpetrators.

After an appeal of the decision through the Israeli Freedom of Information Act, the IDF collected and published information regarding military investigations per unit for the years 2006–7. Although this information is valuable and is not available elsewhere, it is quite limited, because most cases are never reported let alone investigated, and even the data for 2006–7 are very incomplete: the perpetrator's unit is unknown in 22% of the cases in 2006 and 45% in 2007 (Yesh Din 2008). Moreover, although the report has statistics on the number of investigations initiated, it includes no contextual data on the mechanisms that led to varying levels of violence among different units.

36. I include under this label a small number of officers who were conscripted before the Second Intifada began, but remained in service in the standing army as career officers. I exclude combatants who served in the Second Intifada solely as reservists, because such service is limited to a few weeks a year, at most.

37. Despite my focus on regular soldiers, I elected to interview reservists in this case because the vast majority of Second Intifada refuseniks refused to serve during their reserve duty.

38. Statistics on Facebook penetration were retrieved in 2010 from the website, https://www.socialbakers.com. See also Ayala Tsoref, "Israel Ranks 12th in Percentage of Population Using Facebook," *Ha'aretz*, July 7, 2010.

2. NARRATING CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

1. For examples of interviewing, see Cohen 2016; Fujii 2009; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Straus 2006; and Weinstein 2007. For studies of archives and institutional bodies, see Kalyvas 2006; Leiby 2009; and Payne 2008.

2. On these challenges more generally, see Wood 2006a.

3. See also Fujii 2010 for a general discussion of veracity issues in testimonies of war and violence.

4. For an elaboration and typology of the concept see Ashforth and Kreiner 1999 and Kreiner, Ashforth, and Sluss 2006. For a theoretical investigation of the politics of the division of labor between society and its dirty workers—in this case those who slaughter meat for its consumption—see Pachirat 2011.

5. See also Fujii 2010, who argues that the stories that are not articulated in interviews, including such "meta-data" as denial, evasion, and silence, provide vital information about the experience of violence and its aftermath.

6. It is noteworthy that the survey responses nevertheless yielded higher reporting of violence than alternative sources of data (see chapter 6 for further discussion).

7. The term is not unique to the IDF. "Presence patrols" have been used elsewhere, such as in Northern Ireland by the U.K. Army or in Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. Army. In those cases, too, the term is somewhat vague, denoting a variety of actions involving military presence that are designed to be visible; see chapter 5 for further discussion.

8. For an insightful exploration of the role of language in studying state violence, see Cohn's (1987) discussion of nuclear defense strategists.

9. The report can be found at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf.

10. In a nationally representative survey, 93.5% of Jewish Israeli respondents responded that the Goldstone Report was biased against the IDF; 79% opposed the claim that the IDF committed war crimes (Yaar and Hermann 2009).

11. Until recently this particular aspect of violence work was rarely studied by mental health professionals, whose research on the harmful effects of combat exposure had focused primarily on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). To address this gap, mental health researchers developed a new construct, termed "moral injury," referring to the harm caused by transgressing moral or ethical beliefs or norms (Litz et al. 2009).

12. In his study of the Argentine military dictatorship, Robben (1996, 72) calls the pull of emotion "ethnographic seduction," which he defines as the "complex dynamic of conscious moves and unconscious defenses that may arise in interviews with victims and perpetrators of violence." He recalls his surprise, on meeting his military informants, at their polite, friendly manner and their love of literature, art, and music. He initially found himself pulled away from his research objectives by his informants' charm. As analysts of violence are time and again surprised to discover, people who have committed acts of violence are frequently friendly, sensitive, reflective, and in short, "ordinary people."

13. For a similar point see Fujii 2010; Parkinson 2013; and Shesterinina 2016.

3. IDF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE SECOND INTIFADA

1. The Oslo process culminated in the Camp David Peace Summit in July 2000, in which the parties failed to reach agreement on a final-status settlement. Analysis of the peace process and its eventual failure is voluminous; see, for example, Quandt 2005; Ross 2004; Slater 2001; Rothstein, Ma'oz, and Shikaki 2004; and Barak 2005.

2. The internationally recognized boundaries between the OPT and Israel run along the 1949 Armistice Lines or the "Green Line." In Gaza, the border was fenced by an elaborate barrier system in the mid-1990s. In the West Bank no physical separation existed until the construction of the separation barrier beginning in 2003, as discussed later in this chapter.

3. The incident sparked a years-long controversy regarding who was responsible for the shooting; see James Fallow, "Who Shot Mohammed al-Dura?" *The Atlantic*, June 2003, and Michael Schwartz and Elise Labott, "New Controversy over Video of Gaza Boy's Death 13 Years Ago," *CNN*, May 21, 2013.

4. Shmuel Zakai, who at the outbreak of the Second Intifada was the commander of the Golani infantry brigade, observed, "The feeling was that the political echelon was disconnected from what's happening in the field, and the tactical ranks were independent to do whatever they wanted. I say that as a [former] brigade commander. I had the independence to do almost everything that I thought was right" (qtd. in Eldar 2005, 267). See also Ben Ami 2004; Drucker and Shelach 2005; and Ben Kaspit, "Rosh Hashana 2002—Two Years of Intifada" [in Hebrew], NRG-*Maariv*, September 5, 2002.

5. Reuven Pedatzur, "A Thesis in Retrospect" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, October 28, 2011, www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/1.1533202.

6. The major participating groups were the Tanzim, the military wing of Fatah; the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, formed by Fatah members; the Hamas Islamist movement; Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

7. The First Intifada had erupted more than a decade earlier in 1987, was largely unarmed, and was characterized by mass protests, riots, civil disobedience, and grassroots activity rather than by insurgent warfare.

8. I use the term "insurgency" to refer to a struggle over territory between a state and a nonstate group using a wide range of tactics. I use "terrorism" to refer to a particular tactic in the repertoire of insurgency, whose defining feature is the politically motivated targeting of civilians.

9. According to official Israeli figures, a total of 144 suicide attacks were carried out in the Second Intifada's five years, killing 515 Israelis and wounding 3,428. See General Security Services (GSS), "A Summary of 5 Years of Conflict—Data and Trends in Palestinian Terror" [in Hebrew], December 31, 2005, https://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/תורי%20קס%20סרפו%20מי/sikum%205%20years.pdf (accessed April 6, 2017). Analyses of Palestinian suicide bombing are extensive; see, for example, Araj 2008; Bloom 2004; Brym and Araj 2006, 2012; and Moghadam 2003.

10. Israeli security officials reported more than 550 rocket launch incidents in the Intifada's five years and 1,566 mortar launches in its last two, see GSS, "A Summary of 5 Years of Conflict."

11. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, "Five years of Violent Confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians: Data and Characteristics," October 2, 2005, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF1/16_eng_1974232856.pdf.

12. In September 2005, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* published a figure of 3,333 deaths, noting that the Palestinian Authority reported 3,861 deaths. The gap is a result of debates over whether to include suicide bombers, Palestinians who were killed while in the midst of a failed attack, foreign citizens, and Palestinian-Israeli citizens in the data. See Sagi Or, "1,033 and 3,333 Palestinians Killed since the Outbreak of Conflict" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2005. Data on the combatant status of the victims is contested, with debates hinging on the meaning of "participation in hostilities." In September 2006, B'tselem reported that, of the 3,733 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in six years, at least 1,812 (49%) had not been taking part in hostilities when they were killed. See the B'tselem press release, "Six Years of Intifada," September 28, 2006, http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20060928.

13. Data from B'tselem, see https://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics. This rate is more than double the rate of growth within the Green Line. According to B'tselem, Jewish settlements and outposts control approximately 63% of the land in Area C, constituting more than 36% of the land area in the West Bank.

14. On the separation policy see, for example, Gisha 2015. On the change in the nature of Israeli violence in Gaza since the IDF's withdrawal of troops see Levy 2017.

15. This brief account does not do justice to the full range of events that characterized the five-year conflict. A detailed chronology of the Intifada is beyond the scope of this chapter, but see Cordesman and Moravitz 2005; Harel and Issacharoff 2004; and Drucker and Shelach 2005.

16. See, for example, Catignani 2008; Byman 2011; Kober 2009; and Petrelli 2013. For critical analysis by investigative journalists, see Drucker and Shelach 2005 and Harel and Issacharoff 2004. Additionally, research has examined some of the tactics used by the IDF in this period, chief among them its targeted killings policy, noted later in this chapter.

17. See for example David Kilcullen, "Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, blog post, January 27, 2007.

18. On this point, see also Inbar and Shamir 2014, Petrelli 2013, and Shamir 2011.

19. Adamsky observes that Israel's concept of deterrence differs from its typical usage in international relations (IR). Whereas in the IR literature deterrence relies on the *threat* of force, and its actual *use* indicates deterrence failure, in the Israeli understanding, the use of brute force is "not a symptom of deterrence failure but an integral component" of strategy (2017, 162).

20. Bar-Joseph 1998. For a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of this strategy see Maoz 2006, 2007. On its application in the Second Intifada see Almog 2004.

21. These discussions were influenced by debates around the concept of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), then gaining prominence in the U.S. security establishment, with its emphasis on precision air strikes, information technologies, "network centric warfare," and effects-based operations (EBO) (Adamsky 2010). For a critical assessment in the U.S. context see McMaster 2008. On the evolution of Israeli security doctrine in the face of nonstate challenges beginning in the 1990s see Adamsky 2017.

22. An explicit articulation of the population-centric approach can be found in the U.S. 2006 *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM-324), which subsequently became the cornerstone of its policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The manual states that "the primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate

government" (Section 1–113), calling for a mix of military and nonmilitary means to provide security, rule of law, and ultimately, legitimate authority in violence-torn areas. As one of the architects of U.S. COIN policy, General David Petraeus, wrote in a letter containing guidance for soldiers in Afghanistan, "Earn the people's trust, talk to them, ask them questions, and learn about their lives. Inquire about social dynamics, frictions, local histories, and grievances. Hear what they say. . . . Spend time, listen, consult, and drink lots of tea" (Petraeus 2010). This strategy has been vigorously debated within U.S. policy circles, with some arguing that soldiers are not trained to be "armed social workers" nor should they be (Bacevich 2008).

23. IDF conceptualization of civilians on the battlefield in this period drew heavily from the work of the IDF's Training and Doctrine Division, which published a manual on "limited conflict" in 2002 (parts of which were later published by Israel's Ministry of Defense as an edited volume; see Golan and Shay 2004), as well as that of a group of IDF generals who, in 1998, established the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) as an in-house think tank for research and training of senior military officers. Members of OTRI met regularly with officers in the Central Command responsible for the control and administration of the West Bank. OTRI's influence expanded considerably with the appointment of Moshe Ya'alon first as deputy and later as IDF General Chief of Staff. Its work conceptualized limited conflict as a battle of wills waged between two societies and emphasized the importance of targeting the rival society's endurance and commitment to the cause through military, psychological, and economic means; see Hecht 2004 and Nir 2004. On the rise and fall of OTRI and its role in the Second Intifada, see Adamsky 2010; Weizman 2007; Petrelli 2013; Kober 2015; and the 2008 Winograd Commission Final Report (Winograd et al. 2008).

24. From a lecture delivered at the 2003 Herzeliya Conference, full text available [in Hebrew, my translation], http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/1030gioraisland.pdf (accessed July 8, 2015).

25. More generally, it has come under harsh criticism for essentially reincarnating colonial policies, leading in the long run to fragmentation and violence rather than any semblance of control, and for betraying its own purported policies by waging what were, according to critics, essentially campaigns of terror (Khalili 2012; Porch 2013).

26. See, for example, the response of the Israeli Ministry of Justice in B'tselem (2007, 105–18), which notes that "the operation of road barriers has, in recent years, thwarted dozens—perhaps hundreds, of sabotage attacks aimed at Israeli targets" (109).

27. Data from Brym, Araj, and Maoz-Shai 2005–2007.

28. Though these arrangements were designed as a five-year transitional phase to culminate in a final agreement, they persist to this day.

29. According to the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau, there were approximately 184,000 Jewish settlers living in the West Bank on the eve of the Second Intifada. The number of Palestinians residing in the West Bank at the time was estimated at more than 1,900,000. See Nir Hasson, "How Many Palestinians Actually Live in the West Bank?" *Ha'aretz,* June 30, 2013. About one million Palestinians lived in Gaza in 1999, along with approximately 6,000 Israeli settlers.

30. For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between territorial control and the targeting of violence, see Kalyvas 2006 and Ron 2003.

31. Although razing, leveling, and clearing territory were routinely done as part of defensive operations in Gaza, they also took place during offensive operations when deemed necessary by commanding officers. For instance, extensive razing was conducted during Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank, particularly in the refugee camp of Jenin, and in special operations in the Gaza Strip. See, for example, Shachar Fisher, "Miflatzot Hatehila" [Glory monsters; in Hebrew], *Bamachane,* 2005; B'tselem 2002a; and Human

Rights Watch 2004. Demolitions were also used as punitive measures against militants (or, in the case of suicide bombers, against their families)—these operations are discussed later in the chapter.

32. According to B'tselem, in 2004 alone, the IDF demolished more than 1,300 buildings in Gaza, displacing more than 10,000 people, see http://www.btselem.org/english/Razing/Statistics.asp.

33. See, for example, http://www.btselem.org/razing (accessed February 14, 2017).

34. Quoted in Guy Zakham, "Sedaka under Fire" [in Hebrew], *Bamachane*, December 28, 2001. Another former senior IDF officer stated in an interview, "In Gaza, Israel destroyed over 60% of agricultural land. I don't know the statistics today, but let's say that as of 2005, over 60% of the agricultural land [had been demolished]. The agricultural areas did not create terrorist attacks. [The policy] was intended, no one will tell you this, but it was intended to exert pressure on the population so that it would pressure terror to stop" (Brym, Araj, and Maoz-Shai 2005–2007).

35. See Harel and Issacharoff 2004, 58; Amos Harel, "IDF Eases Rules of Engagement," *Ha'aretz*, August 7, 2001, and "IDF Says New Rules of Engagement are for Self Defense," *Ha'aretz*, August 8, 2001.

36. See First Statement of the Government of Israel, presented to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee in December 2000, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2000/Pages/Sharm%20el-Sheikh%20Fact-Finding%20Committee%20-%20First%20Sta.aspx (accessed November 30, 2016).

37. An internal IDF report from 2005, reported in the Israeli press, found that many soldiers were confused about the rules of engagement, which were often unclear and open to interpretation; see Chanan Greenberg, "IDF Report: Soldiers Don't Understand the Open Fire Regulations" [in Hebrew]," *Ynet*, April 4, 2006. See also B'tselem 2002b.

38. According to *Ha'aretz,* some of the controversial new regulations implemented in the Gaza Strip included authorization to shoot armed Palestinians without warning in buffer zones, authorization to fire without warning at Palestinians who approached the barrier fence or other predefined areas in the strip, and authorization to fire from a semiautomatic rimfire rifle at rock throwers in situations defined as life threatening; see Amos Harel, "Debate in the IDF regarding Relaxing of the Open Fire Directives," *Ha'aretz*, 20 March, 2001.

39. See B'tselem, "No-Go Zones Near Gaza Strip Perimeter Fence," January 1, 2011.

40. In 2007 the Israeli High Court was asked to determine whether rules of engagement in the security buffer zones were legal, following a case in which soldiers shot and killed a 13-year-old girl who had approached a military outpost on the outskirts of Rafah, near the Egyptian border. The petitioners argued that the security buffer zones in the Gaza Strip were in fact "death zones" in which soldiers were authorized to fire at anyone who entered. The court analyzed the open-fire regulations for the zone (which were not made public) and found that, although the regulations called for soldiers to exercise discretion and restraint and stipulated that mere presence in the security zone did not in itself indicate a security risk, in practice soldiers believed that in some circumstances they were authorized to shoot to kill. The court also noted that no physical barrier or signposts marked the perimeter of the security buffer zone. See HCJ 741/05, *El-Hams et al vs. the IDF Military Advocate General*, December 14, 2006.

41. For similar reports, see Drucker and Shelach 2005, 32.

42. For analysis of selective and indiscriminate targeting patterns in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1987, see Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi 2011.

43. See https://www.btselem.org/hebrew/separation_barrier, and United Nations OCHA report, "The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier," July 2013. Construction of the barrier has

largely halted in recent years due to the sharp decline in violent attacks from the West Bank, a resulting drop in public interest, financial constraints, and international pressure.

44. On the permit regime in the seam zone see Bimkom and B'tselem 2005; OCHA 2011; and Center for Defence of the Individual 2013.

45. The number of civilians killed in these operations has declined over time. In 2003 the ratio of insurgents to civilians killed in targeted killings was 1:1, but by the end of 2005, it had been reduced to 1:28; see Amos Harel, "Killings in Gaza Becoming More Targeted, and Less Civilians Are Getting Killed" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, December 12, 2007.

46. For empirical analysis see, for example, Byman 2006; Gazit and Brym 2011; Hafez and Hatfield 2006; and Jaeger and Paserman 2009. For normative analysis see, for example, Ben-Naftali and Michaeli 2003; Cassese 2007; and Kretzmer 2005.

47. See Weizman 2007. Heavy damage to buildings and infrastructure was also caused by the mere fact that tanks and other heavy armored vehicles rolled through cramped urban alleyways. For an ethnographic perspective on the experience in Nabus of the operation and its aftermath, see Bleibleh 2015.

48. The vast damage to the Jenin Refugee Camp initially led to a whirl of rumors and accusations that the IDF had conducted a massacre in the camp. Palestinians reported between 500 to 3,000 civilians dead and demanded international intervention. A UN Commission appointed to investigate the battle in Jenin found that no massacre had occurred and reported only fifty-two Palestinian victims, up to half of whom may have been civilians. Human Rights Watch (2002b) confirmed these figures, finding that at least twenty-two were civilians. The IDF reported it had found forty-six bodies, the majority of which had been armed.

49. B'tselem 2002e; Human Rights Watch 2002b. After Operation Defensive Shield several human rights organizations filed a petition with the Israeli High Court against the use of civilians in military operations, which ultimately led to the outlawing of any use of civilians during fighting; see chapter 5 for further discussion.

50. Data from B'tselem. According to the data, 21% of the casualties were engaged in hostilities while targeted, 39% were civilians, and the status of the remaining 40% is unknown.

51. For data tracking number of settlers over time, see http://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics.

52. According to official Israeli data, between 2001 and Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, 12 Israeli civilians were killed and nearly 400 wounded by rocket or mortar attacks; see Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2007.

53. According to B'tselem, 50 of the 116 Palestinian casualties were civilians. See B'Tselem press release, "Disproportionate Force Suspected in Northern Gaza Strip," October 18, 2004, http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20041018.

54. See Ronen Bergman, "Code Name: Straw Widow" [In Hebrew], *Yedioth Ahronoth*, April 26, 2004, and Amir Bohbot, "Don't Eviscerate the IDF" [in Hebrew], NRG-*Maariv*, July 7, 2006.

55. Bergman, "Code Name: Straw Widow."

56. Such house demolitions were not a new tactic and were employed by the IDF long before the Second Intifada; see B'Tselem 2004b. Until the 1980s, they were referred to as punitive by Israeli officials, but they were later termed "deterrent demolitions" to avoid accusations of collective punishment, forbidden under the Geneva Accords; see Cohen and Mimran 2015, 13.

57. See www.btselem.org/punitive_demolitions/statistics.

58. See Amos Harel, "IDF Panel Recommends Ending Punitive House Demolitions for Terrorists' Families," *Ha'aretz*, February 17, 2005. Punitive demolitions resumed in 2014. See http://www.btselem.org/punitive_demolitions/statistics.

59. A number of authors have noted the shift in the model of Israeli control of the OPT beginning in the 1990s, from one based on an "enlightened occupation" administering the lives of residents to one that views the entire population as potential security threats (Berda 2017; Gordon 2008; Weizman 2007).

60. Although difficult to quantify, the economic impact of this policy has been estimated at billions of dollars, primarily because of lost income from the reduction in work permits issued to Palestinian workers in Israel; see Akkaya et al. 2008 for an analysis.

61. During the Second Intifada, the GSS classified more than 200,000 Palestinians as "denied entry for security", and the police classified an additional 60,000 Palestinians as "denied entry by police" (Berda 2017, 34). In the vast majority of cases, Palestinians do not know that they are blacklisted or why and discover it only on applying for an ID card or when stopped at a checkpoint (Berda 2017). According to the Israeli checkpoint-monitoring NGO Machsomwatch, those on lists of entry bans included suspected militants, those deemed likely to be involved in militant activity, family members of casualties from IDF fire who were considered likely to desire revenge, and Palestinians who had previously been caught for illegal presence in Israel (Machsomwatch 2004; Machsomwatch and Physicians for Human Rights 2004). Palestinians can petition to remove the denial in a process that can involve pressure to become an informant in exchange for a permit (Berda 2017).

62. The complex and inefficient permit system continued to expand over the years. As of 2011, some 100 different permits governed travel in the West Bank; see Chaim Levinson, "The Civil Administration Presents: 101 Types of Entry Permits for Palestinians" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, December 24, 2011.

63. With time, as internal and external criticism of the conditions at checkpoints mounted, many major checkpoints were expanded, fortified, and rebuilt, and more sophisticated surveillance methods were introduced to facilitate the monitoring and control of people and goods, including cameras, electronic, remote-control-operated turnstiles, and x-ray machines. In 2005, a "Crossings Administration" was established at Israel's Ministry of Defense to demilitarize the crossings. In the following years, a growing number of Green-Line checkpoints (renamed "terminals") were outsourced to private companies. The power of individual soldiers to determine civilians' fate was reduced dramatically as decisions were entrusted to a bureaucratic, opaque, and sanitized "system," operating from behind bullet-proof glass walls through a system of loudspeakers. See Meron Rappaport, "Outsourcing the Checkpoints," *Ha'aretz*, October 2, 2007; Hammami 2010; and Mansbach 2009.

64. As of August 2004, B'Tselem (2004b) documented thirty-nine cases in which Palestinian civilians died after not receiving timely medical care because they were detained at checkpoints.

65. The barrier, consisting of an electronic fence, observation posts, and patrol routes, was constructed in 1995. It joined the closure policy, implemented in Gaza since 1993, which barred Palestinian entry into Israel or the West Bank without an individual permit. Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada the number of permits to enter both Israel and the West Bank was cut by approximately 98%. In addition, Israel frequently imposed "comprehensive closure" on the Occupied Territories, forbidding all movement out of Gaza and revoking all permits. As a result the number of Gazan workers employed in Israel during the Second Intifada plummeted by around 96%. Together with strict limitations placed on the entry and exit of goods to and from Gaza, these restrictions on movement contributed to a sharp rise in unemployment and poverty during the Second Intifada. For more information. see B'Tselem and Center for the Defence of the Individual 2005.

66. In the initial months of the Intifada the Palestinian workforce in Israel declined from 146,000 to 43,000, a drop from 22% to 9% of the Palestinian workforce. These numbers rose

somewhat in 2001 to 15% of total Palestinian employment, stabilizing at around 10%, or approximately 65,000 employees, beginning in the final quarter of 2004 (Akkaya et al. 2008).

67. Colonel Gal Hirsch, quoted in Ben Kaspit, "New Year 2002: Two Years to the Intifada" [in Hebrew], NRG-*Maariv,* September 5, 2002.

68. Qaladia is located in the West Bank and as such is actually an internal checkpoint. However, the area separating Qalandia from Jerusalem was annexed to the municipality of Jerusalem, turning the checkpoint into a de facto border checkpoint.

69. During the Second Intifada tens of thousands of workers entered Israel illegally each year. The Israeli police's official policy was to warn first-time offenders and send them back and, on apprehending repeat offenders, to arrest, investigate, and charge them. However, enforcement of this policy was highly selective because of the difficulty of prosecuting such large numbers of workers. As a result, members of the police, border police, and army developed repertoires of entrepreneurial and opportunistic violence to deter Palestinians from repeated illegal entry. Apprehended workers were often victims of beatings, abuse, theft, humiliation, prolonged detentions, indiscriminate fire, and other forms of violence (B'tselem 2007).

70. For data and analysis of the effects of the internal closure policy see for example B'Tselem 2001a, 2001c, 2007; B'Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights—Israel 2003; UNSCO 2001; and World Bank 2004.

71. During the Second Intifada there was an average of six hundred obstacles to movement in the West Bank (Hammami 2004). Since August 2005, barrier statistics have been collected and documented by the UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OCHA).

72. For more on West Bank road restrictions see B'Tselem 2004b, 2007.

73. Additional sources of civilian victimization, prevalent especially in areas close to certain hardline settlements, were violence and abuse by settlers. I do not discuss this violence here, because it is not an IDF counterinsurgency practice. However, the relationship between the settler movement and the IDF is an important component of maintaining the occupation more generally and one on which little academic work exists; see Minka 2011 and Gazit 2015 for exceptions. For reports by NGOs see B'tselem 2001b, 2001d; Yesh Din 2006.

74. Cited in Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, "Years of Rage," *Ha'aretz*, October 1, 2010,

75. The suggestion that Israel acted with restraint in the Second Intifada may strike some readers as surprising. Many analysts of Israeli counterinsurgency policies attribute ruthless, disproportionate methods to Israel. Gordon (2008, 206–7) for instance, writes that "with the eruption of the Second Intifada, Israel adopted a new approach toward the Palestinians which rendered them, in many respects, expendable. The fact that the average number of Palestinians killed each year during the Second Intifada has been more than the number of those killed during the first twenty years of occupation is extremely telling. . . . A politics of death slowly emerged." Yet the contrast between relatively small casualty ratios in the Second Intifada and Israel's earlier and later counterinsurgency operations suggests otherwise. Approximately 2,200 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces in less than two months during 2014's Gaza War. Moreover, in analyzing the change in Israeli policies Gordon ignores the vastly different levels of threat posed by the two intifadas. Approximately 1,000 Israelis were killed in the Second Intifada compared to around 160 in the first one.

76. In the wake of the First Intifada, Ron (2000) termed this logic "savage restraint." Since then, scholars have struggled with finding words to describe Israel's policies in the Second Intifada and beyond, capturing their relative restraint, on the one hand, and their comprehensive repression, on the other. Such policies have been called, for example, "enclavisation" and "spatial strangulation" (Falah 2005), "creeping apartheid" (Yiftachel 2005), "spaciocide" (Hanafi 2009), and "politicide" (Amir 2016).

4. THE PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC VIOLENCE

1. The level of Palestinian armed resistance that the IDF encountered in Operation Defensive Shield, especially in Nablus, which the IDF had always considered particularly dangerous, was generally low, with the exception of the city of Jenin, see chapter 3.

2. It is thus tangential to my argument that Israeli counterinsurgency strategy is sometimes described as dominated by tactical thinking, inconsistent, improvisatory, or impulsive (Adamsky 2017; Catignani 2012; Petrelli 2013).

3. Exemptions are also given to individuals on religious, physical, and psychological grounds. As of 2015 only some 50% of Israeli citizens enlisted. See Tomer Hadar, "Head of IDF personnel Directorate: A Quarter of the Boys and a Third of the Girls Evade the Draft" [in Hebrew], *Kalkalist*, February 8, 2015.

4. In 2015, men's mandatory service was reduced by four months.

5. On the development of Israel's military and its historical role in Israeli society see, for example, Gal 1986; Kimmerling 2005; Levy 2007; and Cohen 2008.

6. Members of this group are increasingly choosing to avoid combat service, instead turning to noncombat roles perceived as more useful for personal advancement in such fields as computers, media, or intelligence or, less commonly, dodging military service altogether. On the decline in motivation, see Levy 2007; Levy, Lomsky-Feder, and Harel 2007; and Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008.

7. Quoted in Janine Zacharia, "Israel Confronts Flagging Interest in Military Service," *Washington Post*, November 7, 2010.

8. The source of the term *ra'al* is not clear. Israeli slang expert Rubik Rosenthal has suggested that it initiated in the Hebrew initials for "fighting spirit." However, such initials would require a different spelling, whereas contemporary usage and spelling point to the literal meaning of poison.

9. Many would argue that military socialization in Israel begins as early as preschool (Gur Ziv 2005; Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008). Because my concern here is with organizational control and not socialization more generally, I restrict my focus to the social control processes spearheaded by the IDF.

10. See the program's website at the Ministry of Education, http://edu.gov.il/owlHeb/Tichon/PeilutoyHozBeitSifri/preparation-for-military/Pages/encouraging-youth-service.aspx [in Hebrew] (accessed July 6, 2017). For the most recent Ministry of Education directive on IDF preparation [in Hebrew], see http://apps.education.gov.il/Mankal/horaa.aspx?siduri=84#_Toc256000018 (accessed February 12, 2019).

11. Some of these videos are produced professionally within the IDF, and others are amateur clips created by soldiers. Many are publicly available and can be easily viewed on websites such as YouTube.

12. More broadly, there is a link between combat motivation and the escalation of conflict. For example, a publication on the Ministry of Education website regarding the August 2014 draft cohort (drafted during the Gaza War) notes that "enlisting during war raises morale." See http://edu.gov.il/owlHeb/Tichon/PeilutoyHozBeitSifri/preparation-for-military/Pages/Recruitment-August-Motivation-Purpose-and-recruitment-during-combat.aspx.

13. These statistics should be interpreted cautiously, because they rely on respondent memory, which may have been shaped by later experience. Moreover, my sample only included combat soldiers, so it is biased toward higher motivation. Some young men who attempted to evade combat doubtless succeeded in doing so. Nevertheless, it is of significance that the majority of respondents overwhelmingly recalled very high motivation for combat service during high school.

14. Though the IDF tries to propagate this notion as part of its "people's army" ethos, the military is in fact deeply stratified by ethnicity and class, not to mention gender (Sasson-Levy 2003).

15. Indeed, some inductees break under the stress and are transferred to noncombat units or out of the army altogether. A large share of the suicides in the IDF take place in the first six months of service. See Gili Cohen, "Mapping Suicides in the IDF: Most Are Soldiers at the Beginning of Service, 37% Are Immigrants" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz* August 12, 2013.

16. This, of course, is not a uniquely Israeli phenomenon, but is a prevalent theme in soldier narratives.

17. "Senior companies" is an unsatisfactory translation for the Hebrew term meaning "old-timer" companies, in which combatants serve for the greater part of their regular military service, having completed their training.

18. "Open terrain," as distinct from built or urban terrain, refers to combat on the conventional battlefield, without built space.

19. For debates regarding the compatibility of the warrior ethos with counterinsurgency operations, see Aylwin-Foster 2005 and Kiszely 2006.

20. Between 1985 and 2000, the IDF occupied a strip of territory several miles wide in Lebanon, which it declared a security zone protecting its northern settlements from rockets and mortar shells. The final years of the occupation saw mounting Israeli casualties and a growing popular movement to withdraw from Lebanon.

21. In September 2004 the IDF published a training kit titled "Ethics in Combat—Checkpoints," which discussed typical dilemmas that soldiers might encounter in administering civilians at checkpoints; see Chanan Greenberg, "New in the IDF: A 'Preparation Kit' for Checkpoints" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, September 7, 2004.

22. This is likely a function, at least to some extent, of the type of unit in question. Units whose primary mission was in the OPT received more training than did ordinary infantry units, who rotated deployment in the OPT with other zones.

23. They also reflect what Ben-Ari et al. (2010, 114) call "special forcification," in which regular units mimic special forces in their organizational forms, flexibility, and independence.

24. This question was only posed to approximately half of the sample.

25. The lack of guidance and training for checkpoint duty created a space for entrepreneurial and opportunistic violence, both of which flourished at checkpoints, as discussed in chapters 5–6.

26. For more on resistance and underproduction of military violence during the Second Intifada see Manekin 2017.

27. This distinction may be rooted in international law, which distinguishes between civilians who are involved in hostilities and those who are not, and allows targeting of the former for such time as they participate in hostilities, as described in chapter 1. Yet, while the legal definition is meant to expand civilian status, its local interpretation served to limit it.

28. Interview with former infantry combatant who served in Southern Lebanon on the practice of taking pictures of the bodies of terrorists after they were killed, Uri Blau, "Photo-Retsach" [in Hebrew], *Kol Ha-Ir*, October 5, 2001. Also quoted in the article is a former head of the IDF's behavioral sciences unit, Gadi Amir, who reflected on the difference between achievements in conventional and irregular war: "This is how a successful mission is expressed. In the past, success for infantrymen was measured in how much territory you captured. Today success is measured in how many terrorists are eliminated."

29. For others, it could lead to entrepreneurial and opportunistic violence, discussed in the next two chapters.

30. For discussion of discipline problems and opportunistic violence in the Kfir Brigade, see chapter 6.

31. A natural question that arises is *why* this was the case. It may be simply that organizations take time to adapt, as evidenced by the changes to training that were made over time. Alternatively, it could be that the IDF's offensive culture (discussed further in chapter 5) prevented adjustments to training or that there was resistance in the organization to changes that some may have perceived as compromising the combat abilities and readiness of soldiers. It could be that the shirking that existed did not substantially affect the success of these missions, which, if true, raises additional questions about their purported necessity. Finally, I have already noted the contradictions between a policy that targets civilians (albeit not lethally) and international humanitarian law, making it difficult to communicate a clear and lawful directive to the lower ranks (see chapter 5 for more on this point). Unfortunately, my data, collected at the junior level, do not allow for more than speculation on this issue.

32. See, for example, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006 and Weinstein 2007.

33. Cited in Chanan Greenberg, "The Major General Who Went to the Checkpoints: 'Not All the Soldiers Are Doctors'" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, January 27, 2004.

34. See "A Human Fabric of Life Should Be Enabled" [in Hebrew], NRG-*Maariv*, August 24, 2004.

35. For an official overview of the project, see Knesset Dept. for Information and Research, "Border Crossings to Israel from Gaza and the West Bank" (2006), http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m01532.pdf.

5. THE DYNAMICS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL VIOLENCE

1. Quoted in Roy Sharon, "A Blow Is Sometimes an Integral Part of the Mission" [in Hebrew], NRG-*Maariv*, May 15, 2009, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/890/990.html (accessed August 20, 2016).

2. Excerpts from the testimonies can be read in the petition submitted by Yesh Din, an Israeli NGO, to Israel's High Court, demanding that the IDF suspend the two officers and open a criminal investigation against them. See HCJ 5282/09 *Yesh Din—Volunteers for Human Rights et al. vs. Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi et al.*, June 24, 2009.The petition is available [in Hebrew] at https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/files.yesh-din.org/%D7%A2%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%95%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%91/petition+to+indict+colonel+virob.pdf (accessed February 1, 2019).

3. Two organizations, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and Yesh Din, even filed a petition to this effect in the Israeli High Court, which was withdrawn when the IDF promised an internal investigation of the officers following the conclusion of the trial; see *Yesh Din—Volunteers for Human Rights et al.*, June 24, 2009.

4. See the state's response to the petition filed by ACRI and Yesh Din, *Yesh Din—Volunteers for Human Rights et al.*, August 22, 2009.

5. Roy Sharon, "A Petition of Reserve Officers Supporting the Kfir Brigade Commander" [in Hebrew], NRG.com, June 16, 2009, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/904/497.html (accessed August 16, 2015).

6. Anshel Pffefer, "Major General Gadi Shamni Reprimanded Kfir Brigade Commander, Colonel Itay Virob, Who Justified Violence against Palestinians" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, May 20, 2009.

7. Chanan Greenberg, "After the Reprimand: Kfir Brigade Commander Amends to a Softer Version" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, June 18, 2009, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3733363,00.html.

8. Chanan Greenberg, "Abuse in Kfir: The Lieutenant Colonel who Changed his Account—A Hostile Witness" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, February 6, 2010, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3844752,00.html.

9. Accordingly, I would classify such violence as opportunistic, even if it is tolerated by superiors who are unable or unwilling to control it. Wood (2018), in contrast, distinguishes practice from opportunistic violence because it is often a consequence of social pressures and horizontal dynamics among units, rather than private individual reasons. I do not make this distinction in my definition of opportunistic violence.

10. During the First Intifada, Israel constructed the OPT as an arena of law enforcement (Ron 2000, 2003). The Second Intifada, in contrast, was declared an armed conflict from the outset. Restrictive regulations that had previously constrained Israeli soldiers in the OPT were suspended, and civilian deaths were no longer investigated; see chapter 3 for further discussion.

11. This is not to argue, of course, that armed conflict is not governed by rules, only that the rules, particularly those pertaining to non-international armed conflict, are more contested than those of criminal justice. See, for example, Luban 2013 on the different ways in which military lawyers and humanitarian lawyers interpret the laws of war.

12. This section draws on practices that, based on my interviews and other data sources, were common during the Second Intifada. However, some may be extensions or revivals of practices from earlier periods.

13. As a leading expert on the topic notes, several thousand research articles on entrepreneurship are produced each year (Shane 2003, 1). The review here is thus necessarily brief. For more comprehensive overviews see Shane 2003; Acs and Audretsch 2010; Busenitz et al. 2014; and Ireland and Webb 2007.

14. For reviews, see, for example, Covin and Miles 1999; Dess et al. 2003; Kuratko 2007, 2010; Phan et al. 2009; and Ireland, Covin, and Kuratko 2009.

15. See Casson 2005; Gifford 2010; McMullen and Shepherd 2006; Miller 2007; Shane 2003; and Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn 2009. On the distinction between uncertainty and risk see Jones and Butler 1992.

16. For a comparative analysis of the role of strategic culture in military change and innovation see Adamsky 2010.

17. See Burgelman 1983a, 1991; Floyd and Lane 2000; Floyd and Wooldridge 2000; Mintzberg 1978; Mintzberg and Waters 1985; Noda and Bower 1996; Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd 2008; and Mirabeau and Maguire 2014.

18. Research in economics has only recently begun to investigate the blame-shifting aspect of delegation. See, for example, Bartling and Fischbacher 2012; Paharia et al. 2009; Hamman, Loewenstein, Weber 2010; and Fox and Jordan 2011.

19. The notion of a principal delegating tasks to scrupulous agents turns principal-agent theory on its head, because agency theory largely concerns the law-abiding principal's efforts to curb the self-interest of her agents, given conflicts of interest and information asymmetries. In contrast, the situation here is one of a self-interested principal delegating responsibility to an agent so as to escape sanction.

20. The use of ambiguity and delegation does not necessarily implicate managers in illicit intentions. Intentions may be honorable and aimed at empowering subordinates or achieving organizational flexibility. Moreover, through strategic ambiguity, commanders can engage not only in "other deception" but also in "self-deception," allowing themselves to continue believing they are not engaged in any misconduct (Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007, 74).

21. See Sharon, "A Blow Is Sometimes an Integral Part of the Mission." Some of these terms include "demonstrating presence," "noisy patrol," "violent patrol," "inquiries,"

"noise-making," "disruption block," "creating uncertainty," and "creating a sense of being hunted."

22. See Sharon, "A Blow Is Sometimes an Integral Part of the Mission," for excerpts from the testimony.

23. Indeed, several of the entrepreneurial commanders mentioned in the interviews went on to develop successful military careers.

24. Bergman, "Code Name: Straw Widow." According to Bergman, these practices were first used by the IDF in Southern Lebanon and were later adapted to the Palestinian context by a battalion commander in the Paratroopers Brigade.

25. See interview with Kochavi in Weizman 2006.

26. In 2004 a group of former combat soldiers formed an organization called Breaking the Silence to raise awareness among the Israeli public regarding life in the Occupied Territories and the experiences of soldiers there. One of their first activities was an exhibit of filmed testimonies and photographs from Hebron, including a collection of approximately seventy keys that had been confiscated from Palestinian drivers. See Aviv Lavi, "Giving Occupation a Bad Name" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, June, 16, 2004; Merav Yudilovich, "Combatants Break the Silence" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, May 27, 2004.

27. See coverage of the incident at Chanan Greenberg, "Soldiers Suspected of Hijacking Taxi, Wounding Palestinian Bystander," *Ynet*, July 27, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3430654,00.html; Roy Sharon, "An Indictment against the Disguised Officer" [in Hebrew], NRG-*Maariv*, August 9, 2007, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/619/975.html.

28. See IDF press release, "Indictment against Officer Involved in Dahariya Incident," August 9, 2007, http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/Press+Releases/2007/08/0902.htm (no longer available online).

29. Several studies in recent years explore the bottom-up diffusion of military knowledge and practices through social networks: see, for example, O'Toole and Talbot 2010 and Kollars 2015; see Griffin 2017 for a recent review.

30. Excerpt from the state's response in HCJ 3799/02, *Adalah, et al. v. Yitzhak Eitan, Commander of the Israeli Army in the West Bank et al.*, May 7, 2002. The legal documents in the case in Hebrew are available at https://www.btselem.org/hebrew/human_shields/legal_documents.

31. See *Adalah, et al. v. Yitzhak Eitan*.

32. Bergman, "Code Name: Straw Widow."

33. "Mapping" indicates a practice in which soldiers cordoned and combed a particular zone, recording information about its homes and residents.

34. Both men appealed the conviction, with the appeals ultimately resulting in plea bargains that reduced the sentences. In the sergeant's case, the Appeals Court noted that the reprimand received by the brigade commander for his testimony was problematic because it could be interpreted as inappropriate meddling in criminal proceedings. See Gili Cohen, "The Hebron Shooter Case: The judge Convicted a Soldier Who Hit a Palestinian and Claimed Self-Defense" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, May 11, 2016.

35. Anshel Pfeffer, "MAG Avichai Mendelblitt Ordered an Investigation against Colonel Itay Virob" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, June 13, 2010.

36. See Yaakov Katz, "Controversial Commander's Promotion Draws Criticism," *Jerusalem Post*, August 16, 2011.

6. THE PRODUCTION AND CONTROL OF OPPORTUNISTIC VIOLENCE

1. For studies that adopt this approach see, for example, Gates 2002; Mitchell 2004; Weinstein 2007; and Wood 2006b.

2. Complete data do exist on casualties from lethal force, but in many of these cases strategic and opportunistic lethal violence are hard to distinguish.

3. The Israeli NGO Yesh Din was able to induce the IDF under the Israeli Freedom of Information Act to provide some limited data on internal investigations of criminal offenses by soldiers against civilians and their property per combat unit; see Yesh Din 2008 and discussion in chapter 1.

4. As an additional robustness test, the analysis was repeated on all four items separately. The core findings remain substantially unchanged, with the partial exception of taking private property, for which a few of the estimated effects in some of the models changed somewhat. Further research would be required to determine whether these changes result from the distribution of the item, which is the most skewed of all items in the index, or whether the logic of looting differs from the logic of other forms of opportunistic violence.

5. Yossi Yehoshua, "Abuses Are Revealed" [in Hebrew], *Yediot Ahronoth*, December 16, 2007. Abusive behavior was defined broadly in the report and included such items as physical abuse, verbal humiliation, taking bribes, and unlawful detention. An unnamed senior officer quoted in the article stated, "We knew there was a problem, but did not estimate it to be so severe."

6. The social-psychological literature on behavior toward outgroup members is vast. On the contempt elicited by low-status opponents, see Fiske et al. 2004; on moral disengagement see Bandura 1990, 1999, 2002; on dehumanization see Haslam 2006 and Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002; and on routinization see Kelman and Hamilton 1989.

7. See for example Yuval Azulay, "Kfir Soldiers Abuse, and Officers Admit: We Are in a Bad Period" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, February 24, 2008; Uri Blau, "Chief Education Officer in a Letter to Soldiers: Stop Printing Abusive Statements on Shirts" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, April 1, 2009; Amos Harel, "Officers Testified in Support of Givati Soldiers Convicted of Endangering a Child" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz*, October 26, 2010.

8. Respondents reported the durations of their own deployments with particular units, an indicator that is generally correlated with the length of deployments of their units as a whole. Some units served in particular zones for extended periods of time, leading to extended deployments for their individual members. For instance, the Kfir Brigade discussed later in this chapter was deployed solely to the West Bank, such that respondents who served in Kfir reported long deployments in that zone. Other units rotated between zones of deployment, thereby shortening the deployments of individual combatants in particular zones. For example, armored units rotated between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel's borders. Respondents who served in such units therefore typically served only a few months in the West Bank.

9. Service at the northern border and in Lebanon in the period under study provided almost no opportunities for contact with civilians. In Gaza direct contact with civilians was limited as well, because for the most part soldiers operated from within fortified posts protecting Israeli settlements and roads, leaving far fewer opportunities for opportunistic violence (see chapter 3 for further discussion).

10. One strand of research in criminology has advocated the use of tobit regression in the case of self-reported measures of delinquency, because these are characteristically skewed and bounded at zero, provided the dependent variable has first been transformed to reduce skewness (Osgood, Finken, and McMorris 2002). Tobit analysis of the multivariate models yielded similar results in terms of coefficient size and significance levels.

11. The Kfir infantry brigade was formed in 2005 by bringing together six battalions that had previously been subordinate to regional commands in the West Bank.

12. See, for example, Azulay, "Kfir Soldiers Abuse, and Officers Admit"; Shay Fogelman, "Negative Contexts: Incidents involving the Kfir Brigade in the Past Three Years," *Ha'aretz,* June 17, 2010, Amos Harel, "Kfir Brigade Leads in West Bank Violations" [in Hebrew], *Ha'aretz,* 11 May, 2008.

13. The Park Hotel suicide bombing was the most lethal terrorist attack in Israel's history, killing 30 Israelis and wounding 160 guests at a Passover celebration.

14. I surmised the existence of such a directive, since it was reported by several respondents who served in different units in similar time periods.

15. On this practice, see Public Committee against Torture in Israel Report, "No Defense: Soldier Violence against Palestinian Detainees," June 2008.

16. The Golani infantry brigade was particularly notorious for such rituals. One respondent described how after he and other junior soldiers had cleaned all of the bathrooms, the company sergeant made them do it again because the faucets were not turned toward the wall. Another described how after he and his friends had washed hundreds of dishes, the company sergeant arrived, poured oil and spices everywhere, and forced the soldiers to wash them again.

17. Available online at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399413.pdf.

18. On resistance by IDF soldiers in the Second Intifada, see Manekin 2017.

7. BEYOND ISRAEL

1. See for example Chris McGreal, "Send in the Bulldozers: What Israel Told Marines about Urban Battles," *The Guardian* April 2, 2003; Julian Borger, "Israel Trains U.S. Assassination Squads in Iraq," *The Guardian* December 9, 2003. See also Khalili 2010 for a general discussion.

2. Some, however, are based on blogs that were published during the Iraq War; see, for example, Buzzell 2005 and Gallagher 2010.

3. The number of Iraqi civilian casualties during the invasion and occupation was, of course, far higher, though the estimates are highly contested. The organization Iraq Body Count estimates that 132,764 Iraqi civilians died due to the violence between 2003 and 2013. See https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/announcements/5/.

4. On the U.S. rules of engagement in Iraq, see Khatchadourian 2009.

5. It also appears to be considerably more sexualized and misogynistic, see Wood and Toppelberg 2017 for further discussion of this issue in the U.S. context.

6. For historical analysis, see Shamir 2011. For an argument about recent trends toward more questioning of authority see Hajjar 2014.

7. See the U.S. Department of Defense website, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Casualty-Status.

8. Data from B'tselem, https://www.btselem.org/statistics.

9. The literature on this is large and growing. See, for example, Gordon and Trainor 2012; Ricks 2006; Kaplan 2013; and Woodward 2006, 2008.

10. On the events that led to this development and its significance see, for example, Kaplan 2013. The *Army Field Manual 3–24: Counterinsurgency*, is available online at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=468442.

11. For scholarly perspectives on this debate, see Isaac et al. 2008 and Porch 2013. For critical perspectives from within the military, see, for example, Gentile 2013.

12. My evidence suggests that even before the official change in doctrine, some units were already training soldiers to engage with Iraqi civilians. In the Marines, for example, interest in fighting insurgencies in the post-Vietnam era had been greater than in the army (Kaplan 2013). Former Marine officer, Nathan Fick (2006, 47–48), describes training for low-intensity conflict even before 9/11, which involved "passing out rice in one city block,

patrolling to keep the peace in the next, and engaged in a full-scale firefight in the third." Fick is referencing here "the three block war," an influential concept coined by former Marine General Charles Krulak (1999); see chapter 6.

13. My evidence does not allow me to assess the prevalence of this practice, though it clearly did not encompass all units. See for example Khatchadourian's *New Yorker* profile of one army brigade from the 101st Airborne Division, in which a soldier reports that his unit was not taught cultural awareness or given Arabic-language training.

14. This is not to suggest that such tactics replaced conventional warfare as the heart of soldier training. In both the Israeli and the U.S. case, I found that soldiers emerged from training most eager to participate in high-intensity combat (at least initially, before enduring the strains of prolonged deployment and suffering losses).

15. See, for example, Finkel's (2009) account of an army infantry battalion, in which searches produce Iraqi phones and items likely taken during operations alongside steroids and hard-core porn, or Khatchadourian's (2009) account of an infantry squad whose men sometimes confiscated alcohol from locals while their squad leader abused valium.

16. The squad leader became the first American soldier convicted of negligent homicide for his subordinates' actions. His case was eventually dismissed on appeal, and he was discharged under honorable conditions.

17. Several of the soldiers involved argued that the deaths were enabled by an aggressive command culture, insufficient clarity over the rules of engagement, and an excessive focus on offensive operations; see Khatchadourian 2009 for detailed coverage.

18. Statistics are from Frederick 2010, xvi.

19. Consistent with the argument in this book, Frederick (2010, 127) documents a number of more minor opportunistic violence incidents in the unit well before the rape and murders, as well as incidents of shirking from missions.

20. The investigation could not conclusively link the body to the man who had been pushed; see Filkins 2008, 163–65, for discussion.

21. Milicevic (2004, 108) notes that these are likely to be minimum estimates, with some arguing that in Belgrade as few as 15 percent of those called up actually reported for service.

22. See also Manekin 2017 for a discussion of underproduction of violence through resistance in the Israeli case.

23. See Ron 2003, 57–62 and Schlichte 2010 for further discussion.

24. Some of this testimony, for instance, indicates that Serbian paramilitaries were financed, equipped, and trained by the Serbian State Security Service (SDB). More generally, based on evidence from the trial, Glaurdić (2009) argues that the security structures under the direct control of Milosevic, chief among them the SDB, played a key role in planning and carrying out the war in Bosnia. However, even the phone intercepts he cites are remarkable for their degree of ambiguity.

CONCLUSION

1. See Conal Urquart, Ian Black, and Mark Tran, "Hamas Takes Control in Gaza," *The Guardian*, June 15, 2007.

2. Gisha 2007. Following the revolution in 2011, Egypt reopened the Rafah crossing, closed since the Hamas takeover, to Palestinian travel, although the shipment of goods remained blocked. Since the ouster of President Morsi in 2013 the crossing has generally remained closed, opening on occasion for brief periods.

3. Of the Palestinians killed, 1,392 were civilians; 62 of the Israeli casualties were soldiers. International organizations estimate that approximately 18,000 homes were

destroyed or heavily damaged, rendering more than 100,000 Palestinians homeless; see B'tselem 2016.

4. See the 2017 report of the United Nations country team in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (UNSCO 2017).

5. According to a RAND report, the IDF believed before the operation that it would be facing twenty-six battalions; see R. S. Cohen et al. 2017, 84.

6. See Israel Defense, "Showed up with Motivation" [in Hebrew], August 28, 2014, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/he/content/%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%95-%D7%A2%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%94.

7. Itay Blumenthal, "A Decline in Enlistment of Men, and a Decline in Motivation for Combat" [in Hebrew], *Ynet,* November 11, 2016. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4880035,00.html.

8. See Reut Wilf, "Determined Youth: A Rise in Enlistment Motivation during the Operation" [in Hebrew], NRG, August 24, 2014, https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART2/611/199.html.

9. Efraim Ya'ar and Tamar Herman, "August 2014 Peace Index." See also the report of a different survey with similar findings conducted by Yuval Feinstein, http://wordpress.haifa.ac.il/?p=4571.

10. Breaking the Silence 2015 (37), testimony 8.

11. Breaking the Silence 2015 (16) similarly observed, "While the testimonies include a number descriptions of inappropriate behavior by soldiers in the field, the more disturbing picture that arises from these testimonies reflects systematic policies that were dictated to IDF forces of all ranks and in all zones."

12. See, e.g., Avi Issacharov, "A Year to the Lone-Wolf Intifada: Created a Dramatic Rupture, but not with Israel," *Walla News*, October 2, 2016; Peter Beaumont, "Israel-Palestine: Outlook Bleak as Wave of Violence Passes Six Month Mark," *The Guardian,* March 31, 2016.

13. See, for example, the press release by nine Israeli human rights groups, "Politicians' Calls to Police and Soldiers to Shoot rather than Arrest Endorse the Killing of Palestinians," October 14, 2015, http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20151014_summary_execution_joint_statement.

14. The classification of an act as misconduct is distinct from the question of punishment. An act of violence may be a violation but nevertheless one that is not punished severely, for a variety of reasons. It is possible (though cannot be proven) that had the incident not been caught on camera it would have been dealt with as a disciplinary infraction rather than a criminal offense. Even as a criminal offense, the sentence of eighteen months is a minimal one for a manslaughter charge (an opinion voiced by the dissenting opinion of a minority of judges both in the trial and appellate courts). The military prosecutor Nadav Weisman argued, "A soldier convicted for manslaughter at the bottom end [of the punishment range] for playing with his weapon got four years in prison, so how does the appellant get a year and a half?" Quoted in Gili Cohen, "The Judge in the Azaria Appeal: It's Unclear Why the Soldier Is Considered Not Credible when His Company Commander Changed Versions," *Ha'aretz*, May 17, 2015.

15. Yoav Zeitun, "A Brigade in the Eye of the Storm: Kfir in the Shadow of the Terrorist Shooting Incident" [in Hebrew], *Ynet,* March 27, 2016.

16. Amir Buhbut, "Following the Wave of Terror: The Chief of Staff Ordered the Kfir Brigade to Transfer to Hebron" [in Hebrew], *Walla News*, November 20, 2015.

17. Yoav Zeitun, "Azaria's Father Warned the Brigade Commander: The Boy Is Desperate, God Forbid if Something Happens" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, July 12, 2016.

18. Yoav Zeitun, "The Punishment for Abandoning Weapons during the Attack: The Company Commander Was Suspended, Two Junior Commanders Were Dismissed" [in Hebrew], *Ynet*, March 6, 2016.

19. Much has been written about the doctrine of command responsibility, its strengths and limitations. See, for example, Osiel 2005; Martinez 2007; and Danner and Martinez 2005.

20. Moreover, criminal trials with their high evidentiary requirements are inherently slow, costly, and complex, resulting in extreme underenforcement and consequently in an absence of deterrence.

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